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Economic analyses of public policy typically focus on the detrimental effects of market 
failure. Because of inherent imperfections, a market may not function properly. Government is 
then called upon to rectify the situation. Implicit in this argument is that government 
intervention generates a net social gain; the gainers from the intervention can, in principle, 
compensate the losers. 
Proponents of U.S. agricultural price support policies often adopt this perspective. Recent 
studies, however, have cast some doubt on this argument. If anything, they suggest that such 
policies have generated net social losses. 
If agricultural price support policies do not benefit society, why, then.do they exist? 
Political scientists provide some insight into this matter. The electoral objectives together with 
certain Congressional institutions such as the committee/subcommittee system facilitate the 
passage of legislation that confers benefits to narrow interests while distributing the costs over 
larger, less organized interests. Political models, however, do not identify the underlying 
economic factors which define feasible policy outcomes. 
Some nontraditional economic models, notably those of Stigler, Peltzman, and Becker, do 
address the connection between economic conditions and policy outcomes. But these models 
are stripped of relevant political insitutions. Consequently, like their political science 
counterparts, they fail to completely describe the mapping from political preferences and 
economic phenomena onto policy outcomes. In short, neither class of models provides an 
adequate explanation for the existence of price supports. 
In this manuscript, I develop a formal political economy model of price supports that 
incorporates the interaction of economic forces, organizational costs, electoral objectives, and 
Congressional institutions in the enactment of price support legislation. My efforts are an 
Vll 
attempt to utilize certain aspects of microeconomic theory and political theory to construct a 
positive theory of agricultural price supports. Most studies have concentrated mainly on the 
welfare (normative) aspects of price support policies. Some have dealt with the political 
foundations but they fail to consider the normative implications. But who gains and who loses, 
and the extent and the distribution of the gains and losses, have a great deal to do with the final 
outcome. This inadequacy, I believe, derives from the absence of an analytical model within 
which the interaction of the economics and the politics of price support policies can be studied. 
A regulatory policy can be implemented in various ways. But for the most part, political 
scientists and economists have ignored or downplayed this characteristic. Consequently, their 
models do not have much predictive power. They cannot say much about the nature of a 
particular regulatory policy. 
Different instruments have been used to support prices of agricultural commodities (in the 
U.S.). Support programs have varied both across commodities and over time for a particular 
commodity. I expand my formal model to make it suitable for studying the implicit choice 
process. 
I use the model to generate two sets of hypotheses. The first set involves propositions 
pertaining to the relationship between selected exogenous economic and political variables and 
the level of price supports. The second set involves propositions pertaining to the relationship 
between a slightly different set of political and economic variables and the choice of method 
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My dissertation is motivated by a desire to integrate economics and political science. It 
stems from a realization that integration could lead to a better understanding of many 
phenomena that cannot be adequately explained by either economics or political science alone. 
One such phenomenon is the existence of inefficient policies, in particular, regulatory policies. 
Both political scientists and economists have studied this matter and have proposed possible 
explanations. But, with few exceptions, each group fails to transcend the barriers defined by its 
respective field: political scientists provide political analyses and economists economic 
analyses. Consequently, each presents only a partial view of the matter and gives inadequate 
policy prescriptions. Hence, a fuller grasp of this phenomenon, particularly the relationships 
among political preferences, economic factors, decision-making processes, and policy 
outcomes, is needed. But this can be achieved only through an interdisciplinary analysis. 
A closely related phenomenon is the choice of method in regulating a market. This is 
generally referred to as the problem of instrument choice. Given a market is to be regulated, 
how is the regulation to be implemented? Why is the regulation implemented differently across 
markets? Why does the character of the regulation change over time? These are questions that 
political scientists and economists have not addressed to any significant degree. But a cursory 
look at any regulatory policy is enough to convince one of its relevance and importance. Again, 
an interdisciplinary analysis provides a better grasp of the problem. 
Agricultural policy (U.S.) is a fertile ground for studying the two phenomena. The policy 
revolves fundamentally around price supports for select agricultural commodities. Studies have 
shown that price support programs have not been beneficial to society (Wallace, 1962; Johnson, 
1973; Heien, 1977; and Gardner, 1981), and that they vary considerably both across 
commodities and over time (Paarlberg, 1964; Johnson, 1973; Cochrane and Ryan, 1976). If 
such programs yield inefficiencies, then why do they exist? Why do we observe significant 
variation in the types of programs implemented? My dissertation represents an attempt to 
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explain the existence of price supports (in the United States) and to provide a foundation for a 
theory of instrument choice within a political economy framework. 
The manuscript is divided into three parts. Chapters one through four deal with the 
existence problem and chapters six and seven with the instrument choice problem. Chapter five 
provides a transition from the existence to the instrument choice problem. 
In the first chapter, I present the basic explanation forwarded by economists to rationalize 
the use of price supports-price stabilization at the mean. I argue that the kinds of price support 
programs one observes in the real world differ fundamentally from the price stabilization 
scheme assumed by economists-they necessarily make consumers worse-off. Thus, one must 
look elsewhere for an explanation, in particular at political science models. 
There exist "purely" political models of stable policy outcomes. Political scientists have 
used these models to rationalize the existence of inefficient policies. In the second chapter, I 
discuss and criticize two such models: the Shepsle model and models which defend equilibrium 
outcomes through the adoption of norms. I argue that both are deficient. First, they do not 
identify the underlying economic factors that determine political preferences and thus policy 
outcomes. And second, they assume radical relationships among legislators; the Shepsle model 
assumes a mutually hostile relationship between members and nonmembers of any given 
committee within a legislature, while the latter class of models assume relationships are 
completely fluid. This departs significantly from the actual workings of Congress. In the third 
chapter, I address this deficiency by amending the Shepsle model to accommodate bargaining 
between committee and noncommittee members. Specifically, I identify conditions that make 
some bargaining possible within a Shepsle framework. 
The fourth chapter focuses on the construction and testing of a model that is in theory 
better suited for studying the existence of price support programs. The model is based on the 
fundamental structure implicit in both the Shepsle model and the norm based models. 
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In the first section of the chapter, I create a political structure within which legislative 
decisions are made and link it with the underlying economic factors involved in evaluating the 
effect of price supports. I assume that decisions are made by a legislative body whose members 
are elected representatives from districts that make up the country. Election is by majority rule 
and each member's basic objective is to get reelected. I assume the body is decomposed into 
committees which in tum are divided into subcommittees; each committee is assigned a major 
legislative are(l-{)ne of which is price supports-and each subcommittee therein specializes in 
a certain aspect of the assigned area. I further assume that the assignment process is such that 
members of a subcommittee are precisely those who come from districts whose constituents 
could benefit from favorable legislation under the jurisdiction of the subcommittee. To link this 
structure with economic factors, I construct a preference function for an arbitrary member that 
is based on the economic gains and losses associated with an effective price support and the 
composition of his constituency: a price support above the free market level results in gains to 
producers and losses to consumers so that the electoral chances of each member depends in part 
on the outcome of price support legislation. Note that the gains and losses are derived from 
demand and supply which, in tum, are derived from individuals' preferences over commodities 
and firms' production functions. Thus, the model ultimately links basic economic factors with 
the political structure. In the latter part of the chapter, I show that the preferences of legislators 
as determined by economic gains and losses and the composition of their constituencies 
combined with the assumed political structure make possible the existence of price supports. 
This result depends in part on some form of bargaining between committee and noncommittee 
members such as the one described in the third chapter. 
In the second section, I do some comparative statics to establish predictions that the model 
makes regarding the response of price support levels to changes in economic and political 
parameters. Specifically, I look at the impact of technological improvement, the effect of input 
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restrictions, changes in the composition of a given district, and a change in the cohesiveness of 
producers as a group. In the last section, I then look at some empirical evidence. Specifically, I 
test the predictions against data from the U.S. feed grains markets. 
There are some nontraditional economic models that provide alternative analyses of the 
existence problem. But unlike the political models, they can or do deal with the instrument 
choice problem. Prominent among these are the Stigler/Peltzman and the Becker models. In 
chapter five I summarize and critique these models. Basically, I argue that the models are 
institution deficient Consequently, like the political models, they cannot provide an accurate 
mapping from political preferences onto policy outcomes and instrument choice. 
In chapter six, I extend my model to address the instrument choice problem. I develop a 
theory of choice for an individual legislator and use it to study the choice among production 
control methods associated with price support programs. Methods range from literally no 
restrictions--a pure price floor above the free market price-to severe restrictions--a 
production quota. I state and prove propositions that identify conditions that determine a 
legislator's choice. I show that, under certain conditions, a production quota will prevail over a 
pure price floor. In particular, if demand for the supported commodity is sufficiently inelastic, 
or supply is sufficiently elastic at equilibrium, then a legislator will choose the latter, but if 
demand were sufficiently elastic or supply sufficiently inelastic, then he would choose the 
former. I also show that if input restrictions were imposed in conjunction with a price floor, 
then a legislator may favor a price floor over a production quota. Finally, I perform some 
comparative static exercises to depict how the choice might change in response to changes in 
certain economic and political parameters: technological change, a rise in the cost of 
maintaining the surplus generated by a price support program, a rise in the magnitude of the 
surplus, a decline in the number of rural Congressional districts relative to metropolitan 
districts, and a change in the cohesiveness of producers and consumers. 
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To support the instrument choice predictions of the model, I devote the seventh chapter to 
an empirical analysis of eight agricultural markets where price supports have long existed, 
namely, wheat, com, grain sorghum, barley, oats, cotton, tobacco, and rice. Specifically, I list 
and explain each of the instruments that had been or were used to support prices in these 
markets during the period 1953 to 1972. I then use an ordered probit (econometric) model to 
test hypotheses about the choice among various production control methods. To facilitate the 
interpretation of the results, I give a brief explanation of an ordered pro bit model. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE NONOPTIMALITY OF PRICE SUPPORTS 
8 
A price support represents a fonn of interference in the market. If the demand for and the 
supply of a commodity are stable (more precisely, nonrandom), then a price support above the 
free market equilibrium would necessarily generate inefficiencies. Hence, as early as 1940, 
economists have attempted to rationalize price supports as a means of stabilizing price, which 
under certain conditions would benefit both producers and consumers. But, as I argue below, 
the schemes they assume are inconsistent with real world price support programs. 
Massell (1969) established conditions under which producers and consumers of a given 
commodity would benefit from the stabilization of the commodity's price at its expected value. 
In 1980, Turnovsky, Shalit, and Schmitz "modernized" Massell's arguments. They used the 
indirect utility function to determine the conditions required for a consumer to benefit from this 
kind of price stabilization scheme. Implicit in their analysis is that the producer always benefits 
from price stabilization; as I argue below, this is generally the case. Many others have 
discussed the benefits of this scheme. However, I will limit my discussion to the 
Turnovsky/Shalit/Schmitz argument since it is the most straightforward. 
A. Price Controls and the Consumer: 
Turnovsky/Shalit/Schmitz introduce an the indirect utility function v (p 1, •• ,pn; m ). By 
Roy's identity, 
(ovlop;) 
x; =- (ovlom) for all i = 1, ... ,n. (1.1) 
Letting A.= (ov !om) and differentiating (1.1) with respect to m yields, 
(1.2) 
For definiteness, let commodity 1 be the commodity whose price is to be stabilized and let 




v is strictly ·concave (convex) in p : az~ < ( >) 0. 
Clpl 
(1.3') 




p 1 = , with probability .5 
P1, 
If V is strictly concave then EV (p ~o · ) < V (O~o · ) and if it is strictly convex then 
Now from (1.1), 
or, 
(1.4) 
Substituting (1.2) into (1.4), 
(1.5) 
(1.6) 
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FIGURE 1.1 a 








Note that pis the Pratt/Arrow index of relative risk aversion, e 1 the consumer's own direct price 
elasticity of demand for commodity 1, Tit the consumer's income elasticity for commodity 1, 
and s 1 the commodity's share in the consumer's budget. Now the Slutsky equation implies, 
ax 1 [ ax 1 ] where ap
1 
lu-is the slope of the compensated demand function and e! = ap
1 
lu- (ptfx 1). 
Hence, 
(stCllt-P)-et)=(plxl/m)(llt-p)-(e!-Pt(axl/am)) 
= (plxl/m)(llt- P + (mlx 1)(ax 1!am)- e!) 
= St(2llt- p)- e! . 
Since x 1, p 1, and (av!am) are positive, then, from (1.6), sign( az~) = sign(s 1(2TI 1 - p)- e! ). Now · 
apl 
since e! is always negative, then the consumer will benefit from price stabilization only if 
(2ll1 - p) is negative, i.e., the consumer's relative risk aversion index must always be greater 
than twice his income elasticity for commodity 1. Note also that if (2ll 1 - p) were positive, then 
the consumer will be worseoff under stabilization. 
B. Price Controls and the Producer: 
In analyzing the decision making process of a producer under uncertainty, economists 
often assume that the producer is some risk-neutral firm that maximizes its expected profit. In 
some cases, though, the producer is not some big, impersonal entity. A farmer, for example, is 
not; his profit is generally his main source of income and therefore figures prominently in his 
decision calculus as a consumer. A price stabilization scheme involving the commodity he 
produces affects his utility primarily through his income. 
Assume for simplicity that a producer of commodity 1 provides for his own consumption 
of the commodity, e.g., a dairy farmer provides his own milk. Then his indirect utility function 
12 
and c ( · ) his cost function. Now differentiating m ( ·) once yields, 
(1.7) 
and twice, 
" U t I II II I 2 
m =p 1q 1 +2q 1 -(cq 1 +c(q 1)) (1.8) 
1 II I II I 2 
=(p 1 -c)q 1 +2q 1 -c (q 1 ) 
= q; (2- c "q;) . 
The producer will gain from price stabilization if and only if, 
(1.9) 
or, as above, if and only if V is strictly concave in p 1• Now (ov lop 1) = (ov !om )m' and 
(1.10) 
which is negative if and only if 





m m < (ovlom) · (1.11) 
Upon substituting (1.7) and (1.8) into (1.11), one gets 
(1.11') 
Multiplying both sides of (1.11 ') by (p 1 · q 1) results in, 
(1.12) 
Assuming the producer is risk averse then (a2y Jam 2)/(av Jam) is negative and so 
[- {(a2vlom 2)J(avJam)}m] is the Pratt/Arrow index of relative risk aversion. Note also that 
[(p 1/q 1)q; )] is the supply elasticity of commodity 1. Denoting this ~, (1.12) is equivalent to, 
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~(2- c"q;) < p(l + [c (q 1)/m]) (1.13) 
(1.13') 
Since (2- c"q~) is almost always negative then (1.13') is generally satisfied. That is, the 
producer generally benefits from price stabilization at the mean. 
C. Real versus Theoretical Schemes: 
The preceding arguments are based on the assumption that price is stabilized at its mean. 
The government introduces measures to keep it from rising or falling. However, this is not the 
kind of price support scheme that one observes in the real world. Such schemes generally keep 
price from falling below a certain predetermined level but do little or nothing to keep it from 
rising. This necessarily makes consumers worseoff. By cutting off the lower end of the price 
distribution, such schemes deprive consumers of low prices and occasionally make them pay 
high prices. This point can be proven more rigorously. 
Let V (p 0, p; m) be the indirect utility function of the consumer, where p is the price of the 
supported commodity, m his money income, and Po a price vector of all other commodities. 
Let f (p) be the density of the price p with support at [pL, Pu1· Then, in the absence of a price 
support program, the consumer's expected utility is, 
P. 
E(V) = f V(po.p; m)f(p)dp. 
If a price support program with cutoff point at p is implemented, then his expected utility would 
be, 
~ ~ 
E(V) = J V(p 0 ,p; m)f(p)dp + V(p 0,p; m- t(j)))j f(p)dp 
14 
where t(p) is the tax the government collects from him to maintain the support program. Now, 
ji P. 
E(V)= f v{p 0,p;m)f(p)dp + f V(po,p;m)f(p)dp. 
Oearly, since V(p 0,p ; m) is greater than or equal to V(p 0,P; m- t(j))) for all p e [pL . Pu1 then, 
ji ji 
J V (p O• p ; m )f (p )dp > V (p O• p; m - t (j))) J f (p )dp . 
Hence, E (V) > E (V), i.e., the consumer is worseoff under the program. 
A price support policy that is designed to stabilize prices in order to make both consumers 
and producers betteroff must necessarily chop off the price distribution at both ends of the 
spectrum. This, in fact, is the main idea behind the theoretical price stabilization schemes 
discussed earlier. And, once again, these are not the kinds of schemes we observe. Thus, real 
world price support policies cannot be rationalized on strict economic grounds. But how, then, 




ON THE EXISTENCE OF PRICE SUPPORTS 
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CHAPTER2 
THE EXISTENCE PROBLEM AND 
RELEVANT POLITICAL MODELS 
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Political scientists have developed models to try to explain observable phenomena that 
cannot be justified strictly on economic grounds-in particular the existence of price supports. 
In this chapter I will give a synopsis of two fundamental classes of models relevant to the 
existence problem: the Shepsle-based models and the norm-based models. I will then point out 
their weaknesses and argue why a better model needs to be developed. 
The ultimate goal of a congressman (or senator for that matter) is to get re-elected. To do 
this, he needs to maintain the continued support of his constituents. To get and keep their 
support, he has to use his influence within Congress to persuad~ bureaucrats to provide them 
with material benefits and/or services. Bureaucrats, on the other hand, desire (or at least are 
assumed to desire) budget security. To attaining this objective, they accommodate the requests 
of legislators particularly those who can exercise significant influence on the size of their 
budgets. Accommodation often means doing a congressman's (or senator's) constituents a 
service or providing them with some particularized benefit. Figure 2.1 summarizes this 
legislator-constitUency-federal agency relationship. Given the nature of this relationship, it is 
not surprising that incumbents remain in Congress for many terms, and that membership in the 
various Congressional committees has remained relatively stable over time. Indeed, this is the 
thrust of Fiorina 's (1978) rationale for the vanishing marginals. Congressmen have gradually 
switched emphasis in strategies from a predominantly policy-making to a predominantly pork 
barrel/casework approach. Consequently, given the goals of bureaucrats and constituents, an 
incumbent more often than not gets re-elected. 
The net result of this institutionalized relationship is, first of all, a tendency to focus bills 
that generate particularized benefits. That is, legislators are more inclined to act on bills that 
would yield significant benefits to their constituents. Such bills make the involved bureaucracies 
happy (since they augment budgets) and consequently enhance a legislator's electoral chances. 
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government accomplishment for which he can believably generate a sense of responsibility. 
For the average congressman, the staple way of doing this is to traffic in what may be called 
'particularized benefits' ."2 The relationship also tends toward servicing the better organized. 
"There is deference toward nationally organized groups with enough widespread local clout to 
inspire favorable roll call positions on selected issues among a majority of members · · · there 
is deference toward groups with disposable electoral resources whose representatives keep a 
close watch on Congressional maneuvers."3 Lastly, it foments an inclination toward 
symbolism-the passage of legislation _that expresses an attitude but no policy prescription or 
that contains a prescription which is not pursued. "Perhaps the best examples of congressional 
symbolism are those arising out of efforts to regulate business. Regulatory statutes are the by-
products of congressional position taking at times of public dissatisfaction. They tend to be 
vaguely drawn."4 
The success of this relationship-sometimes referred to in the literature as "the cozy little 
triangles"5-has depended very much on institutions that have developed within Congress. 
Perhaps the three most significant are the committee/subcommittee system, the rules, and the 
Congressional norm of reciprocity. 
Each chamber of Congress-the House of Representatives and the Senate-is divided into 
committees, and in tum many committees are subdivided into subcommittees. Each 
subcommittee (or committee if not subdivided) is given jurisdiction over one or more policies. 
For instance, a majority of the subcommittees ~ithin the Agricultural Committee of the House 
of Representatives is more or less responsible for legislation pertaining to one farm commodity. 
And in general, congressmen and senators are assigned to those committees with jurisdiction 
over legislation that directly or indirectly affects their constituents.6 Thus, committee 
assignments promote and maintain the triangles. 
Assignments to the various committees are made by members of the Committee on 
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Committees (CC), usually party leaders. Each member of this committee has an inherent desire 
to maintain and increase influence in the chamber. If he can place House members for whom he 
is responsible, e.g., members of his state delegation, in their desired positions, then he will 
indirectly increase his influence. In the future, he can ask and normally will get from these 
members assistance on legislative matters, such as getting a certain bill passed. He is, of 
course, faced with certain constraints: certain rules for making committee assignments, desires 
of interest groups, and the desires or requests of other CC members. Nevertheless, through the 
process of restrained advocacy, he manages to place many of those under his "protectorship" in 
desirable positions.7 Each CC member tries his best to accomodate other members' requests in 
negotiating committee assignments, e.g. increasing the size of membership in a committee 
whenever possible to accomodate conflicting interests. 
The nature of the committee system is only part of the explanation for the persistence of 
the triangles. The objectives of legislators are oftentimes in conflict with each other. This may 
lead to the possibility of endless debates, i.e., majority rule cycling. The following (famous) 
example indicates the nature of the problem. Suppose there are three legislators, 1, 2, and 3, and 
three policies, A, B, and C, to choose from to attain a certain objective. Suppose further that the 
preferences of the legislators are represented by those in Table 2.1 below: 
TABLE 2.1 
Ranking of Voters 
Preferences 1 2 3 
1 A c B 
2 B A c 
3 c B A 
Oearly, under simple majority rule, A would defeat B, B would defeat C, but C would defeat 
A . Thus, simple majority rule would be intransitive, resulting in the possibility of endless 
"cycling" (see Arrow (1951) and McKelvey (1978)). Congress has established certain rules to 
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guard against "cycling". For instance, in the above example, if B and C were in fact amended 
versions of A, then a modified closed rule with two allowable amendments, B and C, would 
prevent cycling in the above example. 8 In many cases, committees use the rules as part of their 
strategy to get their bills passed by the whole chamber. Without the rules intense conflicts 
would be difficult if not impossible to resolve.9 
In a seminal article on the impact of institutional arrangements on the decision-making 
process of a legislative body (1978), Shepsle shows convincingly that amendment rules and 
jurisdictional arrangements make it possible for legislators to reach a decision, and that the 
distribution of legislators' preferences affects the nature of the decision. His main argument 
boils down to the following: assuming an issue can be quantified so that the set of issues can be 
represented by a compact set in Euclidean spaceR (where m is the number of issues), if the 
correspondence between jurisdictions and the standard basis vectors of R is one-to-one, if 
amendments to proposed changes must be germane, and if preferences of each legislator over 
issues are single-peaked in the direction of any basis vector, then a "structure induced" 
equilibrium exists. 
A jurisdiction is a set of issues over which a committee within the legislative body has 
authority. In Euclidian space it is represented by a subset of the standard basis of R"', 
{et> e 2, .. • • e,.} where ek = (0, ... ,0, lb 0 .... ,0). A one-to-one correspondence between 
jurisdictions and the standard basis vectors means that a jurisdiction is restricted to one issue, 
i.e., one basis vector ek. Shepsle calls this kind of jurisdictional arrangement simple. 
An amendment refers to a change in the current state of affairs-the status quo. 
Germaneness under simple jurisdictions means that changes that the whole body can make over 
a proposal forwarded by a committee are restricted to "movements in the direction of the single 
basis vector" representing the single issue whose current state the committee proposes to 
change. At this point, I wish to make clear an assumption which Shepsle makes implicitly: a 
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change. At this point, I wish to make clear an assumption which Shepsle makes implicitly: a 
committee (or subcommittee) may have several jurisdictions, but it can only introduce changes 
one jurisdiction at a time. For example, if the committee has control over two jurisdictions, it 
cannot simultaneously propose a change in each. 
Shepsle's assumption regarding preferences simply means that a legislator has a unique 
most-preferred point along any line parallel to a basis vector. In Figures 2.2a through 2.2c, I 
give examples illustrating the three assumptions, given there are only two issues, i.e., m = 2. In 
Figure 2.2a, the two simple jurisdictions are represented by the vectors e = (1, 0) and e = (0, 1). 
Proposals to change the status quo x and any amendments thereafter are limited to movements 
in the direction of e 1 or of e2; they must lie on line 1° or zrr. This is the restriction imposed by 
simple jurisdictions and germaneness. Figure 2.2b depicts a legislator with "eliptical" 
oj oj 
preferences. The legislator has a bliss or ideal point at (x1, x~ and his indifference curves are 
ellipses. Moreover, any point on an ellipse, such as z, would be preferred by him to any other 
point on larger ellipses, such as z '. Thus, along any given line parallel to e 1 (e ~. such as l (I), he 
has a most-preferred point z • (l)(z • (1))--he would prefer this point to any other point on l (I\ 
Alternatively, his utility function along a line parallel to e 1 (e~ is single-peaked and strictly 
concave.10 
A structure-induced equilibrium is a point in the issue space X contained in Rm that cannot 
be altered under simple majority rule, given prespecified restrictions on jurisdictional 
arrangements and the amendment process; its position, and even its existence, depends on the 
jurisdictional arrangements and amendment rules adopted. 11 Shepsle shows that under simple 
jurisdictions and germaneness of amendments a structure induced equilibrium exists. His proof 
can be explained graphically. 
Consider the case of five legislators with eliptical preferences over two issues (m = 2) and 
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that any point on it corresponds to the legislator's most-preferred choice along a line that is 
parallel to e 1 and that cuts through the point. For instance, z is his most-preferred point along I 
and i along [. Figure 2.3b illustrates the same preferences but with a different line, Lj (2) . Any 
point on Lj (2) corresponds to the legislator's most-preferred choice along a line passing through 
the point and parallel to e2• For example, w is his most-preferred point on (and w on/'. 
The assumed preferences of each legislator together with his respective lines Lj (k ), 
j = 1, ... , 5 and k = 1, 2, are illustrated in Figure 2.3c. The lines Lj (1) are reproduced in Figure 
2.3d and the "median voter" line for issue 1, L(l), superimposed on it. The "median voter" line 
is derived in the following way. Pick any arbitrary line parallel toe 1 such as l in Figure 2.3d. 
Along this line, legislator 5 is the median voter. Recall that the intersection of Lj (1) with l 
represents legislator j's most-preferred choice along/; hence, legislatorS's most-preferred 
choice along l would be the median along l. Suppose we pick some other line such as (. Then, -
by the same reasoning, legislator 1 's most-preferred choice would be the median along(. If we 
do this for all possible lines parallel to e 1 then we would end up tracing the line L(1). In short, 
each point on L(l) represents the median voter's choice along some line parallel to e 1. 
Similarly, the lines Lj (2) are reproduced in Figure 2.3e with the "median voter" line for 
issue 2, L(2). A point on L(2) represents the median voter's choice along a line parallel to e2• 
For example, legislator 3 's most preferred choice along [, w 3(l), is the median along [. 
Both "median voter" lines L(l) and L(2) are reproduced in Figure 2.3f. Their intersection .i 
is a structure-induced equilibrium under simple jurisdictions and germaneness. To see this, 
assume i is the status quo. Because jurisdictions are simple, a committee can only propose a 
change either along [ or t but not both. Assume the committee with authority over issue 1 is 
composed of legislators 1, 2, and 3, and suppose it proposes z as an alternative to i. The whole 
body (the five legislators) can amend this proposal. However, since amendments must be 
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choice along[, then clearly it would dominate any proposal along t. Thus z would ultimately 
be defeated by i. The same argument can be made for proposals along r. 
Norm-based models provide an alternative explanation for stable outcomes. Cooperation, 
implicit or explicit, is another way that cycles may be avoided. Political scientists often refer to 
the reciprocity norm among members within each chamber as an institution that greases the 
legislative machinery, reducing internal conflicts to minimal levels. In a clever piece of work, 
Axelrod explains why Congress would adopt such a norm. He argues that any two legislators 
in conflict are in some sense faced with a prisoner's dilemma. Consequently, they may not 
arrive at an agreement. In game theory, this in effect means the absence of a stable solution to a 
single play of a two-person prisoner's dilemma game. Axelrod shows that in an infinite number 
of plays of this game, a stable solution, a so-called Nash equilibrium, does exist. If each player 
pursued a tit-for-tat strategy vis-a-vis the other, then neither would have any incentive to use a · 
different strategy, for this would only make him worseoff. A player follows a tit-for-tat strategy 
if he "cooperates" on the first play of the game and then in succeeding plays does whatever the 
other player did in the previous play of the game. More specifically, legislator j would vote for 
legislator k 's sponsored bill the first time around, but in succeeding session would vote fork's 
bill only if k had voted for his favored bill the last time around. Axelrod then states and proves 
the following proposition: if a sufficient number of individuals mutually cooperating with each 
other is infused into a group which is composed of mutually uncooperative individuals, and the 
former play a tit-for-tat strategy with the latter, then over time the latter will realize that 
cooperation is the best strategy. The import of this proposition is that eventually reciprocity 
becomes the norm in a legislative body such as the House of Representatives and the Senate. 
The last of his propositions implies that reciprocity, once established, will remain the norm. If a 
nice strategy such as tit-for-tat cannot be invaded by a single individual then it cannot be 
invaded by any cluster of individuals. 12 
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Both types of political models provide an answer to the question of the existence of price 
support programs. The interaction of electoral objectives and congressional institutions makes it 
possible for producers to obtain and maintain favorable price support legislation. However, the 
model is deficient. First, it does not address the link between economic factors and legislators' 
preferences and thus policy outcomes. Price support policies (as well as most other economic 
policies) affect and divide the constituents of a legislator. A price support affects demand and 
supply in a way that yields losses to consumers/taxpayers and gains to producers. Thus it 
divides a legislator's constituency into two opposing groups and, via the electoral objective, 
induces legislators preferences over the price support issue. 
This deficiency becomes obvious when one considers changes in economic conditions. For 
example, a shift in demand and/or supply alters the loss-gain configuration (of a price support 
policy) and thus the responsiveness of consumers and producers within a legislator's 
constituency. The latter in turn alters the preferences oflegislators and consequently the policy 
outcome. In terms of a spatial model, changes in economic conditions ultimately move the 
ideal points oflegislators, and thus are likely to change the equilibrium outcome. In short, the 
political model cannot adequately deal with changing economic conditions. 
Second, the models assume either a world in which there is no bargaining or one 
characterized by complete harmony. Shepsle-based models disregard logrolling that frequently 
goes on in Congress. Norm-based models, on the other hand, assume that logrolling is to be 
expected. Neither class is very useful in analyzing the behavior of a specific committee (more 
precisely, members thereof) vis-a-vis the rest of the chamber. Committees generally face a 
hostile environment on the floor, but, often enough, manage to form and defend a logroll with 
other legislators. 
And last, because it does not adequately address the relationship between economic factors 
and legislators' preferences, the political models cannot help resolve the problem of instrument 
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choice. A price support can be maintained using different methods. Economic factors 
determine in part the gains and losses stemming from a particular method, and thus are crucial 
for determining which method is best for whatever criterion is used. It is when such economic 
considerations are combined with political ones that we achieve insights into why particular 
policy instruments are chosen. 
In the next chapter I will present a voting model which identifies conditions under which a 
committee can successfully create and defend a logroll with noncommittee members whose 
preferences conflict with those of its members. The conditions, in fact, are representative of 
those facing the Agricultural Committee, at least in the House. The model can be thought of 
roughly as a Shepsle model with bargaining. 
In chapter four I will develop a simple formal model that is capable of explaining why 
price support programs might exist. Like the political models, the model which I develop takes · 
into account electoral objectives, political factors, the committee system, and jurisdictional 
arrangements. In addition, however, it includes economic factors and employs some notion of 
committee influence. The model generates testable implications concerning the behavior of 
price supports. I derive some comparative static predictions from the model and, in the last 
section of the chapter, then test these predictions statistically using data from selected U.S. 
agricultural markets. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER TWO 
1. See, for instance, Mayhew (1974), Fiorina (1977), Ferejohn (1977), Arnold (1979), and 
Fenno (1973). 
2. Mayhew, D.R 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
3. Mayhew, op cit 
4. Mayhew, op cit 
5. Fenno, in particular, gives a good discussion of the "cozy little triangles" in his book 
Congressmen in Committees (1973). 
6. See Shepsle's The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle (1978). 
7. See Shepsle (1978). 
8. Assume B is first pitted againsr A and then C against the winner. Given that at most two 
amendments are allowed then the game tree would be as follows: 
B c c A 
Given the preferences of the three legislators, B would defeat A in the second round C 
would defeat B . Thus C would win. 
9. See William Riker (1958) and Stanley Bach (1981) for a discussion of the effect of rules 
on Congressional decision making. 
10. A utility function U :X -+ R that is continuous and strictly quasi-concave has a unique 
most preferred point along lines parallel to the basis vectors provided its domain X is 
compact 
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11. In the degenerate case-no rules-an equilibrium may not exist. Moreover, even if one 
exists, it would be highly unstable in the sense that it could be eliminated by a slight 
change in the preference of a single legislator (see Plott, 1960). 
12. An individual invades a strategy if he tries to make himself better off by using some other 
strategy while the others continue to use the strategy. 
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CHAPTER3 
COMMITTEE POWER IN A SHEPSLE WORLD 
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Much of the work on the power of committees over policy outcomes stems from the 
seminal work of Shepsle (1978). Shepsle demonstrates that institutional structures-a 
committee system, jurisdictional arrangements, and amendment rules-act to constrain choices 
among alternative policy bundles and consequently minimize the possibility of majority rule 
cycles inherent in institution-free voting environments. Two major implications follow from 
this. First, a majority voting equilibrium exists in a structured environment (called a structure-
induced equilibrium). And second, committees will have some degree of influence over the 
character of the equilibrium. 
The literature on committee power attributes power to a committee's ability to control 
agendas (Denzau and Mackay, 1983; Fiorina and Plott, 1978; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1985; 
Krehbiel, 1985; Plott and Levine, 1978; Shepsle and Weingast, 1984). A committee can 
influence policymaking in the following way: it may choose not to propose any changes to 
policies over which it has jurisdiction, i.e., gatekeeping. Or, through the strategic use of 
amendment rules, it may restrict the set of alternatives and limit the possible paired 
comparisons among these alternatives. In either case, the committee manipulates the outcome. 
Implicit in this literature, it seems, is the assumption that bargaining with noncommittee 
members is infeasible or yields inferior outcomes. It is generally assumed that a committee 
faces a competitive, if not hostile, environment on the floor. This is not at all surprising since it 
has been convincingly argued that potential winning coalitions are essentially unstable (Cohen, 
1979; McKelvey, 1976 and 1979; Schofield, 1978). These instability results are derived, 
however, from institution-free models. In this chapter I argue that institutional arrangements 
may endow a committee with some bargaining power. Specifically, I show that if a committee 
is given jurisdiction over a policy that does not yield benefits to its members but may yield 
potential benefits to a sufficient number of legislators outside the committee (an "extraneous" 
jurisdiction), then the committee can create and defend a winning coalition. 
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In my analysis I attribute an expanded role to jurisdictional arrangements in providing a 
committee with influence. Previous work accords an "agenda control" role to such 
arrangements: assignment of jurisdictions to a committee gives the committee a "first move" 
advantage and consequently some ability to control the agenda within these jurisdictions. I 
demonstrate that, given a committee has the prerogative to form a coalition with noncommittee 
members and to choose the composition of the coalition (see, for instance, Ferejohn, 1984), 
then, depending on their nature, these arrangements may also confer some bargaining power to 
the committee. 
The situation I posit is not a purely theoretical construct. Ferejohn (1984) and Ripley 
(1969) have pointed out that control over Food Stamps legislation combined with the above 
mentioned institutional structures have given the the Agricultural Committee significant 
leverage over the passage of controversial price support programs.1 As stated by Ferejohn: 
Congressional committees, it is argued, have a monopoly right to initiate legislation 
within their own jurisdictions. Moreover, at least in the House, rules of germaneness 
require that amendments brought against such proposals are confined to the subject 
matter of the proposal. When legislation is reported by committees, legislative 
consideration is managed by the committee leaders and is governed by rules of 
amendment that require that, in the end, the bill as amended is voted up or down . . 
the legislated outcome is achieved by packaging congressionally favored foodstamps 
legislation with less popular commodities programs.2 
A. The Basic Assumptions 
To start with, I assume a committee has the ability to choose which members of the 
legislature (outside the committee) it will collude with and, likewise, can package its members ' 
projects together with projects that are beneficial to those legislators it has included in the 
coalition. For the latter, I am, in effect, assuming that the committee has jurisdiction over the 
projects of the other legislators or equivalently can package them in such a way that they fall 
within its jurisdiction. I let C represent the committee, V the set of legislators chosen by C to 
be part of the coalition, and S the rest of the legislature.3 One can think of V as the swing or 
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pivotal group whose votes C wishes to attract and (C u V) as the coalition C chooses. For 
facility , I let n be the size of the legislature, n 1 the size of C, n 2 the size of V, and n 3 the size of 
S .3 I assume n is odd and both n 1 and n2 are less than [(n- 1)/2]-neither C nor V form a 
majority. The latter implies that (C u V) and (S u V) constitute a majority and thus a potential 
winning coalition, i.e., (n 1 + nz);;::: [(n + 1)/2] and (n 2 + n 3);;::: [(n + 1)/2]. 
To simplify matters, I assume that members of C each have identical projects of scale x 1, 
each yielding benefits b 1 (x 1) and costs c 1 (x 1) to his constituents. Furthermore, I suppose that C 
can offer each member of V a project of scale x2 with benefits b 2(xz) and costs c2(xz).
4 The cost 
of any project is spread out equally across all districts. Thus, if all the projects oflegislators in 
(C u V) are approved, then the cost to each district is (lln)[n 1c 1(x 1) + n 2c 2(xz)], which we denote 
c (x 1, x z). The benefit and cost functions satisfy the following properties: for j = 1, 2, 
b; > 0, b/ < 0, b/0) = 0' 
c; > 0, cj" > 0, cj (0) = 0 , 
and letting 




These properties imply that there is some~ > 0 such that Pj (~) = 0. Since [0, ~] is compact 
and Pj continuous then ij = arg~ Pj(xj) exists; in fact, ij is an interior point. I illustrate this 
[0,>) 
in Figure 3.1 below. 
The objective of C -type legislators is to get their projects approved by the floor. Being in 
the minority, they cannot do this without the support ofnoncommittee members. To obtain the 
necessary support, they formulate an omnibus bill composed of their projects, as well as those 
of the V -type legislators, and propose it to the floor. We denote this bill (x 1,xz) and the payoff 









The payoff to an S -type legislator is, of course,[- c (x 1, x:J] . I assume the payoff functions 
satisfy, 
(3.2) 
Property (3.2) implies that for some neighborhood N of (i 1, i:J, Mj(x 1, x:J > 0 for all (x 1, x:J in 
N . We depict this in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b. 
Finally, I assume that a legislator's preferences over payoffs to his constituents are 
representable by a concave strictly increasing function u 1• This implies the following: for any 
bill (xl> x:J and any al> a 2 > 0, if i E C, 
ifi E V, 
ifi E S, 
ui (c (x 1 - al> x:J) > ui (c (xl> xi) , 
ui (c (x 1> x2 - a:J) > ui (c (x 1> xi)), and 
ui (c(x 1 - a 1, x 2 - ai) > ui(c(x 1, x:J). 
I am, of course, assuming Mj (x 1, x:J > 0. Note that (0, 0) is assumed to be the status quo, and 
that any member of (C u V) prefers (x 1, x:J to (0, 0), and any member of S prefers (0, 0) to 
(x 1, x:J. 
The character of the committee's (C) power differs with respect to the designated rules for 
amending the bill and the response of the S -type legislators, whether they behave collusively or 
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B. Noncollusion by S 
Closed Rule: 
Under a closed rule, C proposes a bill (x 1,x:z) which the floor then must vote up or down; 
we will call this game VG 1 (voting game 1). By hypothesis, all S -types will vote against the 
bill. Thus the outcome depends on how the members of (C u V) vote. Each member of the 
coalition is faced with three possible situations: E 1-a sufficient number (greater than or equal 
to (n + 1)/2) of his colleagues in (C u V), excluding himself, vote for the bill, E 2-his vote is 
pivotal, and E r-less than (n - 1 )/2 of his colleagues, excluding himself, vote for the bill. 
The payoff matrix of a V -type is depicted in Table 3.1 below. The term m 11, is the payoff to 
the legislator's constituents if he plays his zth strategy and the k th situation occurs-/ = 1, 2 and 
k = 1, 2, 3. If E 1 occurs, then the outcome is the same regardless of how the legislator votes. 
Thus, m 11 = m21 • Since the bill is approved,then 
vote is inconsequential, and so m 13 = 0. However, if E 2 occurs, then his vote is crucial. If he 
votes for the bill, then the bill passes, and his payoff is m 12 = M lx" x :z). If he rejects the bill, 
then it fails, and he gets nothing, i.e., m22 = 0. Thus, v 1 is a dominant strategy for a V -type 
legislator. The same argument can be made for a C -type legislator. Consequently, the bill 
passes under a closed rule. An equilibrium then is characterized by an up vote from C -type and 
V -type legislators. 
TABLE 3.1 
E, £2 £3 
1 v, mll m 12 = b2(x 1)- -[n1c 1(x 1) + n2c2(x:z)] ml3 n 
y2 m21 m 22 =0 m23 
The situation is more complex under a germaneness rule. I tum to this in the next section. 
45 
Germaneness Rule: 
An amendment can be represented by a pair (a~> a:J where ai is a change in the scale xi. I 
define germaneness as follows: an amendment is germane if and only if a 1 = 0 or a 2 = 0 but not 
both. Thus, the bill can be altered only one dimension at a time; the same is true for any 
amended version of the bill. 
Germane amendments (to the bill and to amended versions) that scale down projects will 
dominate floor voting. Thus, at any stage of the amendment process the amended bill being 
considered represents a scaling down of the C -type projects or the V -type projects (but not 
both). I present an example in Figure 3.3. The initial amendment scales down the C -type 
projects by a?, which of course passes. In the second stage, an amendment to contract the V-
type projects by a i is proposed and accepted. The third stage amendment (0, - a f) reduces the 
C -type projects even further. The process continues until some final stage T . I denote the final 
amended version of the bill by (x;, x; ). 
Clearly, the outcome of the amendment process is uncertain; any pair (x 1, x:J has a 
probability (perllaps zero) of being the final amended version. Thus, when deciding whether to 
accept the initial amendment or not, a V -type legislator must effectively choose between a 
certain alternative that yields a positive return and a risky one which may yield a higher or 
lower (perhaps even negative) retum.6 Now let F (x 1, x2; af, x?, x f) be the cumulative 
distribution function that describes the probability that, given a proposed bill (x P, x f) and an 
initial amendment (a 1, 0) or (0, a:J, the outcome of the process satisfies x~ ~ x2 and x; ~ x 2. 
Assume a density function for F exists and is given by f (x 1, x2; ai0 , xP, xf). Then, if the initial 
amendment is approved a V -type knows that the net benefits to his constituents would be, 
.%1 .%2 
E 0M 2(x 1,xz) = J J M2(x 1,xz)f(x 1,x2; af,xP ,xf) d.x 1dxz .1 
0 0 
Hence, assuming his preference function is linear with respect to constituents' net benefits, a 
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V -type will reject the initial amendment to the bill if and only if, 
(3.3a) 
Similarly, a C -type will reject the initial amendment if and only if, 
(3.3b) 
That is, if both conditions are satisfied, then a dominant strategy for either a C -type or V -type 
legislator is to reject the initial amendment. 
Given the nature of the amendment process, the probabilities will be weighted heavily 
toward small values of x 1 and x2• The following assumption reflects this: there exists values xf 
and x~ such that, for any proposal <xP, xf) and any initial amendment a/. the support off is 
contained in the set= {(x 1,xz): x 1[xf, 0] and x 2[0, x~]} and furthennore that 
Given this assumption, the committee C can always construct a proposal (xf, xf) that 
yields positive returns to constituents of both C -type and V -type legislators-it can bargain 
with V- and at the same time can be defended on the floor. Fonnally, we have, 
PROPOSITION 3.1: 
There exists a neighborhood N' ~ N (where N is as defined above) such that, for any 
(x P, xf) E N' and any a/. conditions (3.3a) and (3.3b) will be satisfied. 
Proof: 
Let the initial proposal of C be (i 1, i0 and consider any aj. By definition, 
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legislators are risk averse, then the necessary and sufficient conditions for a C -type or V -type to 
reject any amendment to the proposal are weaker: 
(3.4) 
For similar reasons, germane amendments that scale up projects will tend to be voted 
down. Suppose, for instance, that an amendment (0, ai) is initially proposed. The scale of the 
V -type projects will be increased by a i if the amendment were accepted. The amendment 
would reduce the payoff to a C -type. Hence, it is equivalent to one which scales down the 
projects of the C -types and consequently would invite retaliatory measures from the C -types. 
Based on the preceding arguments, the V -types would be betteroff (in an expected value sense) 
with the initial bill (x?, x~) than with the probabilistic outcome of the retaliatory process. 
Hence, they would reject the amendment and thus keep the bill intact. 
I now give two examples. First, consider the case a? =- x?. That is, the initial 
amendment (a?, 0) deletes projects of C -type legislators from the proposal. This guarantees 
retaliation by C in the next stage with an amendment (0, a2J with a2 =- x~. Thus, both V -types 
and C-types are sure ofthe agenda implied by the initial amendment and so can vote 
sophisticatedly. I illustrate the game in Figure 3.5. Given the preferences of legislators, the 
sophisticated equivalent outcome at node 3 is (0, 0); that is, with probability one, the outcome 
under the implied amendment process is M 1 (0, 0) = M 2(0, 0) = 0 which is less than M1 (x?, x ~ ). 
Thus, all legislators in (C u V) will reject the initial amendment. 
Next. consider the density function, 
{ 
0 • • 
p ,x 1 =x 1 , and x 2 =x2 







That is, the amendment process always results in either (x;, x;) or (0, 0) with their 
probabilities varying with the initial proposal and amendment. From the above proposition, C 
can always choose a proposal (x?, x f) such that,for any 
I depict this in Figure 3.6. Notice that if legislators are risk averse and if p 0 is always small-
bounded above by some small number p sufficiently close to zero-then C can even choose a 
proposal (i 1o i v that yields lower payoffs to constituents oflegislators in (C u V) without 
endangering the coalition; in other words, it has more leverage. In Figure 3.6, 
So far I have assumed the S -types act independent of each other. I now tum to the 
situation in which they collude. 
C. Collusion by S 
Since they have been purposely excluded from the "spoils" by C, the S -types have an 
incentive to collude to try and derail the proposed winning coalition (C u V). In the context of 
a closed rule, we assume they do this by offering the V -types the following counter proposal: if 
the V -types agree to reject C 's proposal (x?, xf ), the S -types will support a bill that contains 
only projects of the v -types, i.e., (0, xf). I of course assume V will propose such a bill if they 
agree to reject C 's proposal. 
The situation of a V -type is illustrated in Table 3.2. TheE" and v1 are interpreted similarly 
as in Table 1. As above, the payoffs to his constituents if E 1 orE 3 occur is the same regardless 
of how he votes, which implies he cannot be any worse off by choosing v1• If £ 2 occurs, 
however, his constituents stand to gain m 12 = M 2(x?, xf) if he supports C 's proposed bill and 
some return m22 if he rejects it. Thus v 1 would be a dominant strategy for him if and only if 
M 2(xP, xf) > m22• Now the value of m22 is probabilistic. A V -type can never be sure whether 























self interest of each S -type not to. Let q represent the probability that a sufficient number of S-
types do vote for this bill given C 's bill is rejected. Then m22 = qM 2(0, xf). It follows, then, 
that v 1 is a dominant strategy for a V -type legislator if, 
(3.4) 
where the functions bj and cj are evaluated at (xf ,xf), 
or equivalently, 
(3.4') 
It follows then that if (3.4') is satisfied, then C can defend the proposed bill, i.e., the proposed 
winning coalition. 9 
TABLE 3.2 
El E2 E3 
vl ml1 m12 = M 2CxP, xf) ml3 
v2 m21 m22 m23 
Condition (3.4') indicates the kind of leverage the committee has over the outcome. Define 
R as follows: 
Notice that lim R = (1 - q) > 0. That is, by scaling down its own members' projects, the 
x,~o 
committee reduces the cost to a V -type of joining the coalition and thus increases his incentive 
to do so. If the cost is low enough, then the V -types would be induced to join and maintain the 
coalition. Hence, the committee can guarantee its members some positive payoff. 
A somewhat counterintuitive result follows from (3.4'). Note that lim R = (1 - q ): the 
(11/11,)~0 
smaller the committee is relative to the pivotal group, the greater its leverage over that group 
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and thus the outcome. One would expect the opposite to be true. However, the result does 
make sense; the smaller the committee, the lower the cost and consequently the greater the 
incentive to the pivotal group for maintaining the coalition. Perhaps this is one reason why, for 
example, the Agricultural Committee in Congress, which is composed of a mere 35 legislators, 
has been modestly successful in obtaining favorable legislation via coalitions with urban 
congressmen (see Ferejohn, 1984, and Ripley, 1969). 
There is an alternative interpretation of the committee's power. Condition (3.4) implies 
that the committee has the ability to pit a certain, favorable outcome against a risky, less 
favorable one. Let us assume that the preference function of a V -type legislator is strictly 
concave in net benefits to his constituents. 10 The function is illustrated in Figure 3.7 below. If 
E 2 occurs and a V -type legislator chooses v 2, his constituents get [b 2 - (lin )n 2c 2.1 with 
probability q and 0 with probability (1 - q ). The expected return to his constituents is thus 
q [b 2 - (lin )n 2c 2.1 and his utility is ui = ui (q [b2 - (lin )n:U). If instead the legislator chooses v 1, 
then his constituents get [b 2 - (lin )(n 1c 1 + n 2c~] for sure. Hence, by choosing x1 such that 
[b2- (lin )(n 1c 1 + n2cv] is between q [b 2 - (lin )n 2c:U and [b 2 - (lin )n 2c:U, the committee can 
offer a V -type legislator a more favorable return with certainty, i.e., 
u 1 (b2- (lin )(n 1c 1 + n2cv) > quJb 2 - (lin )n 2cv + (1- q )0 = ii. 
Under a germaneness rule, the results are qualitatively the same except that now S 
immediately proposes an amendment (a P, 0) with a P =- x P. Once again a V -type is faced with 
a choice between a certain and a risky outcome if his vote is pivotal. Since C is guaranteed to 
propose (0,- xf) in the next stage (in retaliation), then a V -type faces an uncertain outcome if 
he chooses vr-M 2(0, x ~) with probability q and 0 with probability (1 - q ). 
In conclusion, I have in effect identified certain conditions that could provide a committee 
with some bargaining power in shaping the character of policies within its jurisdiction, namely, 






winning coalition. The voting model I propose represents a real alternative to the Shepsle 
model. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 3 
1. The Food Stamps Program is basically a welfare program targeted at the poor in urban 
areas and thus is not of much benefit to constituents of legislators in the Agricultural 
Committee. However, it provides nontrivial benefits to representatives from urban 
districts. 
2. Ferejohn, 1984. 
3. Note that {C, V, S} is a partition of the legislature: let N represent the whole legislature; 
then N = S u V u C and C n V = C n S = S n V = 0. 
4. This is a bit simplistic since it effectively requires that the members of V belong to a 
homogeneous group, e.g., urban Democrats. Certainly a committee is not limited to a 
choice of a single homogeneous group (see for instance Barton, 1976). However, rather 
than get hopelessly bogged down in a puddle of algebra, I feel it is more fruitful to 
simplify the model in this way. 
5. Note that this does not preclude the possibility that (bi(ii)- ci(ii)) < 0, i.e., the project 
could be inefficient. If the initial endowment is rejected, then the net benefits to his 
constituents and thus his payoff is the same regardless of how he voted-M 2(x P, x ~ ); but if 
it is approved, then his payoff is probabilistic. 
6. If the initial endowment is rejected then the net benefits to his constituents and thus his 
payoff is the same regardless of how he voted-M 2(x P, x f); but if it is approved then his 
payoff is probabilistic. 
7. We use a superscript "0" to indicate that the expectation depends on the initial proposal and 
initial endowment. 
8. We note two things in connection with this. First, one may invoke Axelrod's (1981) Tit-
for-Tat argument to reject this assertion. However, his argument implicitly assumes that 
the same participants will continue playing the repetitive game for a considerable length of 
time. This is too strong. There is no guarantee that an S -type will still be around in the 
near future. Secondly, V may choose to propose a different bill (0, xv. In this case we can 
let w(xv= {x;: x; <x2} and H
0(xv =prob(w(xv) occurs given C proposes <xP ,xf) with 
density h0• Quite clearly, there is some z~ = x2(xP, x~) such that 
(n-Jn)c 2(z~) = (lln)[n 1c 1(x?) + n 2c 2(x~). This implies that an S -type will never agree to a 
bill (0, xv if x2 > zf; hence, the support of h0 is contained in [0, zf]. A V -type will support 
C 's proposal if, 
zf 
M 2(xP, xf) > EfM2(0, xv = f P 2(xvh 0(xvdx2 (3F.l) 
0 
It can easily be shown that a sufficient condition for C to be able to construct a proposal 
satisfying (3F.1) is, for all x 2, 
'• 




where i 1 satisfies M 1(i 1, .i:J = 0, z2 = xli 1 • .i:J, 
and h is conditional on (x 1 = i 1, x2 = .i:J. 
In Figure 3F.1 I describe graphically how i 1 is derived, and in Figure 3F.2 I illustrate 
(3F.2). Note that condition (3F.2) is roughly equivalent to condition (3.4) in the text. 
9. If the preference of a V -type is linear in payoffs (M :J, then the condition is both necessary 
and sufficient. 
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A PROPOSED MODEL OF PRICE SUPPORTS 
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In the last chapter, I discussed two models that political scientists would most likely use to 
analyze price support legislation. I criticized them for certain weaknesses which ultimately keep 
them from providing a complete mapping from legislator's preferences to policy outcomes. In 
this section I develop a simple, formal model that provides a better picture of this mapping. 
Specifically, I will integrate economic factors, political factors, and key Congressional 
institutions into an institutionally rich collective decision-making model. As implied, I will 
assume a representative form of government in which legislation is decided by representatives 
of political regions who in tum are elected by inhabitants of their respective regions via 
majority vote. I will also assume that a representative's main objective is to get re-elected and 
thus to maximize votes. To facilitate the discussion, I will refer to representatives as legislators , 
to political regions as districts, and to its inhabitants as constituents. Furthermore, I will denote 
the commodity to be supported by com (k) and assume the free market (no price support) as the 
status quo. 
As argued in chapter one, price supports do not serve the public interest. They create 
inefficiencies and so are economically unjustifiable. But why, then, do we observe price 
supports? The seemingly obvious answer is that price supports are the product of political and 
not economic markets. However, given that legislators maximize votes and that producers of 
the supported commodity constitute a very small proportion of the total population, this would 
seem perplexing. My objective is to identify those features that generate this seemingly 
improbable outcome and fuse them into a coherent model. 
A. A Legislator's Objective Function: 
In any arbitrary district j, producers of com (k) base their decision to vote for or against 
(incumbent) legislator j on their gain from the price support. Under the status quo, a certain 
proportion of producers, denoted hi, will vote for the legislator. 1 Let G (jj) be the aggregate 
gain to producers and L (jj) the aggregate loss to consumers if an effective price support ji is 
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adopted, and let W and N be the total number of producers and consumers respectively. With 
an effective price support ji that yields a per capita gain G (ji) = (1/W)(G (ji)), an additional 
proportion 8L(G (ji)) will vote for him. Thus, if a legislator draws randomly from the whole set 
of producers in his district, the probability that that producer will vote for him is [hi + 8L(G (ji)J 
given that a price support of ji is implemented. In other words, [hi + 8L(G (ji)J is the probability 
that a producer in district j will vote for the legislator given a price support ji is implemented. 
Similarly, a certain proportion of consumers in district j, denoted f i, will vote for 
legislator j given the status quo. Since an effective price support ji results in a corresponding 
per capita loss i (ji) = (1/N)(L (ji)), some proportion of these consumers, 8/(L (ji)), will vote 
against the legislator if ji is implemented. Hence, [j i + 8/(i (ji))] can be interpreted as the net 
probability that a consumer in district j will vote for his legislator if ji is implemented. 2 
To sum up, then, the probability vote function of a producer in district j is given by 
\}li (G (ji)) =hi + 8L<c (ji)) 
and of a consumer by, 
A legislator is assumed to maximize expected votes. Let Qi(ji) denote his net expected 
votes if a price support p is implemented. Define the (Bernoulli) random variables Xw and X1 as 
follows: 
{ 
1, if a producer votes for the legislator 
Xw = 0, otherwise 
{ 
1, if a consumer votes for the legislator 
X1 = 0, otherwise 
Let Wi be the number of com (k) producers and Ni the number of consumers in district j. Then, 
Qi (p) = Wi Prob (Xw = 1) + NiProb (X 1 = 1)3 
= wi8L<c (ji)) + Ni8/(i(ji)) 
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= Wi [hi + 8L(G (p ))] + Ni fJ i - 8/(L (p ))] 
= [Wihi + Nif i] + [Wi8L(G (p))- Ni8/(L (p))J . 
Since (Wi hi + Nif i) is independent of p, it can be disregarded. For simplicity then I will let 
expected votes be represented by 
(4.1) 
The functions 8L and 8/ are assumed to satisfy the following properties: 
(i) 8L(O) = o/(0) = o, 
(ii) 8£ > o and 8( < o, 
(iii) 8/, 8{' > 0, 
(iv) Jim 8£ = 0, and 
G-+oo+ 
(v) !im 8/ = oo+ where i = sup{L : 0 ~ 8/(L) 5J i} . 
L--+L 
The last two properties are merely meant to convey that beyond some point additional gains 
would be negligible to the legislator, and additional losses would be prohibitive. Figures 4.1a 
and 4.1b depict these functions. 
Let p • be the free market equilibrium price and assume that a maximum price exists-
there is a price Pm such that f 1c (pm) = 0 where f 1c (pm) = 0 is the demand function for com (k ) . 
Then the policy relevant price support levels are those between p • and Pm. A support level 
below p • such as PL in Figure 4.2 below is ineffective; on the other hand, a support above Pm 
such as Pu is no better than Pm, i.e., fk (pu) = fk (pm) = 0. Now since G (p •) = L (p •) = 0 and 
8L(O) = 8/(0) = 0 then max Qi (p) where IB = {j) : p • ~ p ~ Pm} must be non-negative. Hence, if 
IB 
Q i (p) ~ 0 for all p in IB , then legislator j will oppose the adoption of a price support. On the 
j 
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FIGURE 4.2 
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other hand, if there exists a p in IB such that Q/ii) > O,then legislator j may be willing to 
support the adoption of a price support if the support level is within a sufficient neighborhood of 
p. I will expound on this in the next section, but before doing so let me discuss how interest 
groups fit into the scheme of things. 
Political markets are characterized by competition between interest groups for favorable 
outcomes. The more influential groups benefit, while the less influential lose. The smaller the 
size of a group and to some extent the more concentrated the location of its members, the lower 
its organizational costs. Also, the larger (smaller) the per capita benefit to a group from a 
favorable outcome, the more (less) likely the group can gain from organizing. Both these 
factors provide incentives for the group to organize and thus yield political influence. That is, 
the group membership would be better able to effectively lobby their legislators. 
In the context of the model, producers of com (k) can be thought of as one interest group, 
e.g., wheat farmers, and consumers another. In general, producers would have organizational 
advantages. They are much fewer than consumers. Furthermore, they tend to be geographically 
concentrated. On the other hand, consumers tend to be widely scattered. Consequently, 
organizational costs of producers will tend to be lower. Furthermore, the benefits of a price 
support are concentrated on producers and its costs diffused across a much larger number of 
consumers. Hence, the potential per capita benefit to producers is much larger than that which 
could accrue to consumers, giving the former more incentive to organize. In short, producers 
will tend to be much better organized and better able to lobby their legislators. 
The impact of producers and consumers as interest groups can be accommodated into the 
model by assuming simply that the functions o{ and o/ reflect in part the organizational 
characteristics of each group. 
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B. Properties of the Objective Function: 
Suppose the objective function Qi( ·)is strictly concave. Then it is necessarily single 
peaked. Single peakedness is defined as follows. 
DEFINITION 4.I: 
The function Qi is said to be single peaked if there exists a Pi e [p •, oo+) such that for any 
ji e IB {pi} and A. e (0, 1], Qj('Api + (1- /...)ji) > Qi (ji). The following proposition 
establishes the above claim. 
PROPOSITION 4.1 : 
Let Q/ < 0 for all ji e (p •, oo+). Then Qi is single peaked in IB. 
Proof: 
Since IB is compact there exists a pi e IB such that Q/pi);:~ Qi(ji) for all ji e IB. Now 
either Pi e int(IB ), Pi = p •, or Pi = p,.. Suppose Pi e int(IB ). By Taylor's theorem, for any 
p, 
where ji is between pi andji. Since Pi e int(IB) then Qj(J3i) = 0. Given Qj' < 0 for allji 
then Qi(ji)- Qi(j3i) < 0 provided ji :;e Pi· Now choose any p and/... e (0, 1] and set 
ji =/..pi + (1- /...)p, then it follows that Pi =Pi (see Definition 4.1). Suppose Pi = p •, then 
Q/p •);::: Q/fi) for all ji e IB. Now, given the hypothesis, it must be the case that p • is the 
unique maximizer. If it were not, then by definition there exists some other price fJ such 
that Qi(fJ) = Qi(p • ). Once again using Taylor's expansion, 
Since Qj(fJ) must be zero, then Qi(p •) < Qi (fJ ), which is a contradiction. Hence, 
Qi(p.)>Qi(ji)foralljie!B withji:;ep•. Again,foranyp e/B and/...e (0,1]set 
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ji = A.p • + (1 - "A.)p. This same line of reasoning can be applied to the case p1 = Pm. 0 
Henceforth, I will assume Q1 is strictly concave.
4 I should note that strict concavity is not 
necessary for single-peakedness. Strict quasi-concavity is all that is needed. However, the 
former is useful in deriving comparative static results. 
Given Qi is strictly concave, legislators can be classified into three categories: 
(I) Those with peaks at the left border of the feasible set: Q1 (ji) < Q1(p •) for all 
(II) Those with peaks in the interior of the feasible set: Qj(pi) = 0 for Pi E int(IB ). 
(III) Those with peaks at the right border of the feasible set: Q i (ji) < Q (p,) for all 
ji E lB {p, }. I depict these in Figure 4.3. 
Most legislators will fall under category II and probably none under category III. Only 
those legislators who represent districts with a relatively large number of com (k) producers will 
fall under the second category. The next proposition clarifies this point. 
PROPOSITION 4.2 : 
Proof" 
Suppose we assume otherwise, i.e., Pi = p •. Now the hypothesis implies that Qj(p ·) > 0. If 
Q 1 (p •) = 0 then there exists some e > 0 such that Q 1 (p • +e) > Q 1 (p • ). But this means 
Pi > p • which is a contradiction. 0 
The hypothesis of this proposition requires that the marginal gain in votes from producers 
exceeds the marginal loss in consumer votes at the free market price. In plain language it 
means legislator j can gain votes supporting a price support level sufficiently close to the free 







proportion of com (k) producers. 
C. Institutional Fnimework: 
Each legislator represents voters from a given district. Decisions on policies are hammered 
within a legislative body, e.g., Congress, with each legislator trying to obtain the most for his 
constituents. Unless certain restrictions are imposed on the decision-making process, chaos 
would result (see for instance, McKelvey, 1976). To guarantee a well-behaved decision 
process, I will assume that the legislative body is disaggregated into committees and 
committees into subcommittees and that each committee is granted authority over a subset of 
policies. I describe these restrictions formally below. 
Let L represent the legislative body and T the number oflegislators, i.e., 
L = { 1, . . . , j, ... . T}. Let J be the set of all areas of rna jor legislation and denote an element 
of J as a jurisdiction. Finally, let L s be the set of all possible subsets of L. I will assume there 
exists a correspondence F 1 : L ~ L s such that F 1 (L) is a finite cover of L and a surjection
6 
F 2 : F 1 (L) ~ J that defines the administrative setup of the body. The correspondence F 1 
assigns each legislator to one or more subgroups, to be called committees, and the 
correspondence F 2 makes each committee responsible for a certain subset of jurisdictions. 
Let J P(lc) represent the price support issue involving com (k) and let K be the set of all 
commodities being considered for price supports with K the total number of such commodities. 
I will assume that there exists a CP e F 1(L) such that F 2(Cp) = {Jp(lcl}f=1 and Fi
1 ({Jp(lcl}f=1) = CP. 
Furthermore, I will assume there exists a correspondence F 3 : CP ~ c; where c; is the set of all 
possible subsets of CP and F 3(CP) is a finite cover of CP and a one-to-one function 
F 4 : F 3(CP) ~ {Jp(lcl}f=1 that define the division of labor among members of CP. In other words, 
F 3 divides CP into subcommittees while F 4 assigns each subcommittee to a single price support 
issue and guarantees that some subcommittee will be responsible for each price support issue. 
Note that since F 4 is one-to-one, there are exactly K subcommittees, each corresponding to 
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exactly one commodity. IfF 3 is restricted to being a function, then the K subcommittees are 
disjoint. That is, each is responsible for exactly one commodity-a one-dimensional issue 
subspace. 
Lastly, let cA: e F 3(Cp) and let I cA: I be the number oflegislators incA:. I will assume that 
there are at least [(I Cl: I + 1)/2] legislators in Cl: such that [Wj o!GK - Njo;iK] I p=p· > 07; GA: and 
LA: are the gain and loss functions with respect to commodity k. Referring to proposition 4.2, 
this means that the division of labor in the legislative body is such that a majority of legislators 
who comprise a given subcommittee in cA: are precisely those who would benefit electorally 
from favorable legislation on the price support issue for which the subcommittee is responsible. 
I should point out that I am implicitly assuming that each district has, at most, one 
supported commodity. If more than one commodity is supported, the results remain valid, 
provided producers of each supported commodity help or at least do not interfere in the cause of· 
producers of the other supported commodities. 
D. The Existence of a Conditional Voting Equilibrium: 
Given the the objective functions of legislators, the assumed committee system, and the 
specified jurisdictional arrangements, there will be a conditional and nondegenerate 
subcommittee voting equilibrium. Since Qj is single peaked in p, and each subcommittee in CP 
has a single jurisdiction, then by Black's theorem a subcommittee (voting) equilibrium price 
support level will exist. The equilibrium is the median voter's optimal choice of support level. 
It is nondegenerate since, as implied above, the median voter's choice will exceed the free 
market price. It is conditional because it depends on the method chosen to support price. I will 
have more to say on the choice of methods in later chapters; for now, I assume that some 
method or instrument i has been adopted. 
Formally, a conditional subcommittee equilibrium is defined in the following way. Let C 
be the set of legislators in a subcommittee and I C I the number therein. Let c' be a coalition in 
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C and I c' I the number of legislators in c'. C' is said to be a winning coalition in C if 
I c' I > (I C 1/2). 8 Now let i represent the adopted instrument and let pi be a price support level 
under i. Then pi is said to dominate pi within the subcommittee if there exists a winning 
coalition in the subcommittee, c', such that all members of c' prefer pi' to pi. 
DEFINITION 4.2: 
A conditional subcommittee equilibrium is a pair (i, pi) such that pi e IB and pi dominates 
every other pi e IB . 
The next proposition formalizes the above claim. 
PROPOSITION 4.3: 
For any i, there exists a Pi such that (i, Pi) is a conditional subcommittee equilibrium. 
The question that comes to mind at this point is whether a conditional voting equilibrium 
for the whole legislative body exists. In chapter 3, I argued that under certain conditions a 
committee will have some bargaining power to extract a favorable outcome over policies that 
affect its members' constituents. If one assumes that the subcommittees within the committee 
simply accept each other's recommendations, then committee bargaining power implies that 
some nondegenerate support level will be chosen by the whole body for each of the 
commodities. What this means, of course, is that effective price supports will be implemented 
even if they create inefficiencies. 
To be more specific, assume then that (i (k ), p i(k) is the kth subcommittee's conditional 
voting equilibrium-its recommendation. Assume further that the committee CP has some 
bargaining power indexed by J.l. e (0, 1). This implies a final outcome for each commodity k, 
{(i (k ), (1 -J.l.)p.t" + J.JP i(k>}, in which ((1- J.l.)p.t" + 1JP i(k)) > p • for each k. Hence, a conditional 
voting equilibrium exists and is nondegenerate. Figure 4.4 illustrates this for the case of K = 2 










To recapitulate, then, I have created an institutionally rich voting model that provides a 
possible explanation for the existence of price supports. The elements of the model-
committee/subcommittee system, an underlying assignment process, a jurisdictional 
arrangement across committees and subcommittees, some implicit committee bargaining 
power, and vote maximization-interact with economic private gains and losses to produce 
politically feasible outcomes favorable to producers, i.e., effective price supports. In the next 
section I will explore the relationships between vote outcomes and various economic and 
political parameters, using the familiar technique of comparative statistics, and will then test 
hypotheses about these relationships using data from the feed grains market 
E. Some Comparative Statics Results: 
As implied above, for any instrument i, there is some support level that a legislator will 
prefer to all other feasible choices. This optimal level, denoted p /, maximizes his objective 
function conditional on instrument i. Denote the conditional objective function by Qj,i. Then, 
pj satisfies.br 
(4.2) 
And, since Qj,i is strictly concave, pj is unique. Furthermore, it depends on both political and 
economic parameters, i.e., pj = pj(J.tj) where Jlj is a vector of parameters. Let m be a scalar 
parameter (in Jlj) then, from the implicit function theorem, 
(4.3) 
Since Q/~ < 0, then the sign of (apjtam) is the same as the sign of (aQ/,;tam). I will use this 
result to predict the response of a legislator-whether he prefers a higher or lower support 
level-to changes in selected parameters. 
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E.l A Change in Composition of the Constituency : 
The following proposition indicates how a legislator will respond to a change in the 
composition of his constituency (say, due to redistricting). Specifically, it states that he will 
favor lowering the support level if the number of consumers in his district increases relative to 
the number of producers. It also implies that the median legislator and thus the legislative body 
will desire a lower level. That is, 
a [ . ~ a- i(.t> -- (1- )l)pk* + Wi l(k) = J.l._p __ < 0 
aN . oN · 
J J 
since j5 i (.t) is the median legislator's optimal choice. In general, this result is invariant with 
respect to the instrument adopted. 
PROPOSITION 4.4 : 
For any instrument i, (ap jtaNj) < 0. 10 
Proof· 
In order to analyze the impact of economic parameters on a legislator's optimal choice, one 
must know which instrument is to be used. An instrument yields a specific gain to producers 
and loss to consumers, which is generally different from another instrument's. I will have more 
to say on this in chapter six. For my purposes, I will assume that a price floor is the designated 
instrument. 
E.2 An Improvement in Technology: 
In chapter six I will explain in detail what a price floor is. For now, suffice it to say that, 
assuming demand is linear-/ (p) = d - cp-and supply is linear-h (p) =a + bp-then under a 
price floor, the aggregate gain is represented by, 
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G (ji) = (aji + (b /2)ji2) - (ap • + (b 12)p • 2) 
and the aggregate loss by, 
L (ji) = (b + (c /2))ji2 +(a + (b + c )s )ji- (d -a )s - (dp • - (c /2)p • 2) 
where s is the cost of storing a unit of excess production. 11 The next proposition shows how the 
optimal support level changes under a price floor in response to technological improvements. A 
change in technology is represented by a downward parallel shift in the supply curve, i.e., an 
increase in the value of a. The optimal level falls as new technology is adopted, provided 
supply is not too elastic. 
PROPOSITION 4.5: 
Let i be a price floor. Then, there exists a y > 0 such that for all b e (0, c + y), (oft/loa)< 0. 
Proof: 
First note that 
From above, (oif;loa) > 0, (o(!oa) > 0, Gi' > 0, and('> 0. Since 8{' < 0 and 8( > 0 then the 
second bracketed term is negative. Now, (oGi'toa) = (II M) and (o('toa) = liN. Thus, the 
first bracketed term is negative, zero, or positive if and only if, 
wi'&{ 2. w 
Ni8( > N . 
From the first order condition, 
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Hence, if (b - c) ~ 0, 
I -, -
Wjow L; w 
--=-<-
N-8( (J.' N 
1 ' 
By continuity, there is some y > 0 such that, for any b E (c , c + y), the second bracketed 
term is greater in absolute value than the first bracketed term. 0 
The condition in proposition 4.5-that supply not be too elastic-seems counterintuitive. But, 
in fact, it makes sense. Consider Figure 4.5a. The increased gain to producers due to 
technological innovation is given by (A + B +C) while the added loss to consumers is given by 
[(A +B)+ (D + £)]. 12 Now if the supply were much more elastic, as shown in Figure 4.5b, the 
increased gain to producers would be smaller-(A' + B' + C) < (A + B + C) and, likewise, the 
added loss to consumers would be smaller-(A' + B ')<(A +B) and (D' +E)= (D +E). Hence, 
at the margin, the legislator could increase his net gain in votes by raising the support level 
slightly. 
E.3 Input Restrictions: 
One way of reducing the surplus under a price floor is by imposing restrictions on inputs, 
e.g., a limit on the acreage a farmer can plant to a supported crop. Graphically, input 
restrictions can be represented by a tilting of the supply curve upward and, analytically, by a fall 
in the value of b. Proposition 4.6 indicates that a legislator will want to raise the support level 
if input restrictions are imposed. 
PROPOSITION 4.6: 
Let i be a price floor. Then there exists a y > 0 such that, for all b e (0, c + y), (apjl'db) < 0. 
Proof: 





















The second bracketed term on the right-hand side is negative. The first bracketed tenn is 
negative if and only if 
From the first order condition, if (b - c) ~ 0 then, 
This means 
Hence, (apj!ab) < 0 if (b -c)~ 0. The conclusion follows from the continuity of Gi and Li 
inb. 0 
E.4 A Change in the Surplus: 
Propositions 4.5 and 4.6 deal only with changes in the surplus at the margin. But the 
magnitude of the surplus also affects the choice of the legislator. As fonnalized in proposition 
4.7, the greater the magnitude, the lower the legislator's desired price support level. 
PROPOSITION 4.7: 





Now, bydefinition,L;(p")= f f(p)dp +S(ji). Hence, (oLJoS)= 1. Consequently, 
p" 
(aQ;,iJas) < o. o 
E.5 The Resoonse of Legislators from 'NonProducer' Districts: 
So far, I have been implicitly assuming that the optimal choice of a legislator is an interior 
point-pj e (p •, Pm). In other words, I have been discussing the response of legislators 
representing districts with a relatively large number of producers. Analogous conclusions hold 
for those legislators representing districts with relatively few producers-pj = p •; that is, those 
who represent nonproducer districts. Technological change, input restrictions, and, in general, 
any change in the surplus affect these legislators' resistance at the bargaining table. A build-up 
in the surplus tends to increase their opposition to price supports. A rise in the surplus increases 
the tax burden. This shifts the objective functions of the legislators downward at each possible 
nondegenerate price support level. I illustrate this in Figure 4.6. 
What this means is that a representative of a nonproducer district will tend to bargain 
harder for lower support levels. The same conclusion holds if the ratio of producers to 
consumers falls; a fall in (W/Nj) either due to a decline in the number of producers in the 
district or a rise in the number of consumers makes the representative more hard-nosed. I 
summarize these results in the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 4.8: 
A rise in the surplus or a fall in (Wj!Nj) in non-producer districts results in a fall in the 
price support level. 
By assumption, majority of the members in the kth subcommittee desire an effective price 
support-fi j e (p •, Pm); they represent producer districts. Hence, the desired support level of the 
subcommittee, the median legislator's optimal choice, would be nondegenerate. Since the 





















the subcommittee's desired level-[(1 -Jl.)pk' + J.1i5 i(k)]-then Propositions 4.4 through 4.8 
imply that the body's desired level will change in response to changes in the selected 
parameters. Both jJ i(k) and J1. change (in the same direction) as these parameters shift. 
One can derive predictions with respect to other instruments. However, I will not do this. 
Instead, I will test the above stated predictions against the actual behavior of price supports (in 
the U.S.) for the feed grains. 
F. An Econometric Analysis of Comparative Statics Predictions: 
Since price supports have been a fundamental element of agricultural legislation in the 
U.S. since the thirties, agriculture provides a suitable domain for investigation. From 1930 to 
1939, and 1952 to 1963, the major agricultural commodities were supported via a price floor, 
combined with varying degrees of acreage controls (input restrictions). But beginning in 1965, 
the price floor was abandoned as the basic method of support; hence, I will omit this period 
from my analysis. I will also exclude the period 1930 to 1939, since institutions and 
surrounding circumstances then were different. 13 
Before I proceed, I should point out that the U.S. Congress satisfies the institutional and 
behavioral properties of my model. First, Congress is divided into committees. Second, price 
support legislation is assigned to a single committee, the Agricultural Committee. Third, the 
agricultural committee is divided into subcommittees, with each subcommittee basically 
responsible for price support legislation pertaining to a single supported commodity. Fourth, 
legislators in a given subcommittee come mostly from districts producing the commodity for 
which the subcommittee is responsible. And, fifth, the Agricultural Committee in each chamber 
has some bargaining power vis-a-vis noncommittee members. 
Since there are only twelve years within the period of study (1952-1963), it is not advisable 
to do statistical work on each individual commodity. Twelve observations contain very little 
information. To circumvent this problem, I will concentrate on the feed grains markets. Feed 
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grains consist basically of four commodities, namely com, grain sorghum, barley, and oats. 
Being feed grains, they have some properties in common and thus can be logically lumped into 
a single econometric model to generate (significantly) more observations.14 
The data used in the analysis comes from the U.S Department of Agriculture, "Feed: 
Outlook and Statistical Yearbook, 1985"15• It was crosschecked with data from Cochrane and 
Ryan's classic study (1976) of U.S. agricultural policy, "American Farm Policy, 1948-1973." 
The predictions of the political model (again under a price floor) can be rephrased in the 
form of hypotheses, which in tum can be tested statistically using the above data. 
H 1: If the number of rural Congressional districts declines relative to the number of 
metropolitan districts, then the price support levels will also decline. 
The next hypotheses follow correspondingly from Propositions 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7, each in 
conjunction with Proposition 4.8. 
H2: The adoption of new technology, as measured by rising yields per acre, leads to a fall in 
price support levels. 16 
H3: The imposition of acreage controls results in higher price support levels. Acreage controls 
are a form of input restrictions and thus lead to an increase in the slope of the supply curve 
(under competitive conditions), which in tum leads to a fall in the potential surplus and 
ultimately to higher price supports. 
H4: The larger the surplus of a commodity in a given period, the lower its price support the 
next period. 
There is one more hypothesis that can be tested but which does not stem (at least directly) from 
the political model. Since the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) plays a major role in 
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agricultural legislation and since it represents the viewpoint of the President on agricultural 
policy, then the President has some bearing on the outcome of price support legislation. 
H5: The President has a nontrivial influence on price supports. Furthermore, a Republican 
President exerts a downward pressure on price supports as opposed to a Democratic 
President. In general, Republicans favor the free market, while Democrats favor some 
form of government intervention. Many Democrats believe the market does not function 
as well as hoped for. 
In order to test these hypotheses, I will specify the following linear regression model, 
4 4 4 
ps;, = CXo + L a.jdjYit + L 'YjdjSi(t-1) + L ojdjait + ~1p (1-1) + ~2'(1-1) + E;, (4.4) 
j~ j~ j~ 
where 
ps;1 = price support of commodity i at time t 
Y;1 = yield per acre of commodity i at time t 
Si(H) = surplus of commodity i at time (t - 1) 
a;, = acreage diverted from production of i at time t 
P (1-1) = a dummy which takes on the value 1 if the President is Republican 
and 0 if he is a Democrat. 
r (1-1) = the ratio of rural and predominantly rural to urban 
and predominantly urban Congressional districts at (t - 1). 
Notice that the time indices differ across the exogeneous variables: t for per acre yields and 
acreage controls and (t - 1) for the rest. The reason for this is as follows. Decisions on price 
supports at timet are made at time (t- 1) largely on the basis of the existing surplus, S;(l-t)· 
However, since it is not known at (t- 1) how much yields per acre will be at t and how much 
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land will be withdrawn at t, Congress grants the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to adjust 
price support levels at time t within limits specified at (t - 1). Thus, the index t is appropriate 
for yields and acreage controls. Indexing the presidency and the ratio of rural to urban 
Congressional districts with t is, of course, self-explanatory. 
As mentioned earlier, I will restrict the analysis to the feed grains-(1) com, (2) grain 
sorghum, (3) barley, and (4) oats. To simplify matters and consequently generate more degrees 
of freedom, I will assume Yi is the same for all j U = 1 ..... 4); that is, a change in the surplus 
of any feed grain has the same effect on its price support-for all i (apsi,Jasi(t-1)) = y. This is 
reasonable in light of the fact that the USDA lumps these four commodities under feed grains 
when evaluating the cost (to the economy) of the various farm programs.18 With this 
assumption, the model simplifies to, 
4 4 
psi, = OQ + L aidiYit + 'fSi(t-1) + L oidiai, + ~~p (t-1) + ~2r (t-1) + eit 19 . (4.5) 
j=! j=! 
Note that the parameters OQ, y, ~~o and ~2 represent the common structure of the feed grains. 
Yield per acre is highly correlated with acreage withdrawn from production. There are two 
reasons for this. First, farmers tend to use better fertilizer, better seeds, etc., to compensate for 
the reduction in acreage. Second, they tend to withdraw the relatively less productive acres. 
This suggests that the acreage control variable ai, should be excluded from (4.5). Doing this, 
however, would result in a correlation between Yit and the new error term e;, = ai, + ei1 , i.e., an 
omission of variables problem. 20 This then requires instrumental variable estimation (or 2SLS) 
in place of OLS. 
An instrumental variable for Yit must be uncorrelated withe;, but highly correlated with Yit· 
Time t is one such variable. Table 4.1 shows the coefficients and their corresponding t-




(1) Corn (2) Grain Sorghum (3) Barley (4) Oats 
Constant 29.9 13.75 23.33 30.67 
(21.46) (7.02) (23.26) (24.93) 
2.61 2.05 .95 1.04 
(23.63) (13.73) (12.48) (11.15) 
R .96 .90 .88 .85 
The estimates of Yir from these regressions are substituted into ( 4.5), and the resultant equation 
is then estimated using OLS. 
One last comment is in order. Since the ratio of rural to metropolitan congressional 
districts remained relatively unchanged during the years 1951 to 1962, the term r <H> can be 
absorbed into the constant term. The model to be estimated via OLS thus reduces to, 
4 
psit = <lQ + L aidiYi; + ySi(r-t) + ~P (t-t) + e;r 
j=! 
(4.6) 
where Yi; is the OLS estimate of Yir from Table 4.1. Note now that, with (4.6), only hypotheses 
H2, H4,and H5 will be tested. 
The OLS estimates for coefficients in (4.6) are given in Table 4.2; the t statistics are shown 
in parentheses below the corresponding estimates. The two regressions, Reg 1 and Reg 2, differ 
only in that two observations were excluded from the latter.21 The first exclusion represents 
data for grain sorghum in 1952; in 1951 there was practically no surplus of sorghum, so that the 
1952 price support program was basically inoperative (recall that decisions at t were based 
largely on the surplus at (t- 1)). The second represents data for com in 1960; in 1960, the 
surplus of com was inordinately high due to the abandonment of the Soil Bank program-an 
acreage restriction program aimed principally at controlling com production-in 1959. 
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TABLE4.2 
Reg 1 Reg2 
Constant 1.842 1.893 
(18 .13) .. (19.66)"* 
Yield per acre, Com -.008 -.008 
(-3 .34)"* (-3 .60)** 
Yield per acre, Sorghum -.017 -.016 
(-2.80)"* (-2.81)** 
Yield per acre, Barley -.025 -.026 
( -6.51)** (-7.36)** 
Yield per acre, Oats -.029 -.03 
(-10.46)"* (-11.72)** 
Surplus at (t - 1) -.0001 -.0002 
( -1.35) ( -2.27)" 
Presidency at (t - 1) -.068 -.073 
( -1.98)" (-2.36)"* 
R2 .878 .91 
•• significant at the 1 percent level 
• : significant at the 5 percent level 
As expected, the coefficients of the exogeneous variables have the correct signs. Under the 
second regression, H2 and H5 are "accepted" at the one percent level while H4 is "accepted" at 
the five percent level. The estimated equation for com price supports is, 
PS;1 = 1.893- .008y;1 - .0002Si(t-1)- .073P (r-1), 
for grain sorghum, 
PS2r = 1.893- .016y2t - .0002s - .073P (t-1), 
~ (1 -1) 
for barley, 
PS3r = 1.893- .025Y3r - .0002Si(r-1)- .073P (t-1), 
and for oats, 
PS4r = 1.893- .03y4t- .0002Si(r-1)- .073P (r-1). 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Some producerS may dislike intervention or may like the legislator for his support of other 
issues. 
2. The simplest case is when f j = 1 and hj = 0. 
3. Recall that for a Bernoulli random variable X with parameter p, E (X)= p. Thus, expected 
votes from producers is WjE(Xw) = WjoL((G (ji)) and from consumers NjE (X1) = N/>/(i (ji)). 
4. More precisely, I assume Q/' < 0 which is a bit stronger. 
5. Note that strict concavity implies that the right derivative at p • is non-positive, i.e., 
lim Q/(ji) :50. 
p -'>p" 
6. A surjection is an onto correspondence. 
7. This, of course, implies there are enough such legislators. This is reasonable since price 
supports are assumed to be a major piece of legislation. 
8. I assume for simplicity that I C I is odd. 
9. The gain and loss functions depend on the instrument adopted (I will expound on this 
further in the next chapter). It could very well be the case that o{ and o/ also depend on the 
instrument 
10. Equivalently, (iJpjliJMj) > 0: a fall in the number of producers in his district relative to the 
number of consumers induces the legislator to favor a lower support level. 
11. An effective price floor necessarily results in a surplus of (h (ji)- f (ji)). 
12. In fact, consumers may even underestimate (A +B) and (A'+ B '). Since the price they pay 
remains the same, then consumers can only observe directly the loss due to the rise in the 
surplus, i.e., (D +E). That is, consumers underestimate their loss. 
13. I can include this period in the econometric analysis by adding a dummy variable. I have 
decided not to do this for reasons stated in the text. 
14. Since other commodities, such as wheat or cotton, are distinctively dissimilar from feed 
grains, lumping all commodities within one big econometric model would be equivalent to 
analyzing each commodity individually. 
15. I am grateful to David Hull of the USDA Feedgrains Section for his assistance on this 
matter. 
16. Yield per acre may rise as a result of, either changing relative prices between land and 
other inputs (notably capital and labor), or technological innovation. Thus, to test this 
hypothesis, one must ascertain that technological innovation had a relatively greater impact 
on per acre yields during the period being analyzed. Cochrane (1978, p.328) does in fact 
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attest to this: 
"The technological payoff began in 1937 and continued for nearly thirty years. 
Output per unit of input increased irregularly but persistently from 1937 to 1965, as 
farmers adopted one new and improved technology after another. This is the way 
that total farm output increased over the long period, 1937-65. Over this period the 
input of productive resources held almost constant. In fact, the loss of human labor 
inputs was almost exactly balanced by the addition of capital inputs. Farmers 
increased their total output year after year by adopting new and more productive 
technologies, embodied in capital, year after year." 
17. Farmers are paid to reduce their acreage and thus are compensated for the increased 
production costs that come with acreage restrictions, and in part for the potential loss in 
producer surplus. Hence, at the margin, their gains are reduced only slightly while the 
losses of consumers quite significantly; this results in less political resistance to higher 
price supports. 
18. The cost of supporting wheat, as well as cotton and other major commodities, is considered 
separately under wheat program costs, but the cost of supporting com, sorghum, barley, 
and oats are aggregated under feed grains program costs. 
19. I assume the error terms are identically, independently, and normally distributed: 
2 { crl, j = 1 and s = t 
E;1 - N (O,cr; ) and cov (E;1 , Ejs) = O th · , o erwtse . 
20. I am, of course, assuming that (4.3) is the true model. 
21. Each was rejected under a studentized t -test for residuals at the 1 percent level. 
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PART II 
SOl\ffi NONTRADITIONAL ECONOMIC MODELS 
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CHAPTERS 
THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF REGULATION 
AND THE CHOICE OF INSTRUMENTS 
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As discussed earlier, political models are incapable of addressing the problem of 
instrument choice: why is one method chosen over others in implementing a regulatory policy? 
They cannot tell us much about the nature of regulation. They can only explain, though 
inadequately, why regulation might result in inefficiency. 
Some economists have approached the problem of rationalizing government intervention 
(in markets) that creates rather than rectifies inefficiencies in a nontraditional way. They treat 
regulation, i.e. government intervention, as the outcome of competition among interest groups. 
Foremost among them are Stigler, Peltzman, and Becker. 
The Stigler/Peltzman and Becker models are institution-deficient, particularly the latter. 
Each assumes a black box that encompasses all relevant institutions and which transforms in 
some unknown way interest group pressures into outcomes. Hence, like the political models, 
neither provides a clear mapping from political and economic considerations onto policy 
outcomes. 
Unlike the political models, however, these models address, or at least can be adapted to 
address, the instrument choice problem. Unfortunately, the models either assume that the 
method of implementation is unimportant (Stigler and Peltzman) or that political institutions do 
not affect the choice of method (Becker). Thus, the Stigler/Peltzman model completely ignores 
the problem while Becker model addresses it in a way that many find unacceptable-in 
particular, political scientists. 
In this chapter, I will summarize both the Stigler/Peltzman and the Becker models and will 
point out their weaknesses with regard to the instrument choice problem. In chapter six, I will 
then expand the Stigler/Peltzman model in a way that makes it suitable for addressing the 
problem. 
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A. The Stigler/Peltzman Model: 
Economists' interest in the existence of inefficient regulatory outcomes resulted in an 
economic theory of regulation. Stigler motivated the theory. Peltzman formalized it. And in 
some sense Becker generalized it. Stigler effectively developed a theory of the optimal 
coalition size. He treats regulation as an instrument for wealth transfer and assumes that any 
form of regulation is equivalent to a tax on wealth. He concludes that diminishing marginal 
political returns to legislators and increasing marginal organizational costs to interest groups 
limit the size of the winning coalition, and that the benefits of a uniform tax, such as an 
effective price support, can be identified with a single economic interest. His argument boils 
down to the following: first, a regulatory policy must necessarily split a legislator's 
constituency into a winning group and a losing group; second, the tax rate chosen depends on 
factors that affect benefits to the winning group and losses to the losing group. These are 
crucial factors that the political models fail to account for. 
Stigler concludes further that regulation yields a more efficient allocation of resources than 
a pure monopoly but not necessarily an optimum. In this sense, he provides an explanation for 
the existence of socially nonbeneficial regulation. 
Peltzman constructed a formal model of Stigler's theory. He uses supply-demand analysis 
to derive Stigler's conclusion. Regulatory outcomes result from the interaction of the demand 
for and the supply of regulation. The demand for regulation stems from constituents,and the 
supply is provided solely by a legislator. Demand is inversely related to regulation: as the 
effective tax increases, the wealth of the taxed group falls. 1 This increases opposition and thus 
raises the cost of regulation to the legislator and ultimately to the group formed by regulation. 
This then reduces the "quantity" of regulation desired. In short, a legislator is a monopoly 
supplier faced with a downward-sloping demand curve. 
More formally, a legislator has the following objective function, 
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M = n · f - (N - n) · h , where 
M = expected votes 
n = total number of potential voters in the beneficiary group 
f = net probability that a beneficiary will vote for the legislator 
N = total number of voters 
h = net probability that a victim will vote against the legislator . 
The probability factor f depends on the net gain of regulation g to a beneficiary. More 
precisely, 
f =f(g), g = (T -K- C(n))ln where 
T= total wealth transferred the beneficiary group 
K =total amount spent by beneficiaries mitigate opposition (e.g., campaign funds, lobbying) 
C (n) = organizational costs 
It is assumed thatj' > 0, {' < 0, and c' > 0. The probability function h depends on the tax rate, 
t, and on the expenditures per victim undertaken by beneficiaries to mitigate opposition, z. 
That is, h = h (t, z) with z = K !(N - n ); it is assumed that hz < 0, hzz > 0, h1 > 0, and h11 > 0. 
Finally, note that, given an individual's wealth function, B (t), it must be the case that 
(B (t )t (N - n)- T) = 0. As indicated earlier B' < 0; B" is assumed to be nonpositive. 
The optimal solution to the legislator's problem must satisfy the following conditions: 
iJM =[n{iJg +/] -[(N-n){h1 ~+hz~}+hl =0, iJn iJn iJn iJn J (5.1) 
iJM- -.££__ - ~-
iJT - nf iJT (N n )h1 iJT - 0 , and (5.2) 
iJM , 
iJK = - J - hz = 0 . (5.3) 
Given the above identity-(B (t )t (N - n)- T) = 0---it follows that, 
iJt tB iJt 1 
iJn - (tB' + B )(N - n) and iJT - (tB' + B )(N - n) 
(5.4) 
Substituting these expressions into (5.1) and (5.2) and rearranging results in 
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' ' [ tB ] -[C +glf +! -h, --,--, --
(tB +B) 
- hzz = 0' and (5 .1 ') 
' [ 1 ] f - h, (tB , +B) = 0 . (5.2') 
Using (5.1 '), (5.2'), (5.3) and the definitions of g, t, and z, the following expression implicitly 
defining the optimal n can be derived:2 
~ = 1- [ {(g ~a_) ] where a= (C(n)ln). 
N f+h-f(c-a) 
(5.4) 
Equation (5.4) can be used to derive Stigler's first conclusion. First note that 0 ~ (n IN)~ 1 
so that 0 ~ [ (g + ~ )( ] ~ 1. Suppose c' =a = 0, i.e., zero organizational costs then 
! + h- f (c -a) 
(n!N) = (g()!(j +n). Sincef is increasing but strictly concave, then{< (j lg). 3 This means 
0 < [(g()!(j + n )] < 1--even if there are no organizational costs, (n!N) < 1. Note that this 
follows from diminishing political returns (j' > 0, {' < 0). If instead c ', a > 0, then the optimal 
proportion falls even further since 
g( g( +a{ (g +a){ 
< I< I I I 
(j +h) (j +h)+af (j +h)+af -cf 
(g +a){ 
(j +h)-(c' -a){ 
In sum, due to diminishing marginal political returns and rising marginal organizational costs, 
the proportion of the total population benefiting from regulation will always be less than one. 
From (5.2'), (h11j) = (tB' +B). Let R1 = (h,lf') and W1 = (B + tB\then 
(dR,Idt) = [(j'hn- hrf ')!(f)2],which is positive,and (dW,Idt) + (2B' + tB'),which is negative. 
Thus, R, is upward-sloping and W, is downward- sloping. The optimal tax rate, t•, is 
determined by the intersection of these two curves as shown in Figure 5.1. Now the wealth 
transfer will be maximized only if (aT/at)= 0 which implies W1 = 0. This occurs at tm which is 
the tax rate a monopolist would choose if left unregulated. 4 Thus, the allocation of resources 
would be non-optimal (t• > 0) but not as inefficient as under a monopoly (t• < tm). This verifies 
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FIGURE 5~1 
97 
Stigler's other conclusion. 
Unlike the political models, the Stigler model recognizes that the preferences of a 
legislator are induced by external factors, in particular economic conditions.5 Changes in these 
factors affect the benefits and losses, and via constituents' responses, alter the legislator's 
preferences. However, the model conveniently disregards congressional institutions and 
reduces Congress to a single vote-maximizing legislator. This is one shortcoming of the model. 
As argued earlier, the existence of price support policies depends crucially on Congressional 
institutions. Without these institutions, vote maximization by legislators would most likely lead 
to free market prices. 
More important, though, is that his model implicitly assumes that the manner in which a 
regulation is implemented is inconsequential. This fails to squareoff with actual regulation. As 
I will illustrate later on, the character of a regulation tends to vary across markets and within a 
given market over time. In particular, the methods by which prices of agricultural commodities 
have been supported differ considerably both cross-sectionally and temporally. It turns out 
though that a slight alteration of his model makes it suitable for analyzing the choice among 
alternative instruments, e.g., different price support programs. I will discuss this in detail in the 
next chapter. 
B. The Becker Model: 
Like Stigler, Becker focuses on the competition among interest groups as a way of 
"unifying the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the 
politically powerful. "6 But he takes a more general approach. He develops a model that is 
applicable not only to democratic but also to nondemocratic countries. He circumvents the 
political structure by introducing an influence function, a function that summarizes the 
interaction between the structure and pressures from various interest groups within the country. 
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Although he deals with the case of many interest groups, Becker derives his major 
conclusions from the special case of two homogeneous groups--one subsidized group called s 
and one taxed called t . To simplify matters, he defines a tax (subsidy) as any political activity 
that lowers (raises) the income of a group. 
In Becker's model, each member oft is taxed an amount R1 (the same for all members of 
t) and each member of sis subsidized by an amount Rs . Total taxes raised amount to n1F(R 1 ) 
where n1 is the number of individuals in t and F a function that accounts for the deadweight 
loss stemming from the tax. F is assumed to satisfy the following properties: F(R 1 ) ~RI' 
0 < F' < 1, and F" ~ 0. Total subsidies amount to nsG (Rs) with ns and Gs interpreted similarly; 
G satisfies: G (Rs) ~ Rs, c' ~ 1, and c" ~ 0. The functions F and G are illustrated in Figures 
5.2a- 5.2b below. Taxes and subsidies must always balance out-nsG(Rs)- n1F(R 1 ) = 0. 
The taxes imposed on t depends on its political influence. That is, 
n1 F(R1 )=-I'(p.,pl'x) where I
1 is its influence function . 
Note that I 1 depends on pressure exerted by s, Ps, pressure exerted by t, p 1 , and other exogenous 
factors, x. Likewise, the level of subsidy that s can obtain depends on its political influence, 
Given the above identity Is +I' = 0; that is, competition among the two groups is a zero-sum 
game. It is assumed that (ais laps), (ai 1 1ap1 ) > 0 (which implies (ai
1 laps), (a!" 1ap1 ) < 0). 
The level of pressure exerted by t or s depends on its expenditures and its size. This is 
summed up by pressure functions Ps = Ps (ms, ns) and p1 = p 1 (m1 , n1 ); ni is the size of group; and 
m its total expenditures. For simplicity, it is assumed mi = aini where ai is (exogenously 
determined) per capita expenditure of group i. 
Given the specifications above, the subsidized group must solve the following problem, 
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FIGURE 5.2 b 
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Zs0 is the income of a member of s prior to redistribution. Now the constraint implicitly defines 
Rs as a function of as' at' ns' nt and X - Rs = Rs (as' at' ns' nt' X). Substituting this implicit 
function into the objective function yields an equivalent maximization problem: 
Max(Zs0 + Rs (as, a" nso n" x)- as) or 
a, 
Max(Rs(as, a" ns, nt, x)- as). 
a, 
Similarly the taxed group is faced with a maximization problem of the form, 
Max(Zt0 - (Rt(as, at, nso nt,x)- at)) 
a, 
or equivalently 
Min(Rt (as, a1 , ns, n1 , x) + a1 ) • 
a, 
Assuming each group takes the other's action (strategy) as given, then the first order conditions 
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[ [-~ · ~] IF] =- 1. opl om/ 
Political equilibrium requires that (ol 11op1) =- (ols lop1) so that (5.6') can be expressed as, 






The equations (5.5') and (5.6'') can then be solved for the optimal per capita expenditures of 
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each group (a;, at\ or equivalently, for the optimal pressure of each, (p;, Pt*). Becker 
establishes conditions under which the second order sufficient conditions are satisfied. Note 
that the solution is a Nash equilibrium. 
Becker's derivation of the comparative static results is quite difficult to decipher. 
Therefore, I will go through the basic steps involved in the mathematics and thereafter will 
point out how he derives two of his more important propositions. 
Let (5.5') be represented by 'V(p,(m,, n,) Pt(mt> nt)) = 0 and (5.6") by <P(p,(m,, n,), 
Pt (mt, nt )) = 0. By the implicit function theorem mi is one-to-one in Pi and ni, i.e., 
~ (p,, Pt, n,, nt) respectively. Total differentiation with respect top,, Pt, and any arbitrary 
parameter a yields 
~ .£i_ .£.i -::~ dp, + ::~ dpt + ::~ d a- 0. 
up, opt oa 
(5.7) 
a~ a~ a~ 
::;-dp, + ::;-dPt + -::;-d a= 0 . 
up, upt oa 
Then 
or 
Givens a*- 0 but ta = 0, then 
102 
It is tedious though not difficult to show that a 11 < 0, a 12 > 0, a 21 < 0, and a 22 > 0. Thus, provided 
lA I< 0, then 
and 
dps a 12 -a l1 dp1 
sgn( da ls.=O) = sgn( !AI tJ =- sgn(tJ = sgn(IAI tJ = sgn ( da Is.=<>) . 
Becker derives all his conclusions from these relationships.7 
Of Becker's propositions, the second and the fourth are the most compelling (at least in my 
view). The proofs of those propositions are quite straightforward. However, Becker's handling 
of them was quite unsatisfactory. Hence, I think it is useful to redo them. 
Becker's Proposition 2: 
aR 
An increase in deadweight cost reduces the equilibrium subsidy, i.e., ( a; ) > 0. 
Proof· 
positive since (op8 /om8 ) > 0. Next, it can easily be shown that (op8 !oG > 0. 
8 Hence, 
This proposition implies that a bias exists in favor of less inefficient (transfer) policies. The 
next proposition states that relatively more efficient methods of transfer will tend to be adopted . 
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Becker' s Proposition 4: 
Competition among pressure groups favors efficient methods of taxation. 
Proof" 
First, assume (as Becker does) that taxes R, do not change as the method of taxation 
changes Let F represent a method of taxation and F• another but more efficient method, 
i.e., F • > F and F ., > F'. Suppose a shift is made toward the more efficient method. Then, 
since (R, - F (R 1 )) is deadweight loss, marginal deadweight loss---(1- F)-falls. Now it 
can be shown that (dp11oF) < 0,9 or equivalently, (dp 1!d(1- F))> 0, then since (1- F) falls, 
then optimal pressure of group t falls. Since p1 = p1 (a,, n1 ) and (dp11da.1 ), then a, must fall. 
This implies that per capita expenditure of group t, (R1 +a,), falls (since R, is constant). 
This means the income of each member of group t rises because of the shift to a more 
efficient method. Thus, members of group t would support such a shift. Next, recall that 
( ~Rs · ()p,, > 0. That is, a shift to a more efficient method raises the equilibrium subsidy. 
dPr ()F 
Hence, both group t and group s would favor and support the shift. 0 
Becker's model also gives an explanation for the existence of price supports. But it goes 
one step further than either the political models or the Stigler/Peltzman model. It proposes 
testable hypotheses about the choice of one regulatory instrument over others. Unfortunately, 
the model strips away political institutions, much more so than Peltzman's: political institutions 
are conveniently subsumed in the influence functions Is ( · ) and / 1 ( • ). Consequently, its 
implications are somewhat questionable. For instance, is one to conclude that proposition 4 is 
valid under both a dictatorship and a democracy or even among different types of democracies? 
In fact, Bates (1981) provides numerous counterexamples. 
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Based on the discussion of the political models and nontraditional economic models, there 
seems to be a need to develop a plausible and tenable model of instrument choice. Neither set 
of models is well suited for studying the existence of price supports nor for analyzing the choice 
among alternative price support programs. In the last chapter I developed a model that is better 
suited to addressing the existence problem. In the next chapter I will expand this model and use 
it to study the choice between a pure price floor, a price floor with input restrictions, and a 
production quota. A pure price floor and a production quota are two methods through which the 
price of a commodity can be supported; they represent opposite extremes--the first does not 
involve any controls on production and the second a very stringent form of control over 
production. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5 
1. An example will clarify this. Consider the simple demand-supply model in Figure 5F.l 
without goverrtinent intervention (t = 0), the wealth or tax base is (p 0 · q~. Now suppose 
the government decides to impose a 5% tax. What would the tax base be? Offhand, one 
would think it to be (p 0 · q~. However, this is incorrect. The 5% tax effectively raises the 
supply curve to s' so that price and quantity resettle at (p' · (1.05), q). The new tax base 
would thus be (p'q) which clearly is less than (p 0 · q~. By a similar argument, it can be 
shown that a higher tax rate results in a lower wealth base. This process can be succinctly 
described by a function B : [0, 1] ~ R+ withE ' < 0. 
2. From (5.3) and (5.2'), hz =/and h1 = j'(B + tB\ Substituting these into (5.1') yields, 
- cc' +g){+ f- {tB + /z + h = 0 
and upon rearranging, 
(z - cc' +g)- tB )/ + f + h = 0 
Substituting for g and z, 
{(K I(N- n- c'- [(T- K- (C(n)ln)]- [TI(N- n)]}/ + f +h)= 0 
or, letting a = [C (n )In] 
((- c' +a)- (T - K) · (N lh (N - n ))/ + f + h = 0. 
Further manipulation results in, 
(N -n!N)=(g +a)/l(f +h' -cc' -a)f') 
or 
(n!N) = 1- ((g + a)/l(f + h- (C'- a)f')). 
3. To see this, note that for an increasing, strictly concave function, the corresponding 
marginal curve must be less than the corresponding average curve. 
4. Note that (B + tB)dt = tB, which is the wealth transfer. Thus t is the tax rate that would 
yield the largest possible gain to the beneficiary group. 
5. For an example, see pp. 222-228 of Peltzman's article, "Toward a More General Theory of 
Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics (1974). 
6. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," Quarterly 












7. Surprisingly, in Becker's article, the sign of lA I is claimed to be positive. This has 
disastrous consequences. If I A I > 0 then, from above, 
dp. $, 
sgn(-1 1 :())=-sgn(scJ=sgn(-d l 1 =0 and 
da • a · 
dp. dp, 
sgn(-1. =0) = sgn(tcJ = sgn(-d I 1 =O). 
da • a • 
Thus, all of Becker's propositions would have to be reversed. Fortunately, this turns out to 
be a typographical error, although a crucial one since it tends to throw off the reader. A 
brief digression will clarify this. 
To establish the sign of lA I, Becker restructures the optimization problems of each group 
within a dynamic framework. A group chooses its best strategy at time T given the 
strategy of the other at time (T - 1). That is, the subsidized group solves 
and the taxed group, 
These lead to a comparative static system which is the dynamic equivalent of (5.7), i.e., 
audp[ + al'l_dpr-l +sad a= 0 
a21dp[-1 + a22dpr +tad a= 0 . 
Setting d a= 0 and solving for dp[ leads to, 





Equation (5F.2') is a second order linear homogeneous difference equation with a general 
solution of the form, dp[ = c 1 <...fYl + c 2(- ...fYl where c 1 and c 2 are arbitrary constants. 
Hence, for the political equilibrium to be stable (which Becker assumes), y must be less 
than 1. Since a 11 , a 21 < 0 and a 12, a 22 > 0 this implies I A I =a 11 a 22 - a 1za 21 < 0 contrary to 
what was set forth in the original text. 
8. See the Appendix of Becker's article, p. 398-inequality (A.16). 
9. See the Appendix of Becker's article, p. 398. 
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PART III 
THE PROBLEM OF INSTRUMENT CHOICE 
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CHAPTER6 
A MODEL OF INSTRUMENT CHOICE 
WITH AN APPLICATION TO PRICE SUPPORTS 
110 
The economic theory of regulation focuses on rationalizing the existence of regulation. It 
provides a rational explanation for the existence of inefficient regulatory policies. It views 
regulation simply as a transfer of wealth from one group in the economy to another. It therefore 
allows for the possibility of inefficient outcomes. 
But the theory is deficient. It implicitly assumes that the method of wealth transfer is 
inconsequential. However, regulation of markets invariably takes different forms. This is quite 
evident in the control of imports. The government through the ITC (International Trade 
Commission) regulates the importation of commodities deemed "injurious" to one or more 
domestic industries. It may do this directly through tariffs and/or quotas on the imports or 
indirectly through subsidies for the affected industries. So-called Escape Oause Investigations 
by the lTC "provide relief in the form of an increase in tariff duties, quantitative restrictions 
(quotas), or adjustment assistance in loans, tax breaks, and the like." 1 Dumping activities and 
export subsidization by foreign countries are counteracted by an imposition of a dumping tax 
and a countervailing duty, respectively. 
A variety of methods is also apparent in the regulation of transportation. For instance, 
railroads are subject to long haul-short haul restrictions, a predetermined fair rate of return on a 
fair value, intrastate rate controls, and restrictions on abandonment of service while motor 
carriers ,e.g., trucks, are not. On the other hand, the latter are subject to safety and entry 
regulations, which generally are not applicable to the former, and to more stringent controls 
over minimum rates. In general, the different modes are subject to varying degrees of entry, 
rate, safety, and service regulations. Moreover, even within the same mode, there are some 
differences. The Motor Carrier Act (enacted in 1935) exempts from regulation the 
transportation (by motor carrier) of agricultural commodities and newspapers (Sampson and 
Farris, 1975). Up until 1957, the "Act provided that contract carriers (as opposed to common 
carriers) file only minimum rate schedules with the ICC (Interstate Commerce Commission) 
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and gave the commission authority to control only minimum rates." 2 Common carriers had to 
file actual rate schedules; these rates were regulated by the ICC. The Act was eventually 
amended in 1957. 
The regulation of (U.S.) agricultural markets is also a good example. Regulation of 
agriculture is characterized mainly by price support programs. Different methods are used to 
support prices of major agricultural commodities. These can be classified roughly into five 
basic categories: (i) a price floor, (ii) a production quota, (iii) a two-tier price system, (iv) 
acreage controls, and (v) an income payment scheme. Under a price floor, the government sets 
a minimum price above the competitive free market level and guarantees producers this price by 
purchasing and storing any excess production. Under a quota, producers are assigned maximum 
production limits such that aggregate output is below the free market level. A two-tier price 
system is generally used for a commodity that is sold in two distinct markets, one of which is 
characterized by a relatively inelastic demand and the other by a relatively elastic demand. A 
higher price is set in the former and a lower in the latter. Acreage controls represent a form of 
input restriction. To avail of price supports, producers must plant within prespecified acreage 
allotments. Finally, under an income payments scheme, price is allowed to settle at its free 
market level. The government guarantees producers a minimum price above the free market 
level by paying them the difference between the minimum price and the free market price. In 
practice, usually some combination of methods is used. Table 6.1 shows roughly how prices of 
some major commodities were supported during the period 1952 to 1972 (in Chapter 7, I 
present a much more detailed classification). 
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TABLE6.1 
Methods of Support for Selected Commodities, 1952-1972 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
1952-1964 
Wheat X X 
Feed grains X X 
Tobacco X X 
Dairy X 
1965-1972 
Wheat X X 
Feed grains X X 
Tobacco X X 
Dairy X 
It is quite evident then that the theory and actual regulation diverge. Consequently, the 
theory is unable to predict the nature of regulation that might arise. Why, for instance, are 
textiles and tobacco subject to tariffs and not quotas? On the other hand, why is sugar subject 
to a quota and not a tariff? Why was there a difference in rate controls between contract and 
common carriers before 1957? Why was there a switch in support methods for wheat, the feed 
grains, and tobacco in 1965? More generally, why is one form of regulation implemented and 
not another? This is generally referred to as the problem of instrument choice in regulation. 
My objective in this chapter is to provide a building block for a general (positive) theory of 
choice among regulatory forms. The paper is divided into two parts. In Part I, I construct a 
political/economic choice model similar to Peltzman's (1976). Like Peltzman, I posit a single 
legislator as the decision-maker who bases his choice on his expected gain in votes. My model 
differs from Peltzman's in that the legislator must not only choose a tax rate but also an 
instrument-that is, a regulatory form-from a fixed set of alternatives. It can be interpreted as 
a natural extension of Peltzman' s model. In Part II, I apply the model to the choice between a 
price floor and a production quota in the implementation of a price support program. First, I 
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describe the two instruments both graphically and mathematically. Second, I derive sufficient 
conditions for a quota to prevail over a price floor and vice-versa. Third, I derive some 
predictions implied by the model. And last, I provide some anecdotal evidence attesting to the 
consistency of some of the model's predictions with regulation in the wheat and feed grains 
markets. 
My main finding is that the elasticity of demand and the elasticity of supply are crucial 
factors that affect the choice between the two instruments. Specifically, if demand (supply) is 
sufficiently inelastic (elastic) at the free market equilibrium, then a quota will be adopted. On 
the other hand, if demand (supply) is elastic (inelastic), then a price floor will be chosen. Also, 
I find that an improvement in technology would bias the choice toward a quota, while the 
implementation of input restrictions would bias the choice toward a price floor. Finally, I 
conclude that redistricting induces a relaxation of production controls. Technological change 
was the principal economic factor (Cochrane, 1979), while redistricting was a major political 
factor (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1986) affecting price support programs during the period 
1953 to 1973. Rising yields per acre reflect the improvement in technology.3 Redistricting 
refers to a realigning of congressional (voting) districts according to the one man-one vote rule; 
each district must contain more or less the same number of voters. Prior to 1965, rural areas 
were overrepresented in Congress since the apportionment of districts then was based on the 
composition of the population in the 1930s. Redistricting rectified this. 
A. A Model of Instrument Choice 
One of the basic conclusions ofPeltzman (1976) and Stigler (1971) is that a regulatory 
policy will generally divide people (voters) into two opposing groups: those who benefit from 
the policy and those who are harmed by it, e.g., farmers vs. consumers in the case of price 
supports. I will refer to the first as the winning group (or beneficiaries) and the second as the 
losing group (or losers). Like Peltzman, I assume the decision-maker is a single legislator. In 
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addition, I assume the legislator represents a geographical subunit of the country, e.g., a 
district. 4 I let j indicate that the legislator comes from the pr. district, Mi and Ni the size of the 
winning group and the size of the losing group within his district respectively, and M and N the 
total number of beneficiaries and losers in all the districts respectively. Finally, I assume a tax 
(unit or percentage) is used to generate gains G to the beneficiaries and losses L to the losers; 
we let gains be defined by a function G = G (t) and losses by a function L = L (t ). With these 
specifications, the legislator's preferences are represented by the following function, 
where 
8~ = the net gain in the probability that a beneficiary in district j will vote for the 
legislator, 
(6.1) 
8/ = the net rise in the probability that a loser in district j will vote against the legislator, 
G (t) = ( ~ )G (t) = per capita gain to beneficiaries given a tax rate oft, 
i (t) = ( ~ )L (t) = per capita loss to losers given a tax rate oft. 
Following Peltzman, we assume that 8~. 8(, 8( > 0, 8( < 0, and Qj' < 0. Also, for convenience, 
we assume 8~(0) = 8/(0) = 0. Note that 8~ depends on the per capita gain and 8/ on the per capita 
loss. Note also that (6.1) is a generalization of(4.1). 
A regulatory policy can be implemented in different ways, called instruments. For any 
given tax rate, each instrument generally yields a different per capita loss and per capita gain. 
Let i represent an instrument and (~ (t ), i; (t )) the per capita gain-loss configuration associated 
with instrument i at a tax t. Then, the objective (net expected vote) function of legislator j with 
respect to instrument i is given by 
(6.2) 
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For simplicity, I assume there is a fixed set of alternative instruments from which the legislator 
must choose. 
The gain and loss functions, Gi and Li, are determined largely by economic factors such as 
the levels of demand and supply in the market (being regulated), elasticities, the structure of the 
market, etc. Hence, the legislator's objective function depends ultimately on political-Mi, Ni, 
8L and oi-and economic variables. His choice therefore depends on the state of these 
variables. 
The legislator's decision process proceeds in two stages. For each instrument, the 
legislator chooses an optimal tax rate tj to maximize Qi. i: choose tj such that Qi . i (fj) ;;:: Qi. i (t) 
for all t. He then picks the instrument that yields the largest net gain at the corresponding 
optimal tax level. Specifically, let 't!/ represent the vector of parameters (political and 
economic) associated with instrument i; and define !lil as follows, 
(6.3) 







The legislator chooses the 
optimal tax rate corresponding 
to each instrument 
The legislator determines the 
net gain in expected votes 
under each instrument 
at its optimal tax rate 
The legislator picks the 
instrument that yields the 
highest net gain 
0 for all i 
1 
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As noted earlier, the decision of the legislator depends on both political and economic 
parameters. Hence, changes in these could lead to a different optimal tax rate for each 
instrument and consequently to a different choice of instrument. One can analyze the effect of 
such changes using the technique of comparative statics. That is, let m be any parameter 
(which may or may not be a scalar element in Jli ). Then carjtam) would indicate the direction 
and magnitude of change in the optimal tax rates. Furthermore, if we define Qj. i (J.l.i) as follows, 
Q· i(J.l. ·) =max Q· i( ·; Jl ·)5 
), ' t ), ' 
(6.4) 
then caQ.j , i/am) would give the direction and magnitude of change in the maximum net gain 
under each instrument. 6 Assuming there are values for the parameters Jli (for all i) such that the 
legislator is indifferent among all the instruments, we can then determine how a change in m 
biases the legislator's choice. For instance, assume there are only two instruments and suppose 
~1 .2 = 0 initially. Then, a change in m would bias the legislator's choice toward the first if (and 
only it) ca~tiam) > 0 and toward the second if (and only it) ca~t;}am) < 0. 
In the next section, I show how the model can be used to analyze the choice of instruments 
in the implementation of a price support program. To simplify matters, I restrict the analysis to 
a set of two pure or basic instruments, a price floor and a production quota. 
B. AN APPLICATION TO PRICE SUPPORTS 
B.l. The Choice Set-A Price Floor and a Production Quota 
As mentioned above, I will restrict my attention to two general categories of price support 
instruments: a price floor above the free market price and a production quota below the free 
market quantity. 
The distinction between a price floor and a production quota can best be explained with 
supply and demand diagrams. Under the first scheme, the government guarantees producers a 
price ji above the free market equilibrium level p • by offering to purchase their commodity at 
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the price ji and storing these purchases to keep them from slipping back into the market. The 
government collects taxes to pay for its purchases and storage of any excess production. The 
scheme results in an aggregate gain to producers given by, 
P. 
G 1 (ji) = J h (p )dp 
p' 
where h is the market supply function and an aggregate loss to consumers/taxpayers of, 
P. 
L 1(ji) = f f (p )dp + (ji + s)(h (ji)- f (ji)) 
p' 
where f is the market demand function and s is the per unit storage cost.7 
In Figure 6.2a, the gain is represented by the area (A + B +C) and the loss by 
[(A +B)+(B +C +D +E +F)+s(h(ji)-f(ji))]. 
Under the second scheme, the government legally restricts quantity to f (ji) in order to raise 
the commodity's price to ji. Here the gain to producers and the loss to consumers are (see 
Figure 6.2b), 
pf' 
G2(ji) = (ji- h-1(j (ji)))f (ji)- h (p )dp =(A -G) 
h-'if(p}) 
P. 
L2(ji) = J f (p )dp = (A +B) . 
p' 
To simplify matters, I will focus my analysis on the linear case and leave it up to others to 
generalize my result. From this point on, I will assume supply and demand are of the form, 
h (p) = a + bp; b > 0 and 
f (p) = d - cp; c > 0, d > O,(d - a) > 0 . 
The corresponding free market price is p • = [(d -a )l(b +c)] and the corresponding gain and 







0 q* q 





0 f(p)=q q* q 
FIGURE 6.2 b 
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G t;:;) ( - b -2) ( • b • 2) 1\1-' = ap + 2? - ap + 2_P 
L 1 (ji) = (b + ~ )"p
2 + (a + (b + c )s )ji - (d -a )s - (dp • - ~ p • 2) 
G2(ji) =- c (1 + ;b )ji
2 + (! )[bd + (d -a )c ]ji + [((a - d)21(2b )) - (ap • + ~ p *2)] 
L2(ji) = (dji- ~ ji2)- (dp • - ~ p *2). 
Note that the relevant range of prices is [p ·, p,.] where p,. is the maximum price consumers are 
willing to pay for the commodity, i.e., f (p,.) = 0. 
B.2. The Legislator's Decision Process 
In this example, the beneficiaries are farmers and the losers consumers. For each 
instrument, the legislator must determine the optimal price support level. In particular, he must 
choose .6/ and pf such that .6/ solves 
max Qj,1(j))= max [M/>LCG 1(j)))-N/>{(L1(j)))l, 
[p' .p_] [p' .p_] 
(6.5) 
and p f solves 
(6.6) 
Then, he must determine which instrument yields the higher net gain in votes. That is, define 
(6.7) 
where once again Jl{ and Jl~ are vectors of parameters. Then, he chooses a price floor (1) if and 
only if .11.z > 0 and a production quota (2) if and only if .11,2 < 0. His decision-making process is 







The legislator chooses the 
optimal price support level 
corresponding to each instrument 
The legislator determines the 
net gain in expected votes 
The legislator picks the 
instrument that yields the 
higher net gain 






Qj,l(fi]<~l); ~~) Qj).(fi/(~; ~0 
~I 
~!). > 0 (pick 1) 
~,J. < 0 (pick 2) 
~,). = 0 (indifferent) 
The optimal support level corresponding to the ith instrument, pj, is defined implicitly by 
the first order condition. That is, pj solves 
(6.8) 
Since the G; and L; depend on a set of parameters~~ then pj depends on ~/.8 
B.3. Comparative Statics and the Choice of Instruments 
The choice between instruments 1 and 2 depends in part on the price elasticity of demand 
at the free market equilibrium. A changing elasticity of demand at the equilibrium can be easily 
represented mathematically if demand and supply are linear. First fix a at a0 , c at c0, b at b 0 
and d at d 0 so that the free market price p • is (d 0 - a~!(b 0 + c~]. Then let 
d = d (c)= p • (b 0 +c)+ a0• Notice now that as c converges to zero, d is accordingly adjusted to 
maintain the equilibrium at (p •, q • ). That is, demand becomes more inelastic at (p •, q • ): the 
elasticity of demand at (p •, q • ), denoted TlD (p • ), is given by TlD (p •) = [(cp • )!(d - cp • ); thus, as c 
goes to zero with d = d (c), p • remains constant and so 11D (p •) goes to zero.9 Graphically, this is 






0 - 0 0 
c=c ,d=d(c )=d 
q 
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illustrates this. From here on, we assume d = d (c). 
From Figure 6.2, it is easy to see that a production quota would be politically disastrous if 
demand were elastic at the equilibrium-G 2(ji) < 0 and L 2(ji) > 0 for any ji > p •; that is, both 
producers and consumers will be worse off. Thus, given that he has a negatively significant 
proportion of farmers in his constituency, the legislator would choose a price floor. This is the 
point of the first proposition. 
PROPOSITION 6.1: 
There exists a sufficiently large c (c > 0), an iJ i, and anN i such that .11.2 > 0. 
Proof" 
From above, 
~o -'(f (ji)) 
h (p )dp = r.p- h-'(f (ji))]f (ji) + J h (p )dp . 
p' 
So, for any fixed ji, 
ac2 ', , ' , aji = (1- (h- )f )f (Ji) + (Ji- h- if (Ji)))f + 1 (Ji) 
=(I- (j'!h))J (ji) + f (ji) + (ji- h-1(j (ji))){ . 
Now { =- c, h' = b, and h-1(/ (ji)) = ((j (ji)- a )lb ). Hence, 
ac a/ = (2 + ~ )/ (ji)- c rji- ((j (ji)- a )lb )] 
= ( .£. )[2/ (ji) + 2(!!... )/ (ji)- (bji +a)] 
b c 
= ( .£. )[2(1 + !!... )f (ji)- h (p )] 0 
b c 
- [ ac2] Let d = d (c), then, for any ji , lim -=- = oo-. Hence, 3 some c > 0 such that 
c-+oo+ ap 
ac 2 ac 2 
(aG 21aji) < 0. Furthermore, for any e > 0, aji (ji +e)< 0 if aji (ji) < 0. Now, let 
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p = (p • + 8) where 8 > 0. Then, (dG 2/dp) < 0 V jJ E [p • + 8, oo+) provided c ~c. Choose 8 
to be infinitesimally small, then (dG-}dp) < 0 V jJ E (p •, oo+). Since G2(p ·) = 0 then it 
follows that, if c ~ c, G2(j)) < 0 V jJ E (p •, oo+). Moreover, since L2(j)) > 0 always then 
Q1J.(j)) < 0 V jJ E (p •, oo+), i.e., fi/ = p •. Now pick any jJ > p • and suppose 
M1 8~(G1 (j)))- N18j(L1(j)))::;; 0. We can always choose M 1, N 1 such that 
The next proposition is not as straightfotward. In effect, it states that if demand is sufficiently 
inelastic at the equilibrium, then the legislator will choose a production quota. More precisely, 
it can easily be shown that for any fixed jJ in [p • , p,.], G 1 (j)) > G 2(j)) and L 1 (j)) > L2(j)). Hence, 
it is not clear whether Q1,1(j)) is greater than, equal to, or less than Q1J.(j)). That is, 
support level p chosen for instrument 1, we can find a support level jj (j)) corresponding to 
instrument 2 such that, 
G2(jj (j))) = G 1(p) 
L2(jj (j))) < L I (j)) 
then clearly, Q1J.(ft (p )) > Q1,1(j)). In particular, if we can find such a support level 
(6.9a) 
(6.9b) 
corresponding toP/, denoted jj CP/). then 6 1;2. < 0 so that the legislator will choose instrument 2: 
conditions and the second from the definition of fi/. We can do this if c is sufficiently close to 
zero, i.e., TID (p •; c, d (c)) is close to zero. 
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PROPOSITION 6.2: 
There exists a sufficiently small c • (c • > 0) such that, for any c E (0, c • ], conditions (6. 9a) 
and (6.9b) are satisfied atji =fi/(J.t{) where ll{ = (a 0 , b 0, c, d(c), s,Mj Nj, M ,N). 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
The conditions (6.9a) and (6.9b) have an interesting interpretation. In effect, they state that 
given the support levels ji and p (ji) chosen for the price floor and the quota, respectively, 
farmers would be indifferent between the two instruments, since their gain is the same under 
each (6.2a), but consumers would prefer the quota, since their loss would be smaller (6.2b). 
Proposition 6.2 states that this is the case for corresponding support levels fi/ and p CP/) 
provided demand is sufficiently inelastic at the free market equilibrium; it thus implies that 
~1,2 < 0. 
The idea behind the proof of Proposition 6.2 can be explained intuitively. In Figure 6.5, I 
have etched out an arbitrary compact set [p •, p ••] along the vertical axis. The gain under 
instrument 1 at a price support level of p •• is (A + B + C +D). If the demand curve is steep 
enough at (p • , q •) as shown in Figure 6.5, then there will be some support level p (p ••) higher 
than p •• such that the gain under instrument 2 at that support level will be the same: 
(J +A - H -I) is more or less equal to (A + B + C +D). Notice also that the loss under 
instrument 1, (A + B + C + D + E + F +I + storage costs), will still be larger than the loss under 
instrument 2, (A + B + C + J + K)10• In fact, these properties will hold for all support levels 
chosen for instrument 1 that are in the set (p • , p •• ] : for all ji E (p • , p •• ], 3 p (ji) such that 
(6.9a) and (6.9b) are satisfied. Furthermore, the higher p •• (the larger the set), the closer c • 
must be to zero; that is, demand must be more inelastic at (p •, q • ). I depict this in Figure 6.6. 
Finally, note that fi/ depends on the values of c and d (since d = d (c) by assumption then it 
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all c > 0. Now, if I set p •• equal to p/(0) then there will be some c • > 0 such that the above 
properties will be satisfied for all ji in (p ·, [3/(0)) and in particular for p 1(c • ). Now, the same is 
true for all c in (0, c ·] : p • ~ J3/(c) < [3/(0) and (6.9a) and (6.9b) are satisfied at J3/(c ). 
Consequently, the legislator will stand to gain more in expected votes if he chooses instrument 
2. 
Analogous results can be derived for supply elasticity at the free market equilibrium. 
Since the method of proof is the same, I will state them without proof. 
PROPOSITION 6.3: 
Define a(b) = (d - (b + c )p •) and let a = a(b ). Then there exist b, b • > 0 such that ~1 •2 > 0 
if b ~ b • and ~1 •2 < 0 if b ?. b . 
Figures 6.7a and 6.7b provide the intuition for this proposition. The more elastic supply is 
at the equilibrium (the larger b is) the greater the gain to farmers under a quota-(A - G) 
increases; moreover, consumers are unaffected since (A +B) is unaffected. On the other hand, 
under a price floor, the increased gain to farmers due to an increased supply elasticity is offset 
by the increased loss to consumers. The producer surplus increases, but at the same time the 
cost of the surplus (B + C + D + E +F), not to mention the increased storage costs, also 
increases. Hence, the more elastic supply is at the equilibrium, the more politically attractive a 
quota is. 
From Proposition 6.1 there is some c such that ~1 .2 > 0 and from Proposition a some 
c (<c) such that ~1 .2 < 0. Since Qj,1 and Qj.2 are continuous inc, then it follows that there is 
some c such that ~1 .2 = 0.12 In short, there exist values of the parameters such that the legislator 
is indifferent between the two instruments. Assume that the parameters initially take on these 
values. By performing some comparative statics on ~1 .2, one can then determine whether a 


















By the envelope theorem, 
:'1.1 oQ · 1· I oQ · 2 I 
o ' · I '· I :;----=-:'\-- . !- -:'1-- . z. om om (=pj om r=pj 
where Qi . i = m~ Qi.1( ·; IJ./) and m a scalar parameter. One can use this to determine how .11,2 
p 
changes in response to changes in selected parameters. 
PROPOSITION 6.4 : 
Proof: Trivial. 
This proposition implies that the legislator will choose instrument 2 if the cost of 
maintaining the surplus rises. However, it has an alternative interpretation. Recall that I have 
assumed that the surplus is to be stored for only one period and thereafter given away (see 
footnote 1). Suppose I lett be the number of periods that the surplus is to be stored. Then, total 
storage cost would be (s · t)(h (]3/)- f (]3/)) with t = 1. If t rises then so does the storage cost. 
Now let t 0 represent the initial length of time that the surplus is to be stored and define 
s = (s · t~. Assuming s is constant then Proposition 6.4 implies that the legislator will choose 
instrument 2 if t 0 rises, i.e., (o.11.z los)< o. 
During the period 1952-1965, technological change as reflected in rising yields per acre 
was the principal factor affecting the price support programs; from 1965 to 1972, redistricting 
was a major political variable that shaped the programs. It would thus be interesting to see what 
the model has to say about the impact of these variables. 
Technological improvement manifests itself as a downward shift in the supply curve or 
equivalently as an increase in supply. A rise in supply in tum leads to a fall in the free market 
price and an increase in the free market quantity. In the absence of any price support program, 
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the price paid by consumers falls. However, with either a price floor or a quota, the consumer 
price remains the same. More important, though, is that under a quota consumers fail to 
recognize that they could in fact have paid a lower price if there were no support program. That 
is, at least in the short run, consumers do not know whether producers have acquired new 
technology and so are unaware of any potential gains that would accrue from a lower free 
market price. This information asymmetry can be reflected in the model by simply assuming 
that o(N/6/(I iJ)!oa is zero. That is, under a quota consumers do not react to foregone benefits of 
technological change. 
With a price floor, consumers will know that their loss has increased if new technology is 
adopted. They can observe the size of the surplus. If it increases,then they know that their tax 
loss must have increased and could infer that they could have paid an even lower price in the 
absence of the floor. In other words, there is no (or perhaps less) information asymmetry under 
a price floor. 
Besides pushing the free market price downward, an increase in supply will force the 
government to increase it's own holdings of the commodity, i.e., the surplus, if a price floor 
were the chosen means of support. That is, the government would have to actively intervene in 
the market. Since consumers can observe changes in the surplus, one would expect the gains 
and losses resulting from this to be politically sensitive. In fact, historically, the debates in 
Congress focused heavily on the burden of the surplus (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 
1952-1965). 
Under a quota, consumers do not react to the effect of technological change. Producers, on 
the the other hand, do, since they gain; new technology leads to lower production costs and thus 
to increased profits. The increase in profits is illustrated in Figure 6.8a. 
The preceding discussion suggests that technological change biases a legislator's choice 












FIGURE 6.8 b 
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time producers gain. On the other hand, under a price floor, consumers observe an increase in 
the surplus and thus will react accordingly. Consequently, the vote gains from producers are 
offset by the vote loss to consumers. I state this formally in the next proposition. 
PROPOSITION 6.5: 
There exists an e > 0 such that, for all b e (0, c +e), (iJQj,11oa) < 0. 
Proof· 
aQjl .. acl .,ail 
--· =M ·51 ---N-51 -
oa 1 p oa 1 p oa 
It can easily be shown that, 
From the first order condition, 
Mjo£ = [ M] [ £~] = [ M] [ (]3; +s)(b -c)+h(fi/)] 
Njo( N G 1 N h(ft/) 
Thus, ~;:; ~ [ Z] if b <c. Now, -~~ · ' < 0 if and only if 
Mjo£ <[M] [ (]3/+s)+(j(p.)l(b +c))] 
Njo( N (ft/-p.)+(h(p.)l(b+c)) 
Since f (p •) = h (p •) then the RHS is greater than (MIN) and since the LHS is at most equal 
to (MIN) then (iJQ j .tfoa) < 0 if b ~c. By continuity, there exists some E > 0 such that, for 
all b E (c, C +E), 
w/ + s)(b- c)+ h(fi/) 
h(ft/) 
< . 0 [ 
(]3/ + s) + (j (p. )/(b +c)) ] 
w/-P ·) + <<h (p • )/(b +c)) 
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What this proposition in effect implies, is that by choosing instrument 2, the legislator could 
avoid magnifying an already politically sensitive issue-the cost of maintaining the surplus-
and still provide some support for fanners. To see this, note that 
is zero (by assumption), and the gains to producers increase as a increases, then (aQ1,-}aa) is 
positive. Consequently, (at:.t.-Jaa) is negative. 
An increase in the surplus brought about, say, by the adoption of new technology can be 
offset by restrictions on input usage. The analysis of the impact of such restrictions proceeds in 
a similar fashion. A restriction on inputs tilts supply upward; analytically, it is represented by a 
fall in b. If a quota were the method of support, its effect would not be observed by consumers. 
If instead a price floor were in effect, the consequent contraction of the surplus would be 
observed by consumers. Again, an information asymmetry exists. To accommodate this, I 
PROPOSITION 6.6: 
There exists a y > 0 such that for all b E (0, c + y), (aQ1 ,1/ab) < 0. 
Proof· 
Now, 
ac h (p • ) • af 1 (p • ) • __ 1 = ..!.(.6 2- • 2) + p and _1 = fi 2 + sji + p 
ab 2 ' P (b + c) ab ' (b + c) 
From the first order condition, if (b - c) ~ 0, then, 
Since f (p •) = h (p •) then 
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J3/+J3/+(f(p.)p.)l(b +c) 
lr"' 2 _ p • 2) + h (p • )p • )/(b + c) 2 I.Yj 
This implies that (aQj ,/ab) < 0 if (b -c)~ 0. The conclusion follows then from continuity 
ofQj,I in b. 0 
Figure 6.8b shows quite clearly that producers' gains under a quota fall if input restrictions are 
imposed. Since (a(Njo/(Lz))/ab) is zero, then this means (aQjjab) is positive. Proposition 6.6 
thus implies that (a/11,')/ab) is negative, i.e., the imposition of input restrictions biases the choice 
toward a price floor. 
Propositions 6.4 and 6.5 suggest that changes in the surplus trigger changes in the degree 
of control over production. An increase in the surplus leads to a greater degree of control and a 
decline to a lesser degree. Proposition 6.6 then suggests that once the appropriate level of 
controls are in place, a price floor can be politically maintained as the method of support. 
So far I have dealt only with changes in economic parameters. I now tum to the effect of 
changes in certain political parameters on a legislator's choice. Proposition 6.7 states that, 
given a quota is the instrument used, a decline in the number of producers relative to the 
number of consumers in a legislator's district will induce the legislator to lower the quota 
equivalent price support, which in tum suggests that the legislator would prefer to relax 




First note that, by the implicit function theorem, for any parameter m, 
a_pj (oQ/.JCJm) 
am =- Qj~ 
Since Q;~ < 0 then sign (CJpjtam) =sign (CJQ/,JCJm ). It follows then that 
Producers need not necessarily be a cohesive group. The same is true for consumers. The 
cohesiveness of either group is reflected by the probability vote functions 8~ and 8/; the less 
cohesive the group, the lower the value of the vote function at any given per capita gain G or 
per capita loss L. 13 The next proposition suggests that a legislator would prefer less control over 
production the less cohesive producers (or the more cohesive consumers) are. 
PROPOSITION 6.8: 
a_p.z a_pf 
a8£ > o and a8{ < o . 
Proof: 
In this chapter I have constructed a political economy model of instrument choice in the 
regulation of markets and have used it to analyze the choice between a price floor and a 
production quota in the implementation of a price support program. I show that both economic 
and political variables and/or changes therein affect a legislator's choice between the two. In 
the next section I will present some anecdotal evidence supportive of the implications of 
Propositions 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. In the next chapter I will present statistical evidence attesting to 
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or rejecting these implications as well as implications of the other propositions. 
C. Some Empirical Evidence 
A price floor was the basic method used to support feed grains and wheat prices during the 
period 1952 to 1965.14 Hence, the period 1952-1965 provides a fertile ground for evaluating the 
consistency of Propositions 6.4 and 6.5 with actual events. I should note that in no other period 
after World War II was a price floor adopted as the support instrument. 
From Table 6.2 below, observe that the acreage planted to com each year from 1953 to 
1960 remained more or less constant. On the other hand, yield per acre rose consistently. The 
average per acre yield the first half of the period was 35.8 and in the second half 45.7, an 
increase of 27.6% (the same trends characterized the other feed grains-sorghum, barley, oats). 
Oearly, this implied an increase in supply due to technological change. 15 From Propositions 
6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 one would predict that some form of effective control on production would be 
imposed. In fact, there was indeed a shift in the predicted direction. Effective quantity 
restrictions were imposed beginning in 1961. In 1961, the Kermedy administration proposed 
stiff production controls in conjunction with price support programs. "The basic objectives of 
the program were (1) to raise farmer income and (2) to reduce government costs. The technique 
to achieve these ends was 'supply management'-a stringent system of sales and production 
quotas that would prevent surpluses from reaching the market thereby driving farm market 
prices above support levels. The quotas were to be based on an individual farmer's history of 
production. The increase in price would mean few Government price-support acquisitions 
would be necessary, and therefore CCC (Commodity Credit Corporation) would not acquire 
expensive inventories with heavy carrying costs.'' 16 This reflected the rise in opposition to the 
price support program, due basically to the excessive buildup in the surplus (as indicated in 
Table 6.2). Although the proposal was defeated in Congress, a weaker form of quantity 




End of Year End of Year 
Year Acreage Yield/Acre Carryover Stocks Acreage Yield/Acre Carryover Stocks 
1953 81.5 35.4 920 78.9 14.9 933 .5 
1954 82.2 32.9 1,035 62.5 15.7 1.036.2 
1955 80.9 35.5 1,165 58.2 16.1 1.033.5 
1956 77.8 39.5 1.419 60.6 16.6 908 .8 
1957 73.2 41.6 1.469 49.8 19.2 881.4 
1958 73.3 46.8 1.524 56.0 26.0 1.295.1 
1959 82.7 46.3 1,787 56.7 19.7 1.313.4 
1960 81.4 48.0 2,016 54.9 24.7 1.411.3 
1961 65.9 54.6 1,653 55.1 22.1 1.322.0 
1962 65.0 55.5 1,365 49.3 22.1 1,195 .2 
1963 68.8 58.4 1.537 53.4 21.5 901 .4 
1964 65.8 52.9 1,147 55.1 23.0 817 .3 
1965 65.1 63.0 840 57.4 22.9 535.2 
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controls in which government costs of farm programs might be reduced significantly. But in 
losing, it pioneered a system of voluntary controls, which were workable in he sense that (1) 
they were acceptable and (2) they had the capacity to reduce production. The experience in the 
Kennedy years further demonstrated that any farm policy which seeks to hold farm prices and 
incomes above equilibrium levels must, if it is to be continued over a period of years, have 
coupled with it a system of effective supply management devices." 17 In the years following 
1961, the surplus was gradually reduced. 
The data for wheat also supports the prediction. Except for the years 1956 and 1957, when 
export demand was unusually strong, the surplus increased from 933.5 million bushels in 1953 
to 1.41 billion bushels in 1960. Planted acreage fell continuously during the period,but yield 
per acre increased by about 65%, thereby offsetting the potential reduction in the surplus that 
the decrease in acreage could have generated. As mentioned earlier, quantity restrictions were 
imposed beginning in 1961. 
In this chapter, I constructed a political economy model of instrument choice and used it to 
analyze the choice between a price floor and a production quota in the implementation of a price 
support program. I argued that demand and supply elasticities at equilibrium affect a 
legislator's choice between the two instruments and I go on to show that changes in certain 
parameters, both economic and political, result in a bias toward one instrument or the other. In 
the next chapter, I will present stronger evidence attesting to the model's credibility. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6 
1. Hansen (1986), pp. 4. 
2. Sampson and Farris (1975), pp. 347. 
3. For a justification, see Chapter 4, footnote 16. 
4. This is meant to reflect in part the differences in the incidence of benefits and costs across 
different parts of the country. 
5 . . Note that Qi. i (J.t/) = Qi. i (~(JJ./); 11/). 
6. By the envelope theorem, 
oQ · i oQ· i 1 --'·-= --''-1 . om om lt=tj. 
7. I assume that consumers shoulder the whole tax burden of the surplus and, at least initially, 
that the surplus is given away after one period. Note too that I have expressed the gain and 
loss functions in terms of the price support level ji. I can also do this in terms of a unit tax. 
Lett = (ji- p • ). Then I can derive the functions in terms oft by substituting (t + p •) for ji. 
That is, G (ji) = G (t + p •) and L (ji) = L (t + p • ). 
8. More precisely, by the implicit function theorem, there exists a neighborhood N such that, 
for all JJ./ e N , 
(i) fi} = pj(Jl/) and 
(ii) Qj , ((fij(Jl/) ; JJ.,0 = 0. 
Note that 11/ and~ differ only ins. 
9. 11D (p •; c, d(c )) = 1 • . Since lim d(c) = (p • b0 +a!) then lim llD (p •; c, d(c )) = 0 . 
d (c )lcp - 1 c-+0 c-+0 
10. Notice that the steeper the demand curve is at the equilibrium, the smaller the surplus and 
thus the lower its tax burden. Figure 5 shows that the lower tax burden is still larger than 
the potential additional loss to consumers under a quota, due to the higher support level: 
(J + K) < (B + C + D + E + F + I) < (B + C + D + E + F +I + storage cost). Implicit in this 
is the assumption that consumers place at least equal weight on the loss due to the surplus 
as on the loss due to higher prices. In fact, congressional debates seem to indicate that a 
greater weight is put on the former (which makes our argument ever stronger). 
11. As c rises the demand curve becomes flatter at the equilibrium, and thus the surplus 
increases. This increases the loss to consumers who then will increase their lobbying 
activities. To stymie the rise in opposition, the legislator must lower the support level 
given that he chooses to retain instrument 1 as the method of support. 
12. Note that, at c = c, demand is inelastic at the equilibrium. Otherwise, ~1 .2 < 0. 
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13. A fall in 8L(8/) results also in a fall in 8!(8(). 
14. During 1953-1960, acreage restrictions were also imposed occasionally in conjunction 
with a price floor. But these restrictions were ineffective or at best partially effective. The 
results of Propositions 6.4 and 6.5 can be interpreted as conditional on partially effective 
acreage restrictions being imposed under each instrument. 
15. Domestic demand was relatively stable and exports insignificant during the period. 
16. Cochrane and Ryan (1976), pp. 92. 
17. Ibid, pp. 95. 
18. Data is from Cochrane and Ryan (1976), pp. 179,203. 
19. (G 2(p;c,J(c),a,b)-L 2(p;c,J(c),a,b)={-c(I+ ~lP'+[ !] (bJ(c)+(J(c)-a)cJP 
- 2 
[ (a- d(c)) ( • b •2)]} { c -2 d-( )- (d-( ) • c •2)} + - ap + -p - - -p + c p - c p - -p 
~ 2 2 2 
So, lim[G 2(.0; c, d(c ), a, b)- L 2(.0; c, d(c ), a, b)] cJ.o 
= J(Ojp + [ :] J(O)- [ ~] (a 2 + J(O)"')- ap' - ~ p ' 2 - J(O)p + J(O)p' 
= [ E.] (p • b + a ) - £ - (p • b + a )2 - ap • - .!!_ p • 2 + (p • b + a )p • 
b 2b 2b 2 
• a
2 
[ 1 ] •2 2 • 2 • b •2 •2 • =ap + 
2
b- ~ (p b +2ap b +a )-ap - 2? +p b +ap 
= - [ ; ] p. 2 - ~ p. 2 + bp. 2 = 0 . 
20. This condition guarantees that there are values of c and s such that 
Qi ,1 (ft/ (c, d (c), a, b, s ); c, d (c), a, b, s) > 0. The choice problem is trivial unless such 
values exist 
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The route to the major proposition is long and somewhat difficult. Therefore, I will use a 
step-by-step approach, proving lemmas one at a time and using them to gradually build up to 
the proposition. 
LEMMA 1: 
For any p E [p •, oo+), 
(iii) L1o G 1 are strictly convex and strictly increasing in p and L 2, G2 are strictly concave in 
p for all c > 0 and, 
A 
(iv) let p = argmax G20 and Pu = argmax L20 then, 3 an e > 0 such that, for all c E (O,e), 
[p ,oo+) fp ,oo+) 
(a) p>p* 
(v) G 1 and G2 satisfy the following additional properties: 
A A 
p '=p ifp =p; 
(vii) given c > 0 then .!}_(L2 - G _\ > 0 for all p >> p • and..!}_ (L 2 - G~ = 0 if p = p •. dp 21 dji 




(ii) this follows from the definitions of the gain and loss functions. More precisely, 
since (h - n' > 0 then 
i i 




L 1 (ji) = J I (p )dp + (ji + s )(h (ji)- I (ji)) > J I (p )dp + CP- p. )(h (ji)- I (ji)) > 
i p_ 
> J l(p)dp +I (h -l)dp =Gt(ji) 
and 
p_ p_ p_ 
Gl(ji)= I l(p)dp +I (h -l)dp >I l(p)dp =L2(ji). 
Furthermore, since I (ji) < h (p) and I (ji) <I (p) for all p e (h -t(f (ji)), p • 1 then, 
p" p" 
<p. - h-1(j (fi)))l (ji) = J I <p )dp < J h (p )dp 
h -l(j (jj)) , - l(j (p}) 
and 
p_ p_ 
(ji - p. )I (ji) = I I (ji)dp < I I (p )dp . . . 
p p 
This implies that 
L 2(ji) = j I (p )dp > (ji- p • )I (ji) > {(ji- p • )I (ji) + [(p • - h-11 (ji)))l (ji)- Pj h (p )dp]} 
p. ,-l(j (p}) 




d.Lt c d2L 1 c 
- = 2(b + - )ji + (a + (b + c )s) > 0, --
2 
= 2(b + -) > 0, 
dji 2 dji 2 
. 2 2 
dG 1 d G 1 d L 2 
-=a + bp- > 0, and -- = b > 0. Also, -- =- c < 0, 
dji dji2 dji2 
dG2 c 1 
(a) dji =- 2c(1 + 2b )ji + <-,;)[(b + c)d- ac] so that 
A 1 
p =(2c)[((d -a)c +bd)!(b +2c)]. Now, 
rj _ )=(-1 )[ (d -a)c +bd] _ [ d -a] 
Pm 2c b + 2c b + c 
= [ ((d -a)c +bd)(b +c)-(d -a)2c(b +2c)] 
2c(b +2c)(b +c) 
Furthennore, 
((d - a )c + bd )(b + c) - (d -a )2c (b + 2c) 
= (d -a )c (b +c)+ bd (b +c)- 2(d -a )c (b + c)- 2c 2(d -a) 
=- (d -a)c(b +c) +bd(b +c)- 2c 2(d -a)= 
= [ac + (b - c )d](b +c)- 2c 2d + 2ac 2 = ac (b + c )(b - c )d (b +c)- 2c 2d + 2ac 2 
This is positive provided c is sufficiently close to 0. 
(b) dL}. =d-cp=f(ji)=Oiffji=!!_=pM. Ifa ~-3d andc >Othen, 
~ c 
: d [ (! )((d -a )c + bd)j 
(fi- PM)=--
c 2c (1 + 1£.) 
b 
= ( _!_ )[d _ ((d _a )c + bd)] = ( _!_ )[ d (2b )(1 + -¥-)- ((d- a )c + bd)l 
c 2b (1 + 2c) c 2b (1 + 2c) 
b b 
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= [ 2bc(l + 2: )]-'[ 2db(l + 2:)- (d- a)c - bdl 
= [2bc(l + 2: r·[bd +(3d+ a)c] > 0. 0 
(v) (a) G 1(p • ) = 0 and Gift)> 0. Since G 1 is continuous and strictly increasing on 
(p •, oo+) then there must necessarily be a price Pu e (p •, oo~ such that 
(b) Givenp E [p* ,pu] and a;> 0 on (p*, 00~ then Gl(p) ~ Gl(pu). 
Since G 1(pu) = G2(]3) then, for p e (p • ,pu), G2v§) > G 1(.P) ~ G 1(p •) = 0. Since 
G; > 0 on (p · , fi) and G 2(p ·) = 0 then 3 a p e (p ·, fi) such that G 2(ft ) = G 1 (p). 
Since G 1 > G2 then it follows that p > ji. Now if ji = p • then, since 
(vi) This follows from the fact that G 2 is strictly concave on [p •, oo~ and G 2(]§) > 0, i.e., 
G 2 is an upside-down parabola with a positive peak on [p •, oo~ . 
So, 
_E_(L 2(p)- G2(p)) = (- cp +d)-{- 2c (1 + ...£)p + .!.[(b + c )d- ac]} dp 2b b 
= [- c + 2c (1 + ;b )JP + d - ! [(b + c )d - ac] 
( c
2 )_ db- [bd +(d -a)c] = c+-p+ 
b b 
= (.!. )[c (b + c )p- (d -a )c] = ( .£ )[(b + c )p- (d -a)] . 
b b 
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This implies that, given c > 0, 
d - - { > 0, if ji > p. 
--=<Lift)- Gift)) O if - • · 0 
dp = ' p =p 




) ( • b • 2),] + - ap + -p 
2b 2 
=- c (1 + ~ )ji2 + ( ! )[(b + c )(p • (b + c) +a)- ac ]ji 
+ [<:)(p"(b +c)+a)-( 2~)(a 2 +(p"(b +c)+a)2)-(ap" + ~p"')] 
=- c (1 + ~ )ji2 + ( ! )[p • (b + c )2 + 1(b + c) - ac ]ji 
[ 
a • a2 1 2 • • 2 • b •zl + ( b )p (b + c) + b - ( 
2
b )(a + 2ap (b +c)+ p (b + c) - (ap + "2? )J 
a • 1 • • 2 2 • b •2 + [( b )p (b + c)- ( 2b )(2ap (b +c)+ p (b +c) ) - (ap + """"ip )] . 
So, 
dG 2 = _ (1 + .£ )ji2 + [ 2p • (b +c)] ji + [<E._ )p. _ (-1 )(2ap • + 2P •2(b + c ))l 
de b b b 2b j 
(1 c)-2 [2p.(b+c)]- (1) •2(b ) =- +-p+ p--p +c 
b b b 
=-(1 + ~)ii'+ [ p"(bb +c)] (2ji -p") 
= ( !l[- (b +c)P2 + p" (b + c)(2ji- p")] =- [ b; '] [ii2 - 2jip" +p"~ 
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Note that property (vii) implies that a legislator will always prefer jJ to jJ' (where jJ and fJ' are 
as defined above). That is, since G2(jJ, c)= G2(jJ ',c), (L 2(fJ ')- G2(jJ ')) > (L 2(fJ)- G2(fJ )) and 
I eSc > 0 then, 
Hence, I will restrict attention to the interval [p •, fi ]. Given this, the implicit function theorem 
implies that there exist functions p = p (c, d, a, b), p 11 = p 11(c, d), Pu = Pu (c, d, a, b), and 
jJ = jJ (ji; c, d, a, b) (where jJ ( · ) is defined on [p •, Pu]) on some well-defined neighborhood. 
The function jJ (ji; c, d, a, b) can actually be derived from the definition. Recall that this 
function is defined implicitly by the equation G 1 (ji) = G2(jJ ). Substituting the appropriate 
expression yields, 
or equivalently, 
_R +[f~2-4R R ]112 
_ r;:;:. d b) = 1-'2 - 1-'2 1-' 11-'3 
p \Y , c , , a , 
2
p, (A.l) 
From Lemma l,jJ (ji; c, d, a, b)> 0 for all p e (p• ,pu(c, d, a, b)]. Hence, <Pi- 4P1P3)::;:: 0. 
Furthennore, since p1 < 0 and p2 > 0 then only the first root needs to be considered, i.e., 
which from above means the legislator will only consider p (ji; c, d, a, b). Note that ~ 1 , ~2• and 
~3 are functions of (c, d, a, b, ji); since a and b are fixed then each is effectively a function of 
c, d, and/or ji- ~1 = ~ 1 (c ), ~2 = ~2(c, d), and ~3 = ~3(d ,ji). 
The denominator of (F.l ') is zero when c = 0 and so (F.l ') is undefined at c = 0. To find 
p (ji; 0, d, a, b), set G 2(ft , 0, d, a, b) equal to G 1 (ji; a, b). This yields 
d- [(a - df ( - b -2)] 0 'P + - ap + -p = 
2b 2 
which implies 
-r;;·Od b) (1)[- b-2 (a-d)2] 
p \Y' ' 'a' = d ap + lp + 2b · (A.2) 
Note that p (ji; 0, d, a, b) is unique. This follows from the fact that G 2(ji; 0, d, a, b) is linear in 
ji- G2(ji; 0, d, a, b)= dji + [(a ;d)
2 
- (ap • + ~ p • 2)]. Notice, too, that for 
d = d (c) = p • (b + c) + a, 
(A.2') 
To simplify notation, I will let p (ji; c, a, b)= p (ji; c, d(c ), a, b). From here on I will restrict 
my attention to the function p (ji; c, a, b). 
I will now prove that p (ji; c, a, b) converges pointwise top (ji; 0, a, b) as c goes to zero. 
Consider the following problem: find x • such that ~1x 2 + ~zX + ~3 = 0. If ~1 -:F. 0 there will be two 
solutions, 
If ~ 1 = 0 then obviously x • =- (~:y'~z). The next lemma establishes conditions under which x; 
and x; converge to x • as ~ 1 approaches zero; Corollary 1 follows from this lemma. 
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LEMMA2: 
lim x • == 0 { 
x· , if P2 > 0 
131--.o t oo+ , tf Pz < 0 
{ 
-oo , if p2 > 0 
1
0 • 
tm x 2 == • 0 131--.o x , tf P2 < 0 
Proof: 
Case (i): P2 > 0 
Case (ii): P2 < 0 
COROLLARY 1: 
Let Q be any compact set in [p •, oo+)o Then, for any ji E Q, limp (ji; c, a, b)== p (ji; 0, a, b )o 
c!o 
Proof: 
P CPtCc ), P2(c, d(c )), P3(d(c ), p) = p (ji; c, a, b). Now dis continuous inc, P2 and P3 are 
continuous in c and d, and P1 is continuous in c . Also P is continuous in P2 and p3. Since 
P2 > 0 for all c 2::0 then from Lemma 2, P is also continuous in p1• Consequently, 
limP CP1 (c), PzCc, d(c )), P3(d(c ),ji)) = P (lim P1 (c), lim P2(c, d (c)), lim P3(d (c), p)) c!o c!o c!o c!o 
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p ] = p (jj; 0, a , b) . D 
B r·-+~~ (O~ p 2(0,d (0)) d (0) 
~2_,~2(Q.. d(O!J 
~3_,~3(d(O),p) 
For succinctness, we will denote p (ji; 0, a, b) by p lim(ji). Some properties of p lim(ji) are proved 
in Lemma 3. 
LEMMA3: 
p lim(ji) satisfies the following conditions: 
(i) p(ji;c,a,b)>plim(ji) ifji>p• andc >0, 
(ii) ji < p lim(ji) if ji > p •, and 
(iii) p (p • ; c, a, b)= p lim(p •) = p • . 
Prooi: 
(i) Recall that G2(ji; c, d(c ), a, b)= G 2(ji; c, a, b) and that 
[G 1(ji; a, b)- G 2cP(ji; c, a, b); c, a, b)] =0. From Lemma 3(ii), 
p(ji;c,a,b)e fp•.ficc,d(c),a,b)]. Since a; =(dG 2!dp)>Oon 
(p •, fi (c, d (c), a, b)) then, by the implicit function theorem, there exists a function 
p (ji; c, d(c ), a, b)= p (ji; c, a, b) such that 
[G 1(ji; a, b)- G 2cP(ji; c, a, b); c,a,b)] = 0 in some neighborhood of(ji, c, a , b). 
Moreover, in this neighborhood, 
From Lemma l(iii), (aG 2/ap) > 0. Now, it can be shown that caa -}ac) < o so that 
(ap 1ac) > o. Thus, p lim(ji) < p (ji; c, a, b) for any c > 0. 
(ii) By definition, G1(ji; a, b)= G 2cP lim(ji); 0, a, b). From Lemma 1, G 1 > G 2 so that 
Gl(ji; a' b)> G 2(ji; 0, a, b). Since c; >0 on (p •• fi<c' d(c) , a, b)) and 
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ji E (p •, fi (c, d (c), a, b)) then it follows that p lim(ji) > ji if ji > p •. 
(iii) By definition, G 1(p •; a, b)= G 2(p •; c, a, b). Since 
G 1(p •; a, b)= G 2(p •; c, a, b)= 0 and G ~ > 0 on (p •, fi (c, d(c ), a, b)) then 
p(p*;c,a,b)=p·. 
Also, p lim(p •) = p (p •; c, a, b). D 
From above we already know that lim G 2(ji; c , a, b) = G 2(ji; 0, a, b) is linear in ji. It can do 
easily be shown that lim L2(ji; c, d(c ), a, b)= limG 2(ji; c, a, b )
19 so that the fonner is linear in 
c!o do 
ji. Both these facts imply that pJ.L(d, d(c )), ft (c, d(c ), a, b), and Pu(c, d(c ), a, b) become 
infinitely large as c gets closer to 0 from above-lim pJ.L =limp =lim Pu = oo+. 
c!o c!o do 
Now, consider the sequence of functions f.P (ji; ! , a, b)}:. Corollary 1 implies this 
sequence converges pointwise top lim(ji). It is also true that the sequence converges uniformly 
top lim(ji) on any compact set [p •, p •• ]. To show this I will first prove a more generalized case. 
LEMMA4: 
Let F1 : Q ~ R, F : Q ~ R. Suppose x; = argmax IF 1 - F I exists and is unique. Then, if 
Q 
-+ 
{F1 } converges pointwise to F then it converges uniformly to F on Q. 
l:=l 
Proof' 
For each k, uniqueness of x; implies IF 1 (x)- F (x) I < F1 (x;)- F (x;) I for all k and all 
x '# x;. 
k' ~k. Byuniquenessofx;, IF1 (x;)-F(x;)l <M1 forallk' >k. Hence,MK <M1 forall 
-+ 
k > k'. This means {M1 } is a decreasing sequence. Since M1 ~ 0 for all k then Mk 
l:=l 
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converges to 0 ask increases. Thus, for any e > 0, 3 N (e) such that Mt < e if k ~ N (e). 
Since IFt(x)-F(x)~Mt forallk andallx E Q thenitfollowsthat IFt(x)-F(x)l <efor 
-all x E Q if k ~ N (e), i.e., {F.d converges uniformly on Q. D 
t=l 
COROLLARY 2: 
{jf (ji; ..!. , a , b)}- converges uniformly to p lim (ji) on any com pact set [p • , p •• ] . 
k k=! 
Proof: 
For any fixed k 0 and for any k ~ k 0, p (ji; ! , a ,b) is continuous on 
• 1 - 1 
[p ,pu(0 ,d(0 ),a,b)]. Now k k 
Hence, p (ji; ! , a, b) is a positive monotone in ji. Thus, for any compact set [p •, p ••] with 
p•• ~Pu(~, d(~), a, b), argmaxp; ..!., a, b) exists and is unique provided k ~ k 0• By 
k k fp 0 ,p 00 ) k 
Corollary 1 and Lemma 4, p (ji; ! , a, b) converges uniformly top lim(p) on [p •, p •• ]. D 
I can now show that, for a given compact set [p •, p ••], L 1 (ji; c, d (c), a, b) > 
Lz(§ (ji; c, a, b); c, d (c), a, b) for any ji E [p • , p ••] if c is sufficiently close to 0. Given the 
definition of p ( · ; ·),this implies conditions (6.9a) and (6.9b) in the main text are satisfied for 
all ji E [p • , p •• ] provided c is close to 0. 
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LEMMAS: 
LetL 2(D; c, d(c), a, b) =L 2(0; c ,a, b), <j>(D) = [L 1(D; 0, d(O), a, b)-[ z(p(D; 0, a, b); 0, a, b), 
Proof" 
(i) <j>(D) > 0 and 
oo+ 
(ii) { <Pt (D) converges pointwise to <jl(D). 
k=l 
(i) <jl(D) = bji2 + aji + bs (D - p •) - (p • b +a )p (D; 0, a, b). Hence, 
~; = 2bji + a + bs - (p • b +a) ~ (D; 0, a, b) = 2bji + a + bs - (a + bji) = b (D + s) > 0 
and 
a2"' 
~=b >0. ap2 
Thus, <P is strictly increasing and strictly convex in [p • , oo+ ). Since <j>(p •) = 0 
then <j>(D) > 0 for all ji e (p •, oo+ ). 
( 1 );:r;:;. 1 b)2 d-( 1 );:';:;. 1 b) + 2k P'Y'k'a' - k'P'Y•k•a, = 
= bji2 + aji + bs (D - p •) + ( 2~ )(52 + p (D; ! , a , b )2) + 
From Corollary 1, p (D; ! , a, b) converges pointwise top (D; 0, a, b). Thus, 
lim <Pt (D)= bji2 + aji + bs (ji - p •) - p • b + a )p (D; 0, a, b)= <j>(D) . 0 
.t~oo+ 





Let p •• > p •. { <ll.t} converges uniformly to <!>on [p •, p •• ]. 
k=l 
Proof" 
<l>.tCO)-<I>mCO)={(b + ~)ji2 +( 2~)p(O; !,a,b)2 +aji-d(!)p(O; !,a,b)} 




p v-- , -,a, + ap - - p v--, -, a, 
m m m m m 
= ~ (! - ! )ji2 + ( 2~ )p (0; ! , a, b l- ( 2~ )p (0; ! , a, b))- d(! )p (0; ! , a, b) 
+ d( .l__P (0; .1__ ), a, b). 
m m 
Since limpu(c, d(c), a, b)= oo+ then 3 k 0 > 0 such thatp** <puC~. d(~, a, b); 
d.o k k 
furthermore, from Lemma 3, for any k, m ~ k0, jJ (0; .!. , a, b), jJ (0; .1__, a, b) must be less 
k m 
thanp(O;~, a, b). Thus, 
k 
( 1 );;; r;;. 1 b)2 ( 1 );;; r;;. 1 b)2 I d-( 1 );;; . 1 b) d-( 1 )-::: r;;) + 2kPI.Y•o•a, + 2mPv--.-o,a, + -p,-,a, - -plimv--
k m m m m 
+ d(.l__)P;:;!imr;;) - d(.!.)p-::: r;; · .!. a b) I < .!. I .!. - .1__ I p (-1 d(-1 a b )2 
m v-- k v--' k' ' - 2 k m u k 0 ' k 0 ' ' 
+ 
2
1 ( kl + .1__ )p (0; ~.a, b )2 + I d(.l__){j (0; .1__, a, b)- p lim (D) I + I d(.l__)p !imW) 
m k m m m 
- d ( ! )p (0; ! , a, b) I . 
Without loss of generality, assume m ~ k. Then, 
I - r;;) I 1 ( 1 1 ) ( 1 d-( 1 ) b )2 1 ( 1 1 ) -::: r;;. 1 b )2 <l>.t(ft)-<l>mv-- ~2 -;;- m Pu kO' ko ,a, +2 -;;+-;;;Pv--•J:O•a, 
+ ld(!){f(O; !,a,b)-plim(O))I + ld(!){jlim(O)-p(O; !,a,b)l 
From Lemma l(vii) we know thatp (0; ~.a, b) ~fie~. d(~). a, b) for all 
k k k 
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jie [p*,pu(~),d(~),a,b)]. Hence, 
k k 
- -<11 1 1-1 211 1;:1-1 2 
i<h(.O)- <l>m(.O)l- l(k- -;;;)Pu(!Jl, d(kO), a, b) + l(k + m )p(kO, d(kO), a, b) 
+ ld(!)(f(ji; !,a,b)-plim(ji)l + ld(!)cP!im(ji)-p(ji; !,a,b))l. 
Now for any e > 0, the following are true, 
(i) 
11 1 1-1 2 e. o 3 N 1(e) such that-(-- -)pu(0 , d(0 ), a, b) <- 1f m?:. k?:. max{k , N 1(e)} 2 k m k k 4 
and 
(1.1.) ::IN() hth 1 ( 1 1 );:( 1 d-( 1 b)2 e.fk {k 0 () ::1 2 e sue at 2 k + m p kO, kO, a, < 4 1 , m ?:. max , N 2 e } . 
Also, from Corollary 2, 3 N 3(e) and N ie) such that 
ld(_!_)(f(ji;_!_,a,b)-plim(ji))l <~ 'V jie [p*,p**] if k,m?:.max{k 0,N3( )}and m m 4 
ld(! )(f(ji; ! , a, b)- p lim(ji)) I < : 'V ji E [p* ,p**] if m?:. k?:. max{k 0,N4(e)}. 
Thus, <l>.t (ji) converges uniformly to some function g (ji). From Lemma 5, <l>k (ji) 
converges pointwise to Q>(ji). This means g (ji) = <j>(ji). 0 
Proposition A.2 below follows directly from Lemma 5 and Proposition A.l. It establishes that, 
fork sufficiently large, or equivalently c sufficiently close to 0, <l>.t (ji) is positive on any 
compact set in (p •, p • ]. 
PROPOSITION A.2: 
For any o > 0 with (p • + o) < p •• , 3 N 11 such that <!>~: (ji) > 0 for all ji e [p • + o, p •• J if k ?:. N 8• 
Proof: 
PickanyibOsuchthat(p* +O)<p** andchooseanye11 e (O,Q><p* +o)). FromLemma5, 
156 
and set E = I <Pko(p. + o)- $(p. + o) I. From Proposition 1' 3 N (E) such that 
I<Pt<P)- <!>(p:) I< E for all p E [p. + o,p •• ] if k ?:.N(e) . 
Hence, if k?:. max{k 0,N(e)}, then 
Since <P' > 0 then <P(p. + o) ~ $(.0) for all p E [p. + 0, p •• ]. This implies that if 
means <Pt<P) > 0 for all p e [p • + o, p ••] and all k ?:. max{k0, N (e)}. So set 
0 -
N 0 =max{k ,N(e)}. 0 
So far I have focused on the properties of the loss and gain functions associated with the 
two instruments. I will now relate them to the legislator's objective function. We will make 
two assumptions. First, for any vector (a, b, c, d, s) and for each i, there is some support level 
0- • '0- . P;/c, d(c), a, b, s) E [p , oo+) such that Q1,;(p;ic, d(c), a, b, s), a, b, c, d, s) < 0. And second, 
for given (a, b), there exist numbers c, s e (0, oo+) such that Q;,1 (p •; a, b, c, d(c ), s) > 0 for all 
C E (0, C] and S E (0, S] .20 
LEMMA6: 
Letpj(c, d(c), a, b, s) = argmax Q1,;(.D; a, b, c, d(c), s). Then, pj(c, d(c), a, b, s) < oo+, i = 1, 2. 
[p • oo+) 
• A 1 - • dpj 
[ 
:\A 1] 
Furthermore, 1f p1 (c, d(c ), a, b, s) > p then Tc < 0. 
Proof: 
Since Q1,;(p•; a, b, c, d(c), s) = 0, Q;,;(p;?J<c, d(c), a, b, s); a, b, c, d(c), s), and 
Q;~(.D; a, b, c, d(c ), s) < 0 for all p?:. p • then pj(c, d(c ), a, b, s) exists and is greater than or 
equal to p•. 
Now consider Q1,1(.D, c ;i(c), a, b, s) = M/6j(G(.D; a, b) -N/6j(L1(.D; c, d(c), a, b, s)) where 
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G1 = ( ~ )G 1 and L1 = ( ~ )L 1• Suppose ft/(c, d(c ), a, b, s) E (p •, oo+) then, by the implicit 
function theorem, 
' A I - - I -, A I -
Qj,l (pj (c, d(c), a, b, s); a, b, c, d(c), s) =Mj8p · G 1 (pj (c, d(c), a, b, s); a, b) 
I -, A I - -
-Nj8c · L 1 (]3j (c, d(c), a, b, s); c, d(c), a, b, s) = 0 
and 
Since Q}:1 < 0 then sign (oft/lac)= sign (aQ},1 Jac ). Now, 
a - - • 
Furthermore, from above, a;;L 1 ( • , c, d (c), a, b, s) ~ 0 for all p ~ p and also 
a -, - a c 
a;;L 1 (-, c, d(c), a, b,s) = a;;[2(b + l)p +(a+ (b + c)s)] = (jJ + s) >0 for all p ~p· . 
Since (ai;Jac) > o and 8{, 8{ > o then (aQ},1 Jac) < o. 0 
This lemma in effect states thatft/(c, d(c ), a, b, s) ~ft/(0, d(O), a, b, s) for all c ~ 0. For 
succincmess let ft/(0) = ft/(0, d (0), a, b, s ). 
LEMMA 7: 
For any 8 > 0, 3 a c > 0 such thatp,.(c ,d(c), a, b, s) > <P/(0) + 8). 
Proof: 




For any s E [0, S] and o·· > 0, 3 c. E (0, c] and 0° > 0 such that 
ft/(c*, d(c* ), a, b, s) E {p* + 0° ,p/(0) + (5**), and <l>c•(D) > 0 for all p E [p* + o• ,p/(0) + 0° 0 ]. 
Proof: 
Pick any s 0 e [0, S] and then choose any c0 e (0, c]. By assumption, 
that (p. +a·) <ft/(c 0, d(c~, a' b' s~. Choose any o·· > 0 and form the interval 
[p • + o*, ft/(0) + a•• ]. From Proposition F.2 we know that 3 k > 0 such that <l>.t\P) > 0 
V ji e [p* +a· ,p 1(0) +&**];let i = (1!{). From Lemma 7 we also know that 3 c > o such 
that Pu (c, d (c), a, b) > (p/(0) + o··) and from Lemma 6 that, for all j e c, (ap] 1ac) < o or 
equivalently that P/Cc, d(c), a, b, s~ <ft/(0, d(O), a, b, s~ for all c > 0. Now, 
Since (ai; las)= (1/N)(b +c) and (ai,;as) = (1/N)(h (D)- f (jj)) then (aQ;,, !as)< 0. 
Consequently, Pj1(0, d(O), a, b' s~ <ft/(0, d(O), a' b' 0) :::;p 1(0) +a··. Hence, 
ft/(c 0, d(c~.a, b, s~,ft/(c, d(c), a, b, s~ and ft/(c, d(c), a, b, s~ must be less than 
(p 1(0) + a•• ). Finally set c • = min{c 0, c, c *}then, 
ft/(c*, d(c *),a, b, s~ E (p* + o• ,p 1(0) + o**) and, since 




' d(c*), a' b, s~. <l>c• (jj) > 0 for allp E [p* +a· ,p 1(0) + 0°0 ]. Note also 
that C • E (0, c) Since c0 E (0, c]. 0 
Proposition A.2 and Lemma 8 prove Proposition 6.2 in the text The last proposition states that 
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~1 .2 < 0 given Proposition A.2 and Lemma 8. 
PROPOSITION A.3: 
For any c E [0, c •] (where c • is defined as in Lemma 8) and for any s E (0, S], 
A2 - - AI - -
Q j .z(fij (c, d (c), a, b); c , d (c), a, b) > Qj ,1 (fij (c, d (c), a, b, s ); c, d (c), a, b, s ). 
Proof: 
Lemma 8 implies that for all c E [0, c •], 
;;:;"AI - - AI - -
Qj.z{ji (fij (c, d(c), a, b); c, d(c), a, b)> Qj,l(fij (c, d(c), a, b, s); c, d(c), a, b, s). But 
A2 - - ;;:;"AI - -
Qj .z(fij (c, d (c), a, b); c, d (c), a, b)~ Qj,2(ft (fij (c, d (c), a, b); c, d (c), a, b). D 
What this proposition says is that the legislator will always choose a production quota over a 
price floor provided demand is sufficiently inelastic at the equilibrium. 
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CHAPTER 7 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INSTRUMENT CHOICE 
IN U.S. AGRICULTURE: 1953-72 
161 
In this chapter, I will present some statistical evidence supportive of predictions made in 
chapter six about the nature of price support programs for selected agricultural commodities. I 
will investigate the markets for eight commodities, namely, wheat, com grain sorghum, barley, 
oats, cotton, tobacco, and rice. These commodities were heavily supported over the twenty-year 
period, 1953-72; in fact, wheat, com, and cotton were the most controversial. 
As I hinted earlier, the character of regulation of major agricultural commodities changed 
over time and varied across markets. In fact, as I will illustrate shortly, the variation was 
considerable. One therefore cannot help but think that perhaps some underlying choice process 
other than a naive economic efficiency mechanism is involved. My objective here is to show 
that the facts are statistically consistent with my proposed instrument choice model. 
In the first part of the chapter, I describe the basic instruments that were used to support 
prices during the twenty-year period. In the second section, I then show how these were 
combined to fonn mixed instruments; agricultural price supports have almost always been 
implemented via some type of mixed instrument. I also illustrate how each commodity was 
regulated over the period, i.e., what instrument was used for a particular commodity in a given 
year, and then explain the workings of each mixed instrument. In the third section, I state the 
hypotheses to be tested and relate them to predictions of my instrument choice model. I discuss 
how the hypotheses proceed from the comparative statics results in chapter six. Finally, in the 
last section, I present and analyze the econometric results. I first explain in brief the 
probabilistic model used to to test the hypotheses and then produce the estimates of the 
coefficients of this model. I end with an analysis of the estimates. 
A. The Basic Instruments: 
Between 1953 and 1972, there were five basic methods used to support prices: a price 
floor, acreage allotments, marketing quotas, an acreage diversion program, and income 
payments. There were three kinds of diversion programs-the Soil Bank, the Acreage 
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Retirement program, and the Set Aside program. Acreage allotments and diversion programs 
represent different methods by which production of a commodity could be controlled. 
As explained earlier, a price floor is a price set above the free market level by the 
government. To keep the price from falling, the government agrees to buy the commodity at 
the price floor. Hence, if the market price is above the floor, farmers sell in the market; if it is 
below, they sell to the government. The government ends up purchasing and storing all of the 
surplus production. The government attempts to dispose of the surplus without affecting the 
domestic market, for instance, by giving some of the commodity as aid to a third world country 
or to the very poor in this country who otherwise would not purchase the commodity. The 
remainder is eventually allowed to rot. 
Acreage allotments are restrictions on the acreage that farmers may plant to a crop. If a 
crop is subject to allotments, a national allotment is proclaimed which then is allocated to the 
States and farmers, usually on the basis of past plantings of the crop. In general, to avail of 
price supports for the crop, a farmer must not exceed his allotment. 
Restrictions on the quantities of a crop that may be grown on acreage allotments are 
referred to as marketing quotas. Whenever marketing quotas for a given crop are proclaimed, 
farmers producing the crop vote in referendum to approve or disapprove the quotas; a two thirds 
majority is required for approval. If approved, then besides losing price supports, a farmer was 
subject to penalties if he exceeded his acreage allotment. 
A marketing quota differs from a production quota (as defined in chapter six) in that it is 
used in conjunction with a price floor. Consequently, it may be nonbinding; that is, the quantity 
limit may (and usually does) exceed the demand for the commodity at the established price 
floor. A production quota is in effect a binding marketing quota. Figure 7.1 illustrates the 
distinction between the two. Under a production quota, quantity is restricted to q, resulting in a 
quota equivalent price support of p; there is no excess production. With a price floor cum 
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marketing quota, the floor is set at ji, but the quantity limit may be set above q, for instance, at 
ij ; thus a surplus of ij - q is created. 
The closest approximate to a production quota that was implemented was a poundage 
quota. A poundage quota is a limit on the number of pounds of a crop that a farmer may 
market. Only tobacco has been subject to such quotas. 
Acreage diversion refers to restrictions on acreage planted to a crop over and above 
acreage allotments. The diversion may be optional or mandatory. For example, a farmer may 
be restricted by allotments to planting 200 acres to wheat. If the diversion is optional, then he 
may choose to reduce his acreage further by some x percent of the 200. If it is mandatory, then 
in order to avail of price supports, he must reduce his acreage by x percent. In either case, the 
farmer is compensated by the government for the additional reduction. 
There were three diversion programs introduced during the twenty-year period. The Soil 
Bank was first implemented in 1956 and was ended in 1958. The Acreage Retirement Program 
was introduced by the Kennedy administration in 1961 and continued in operation (in varying 
degrees) until1969. It was then replaced by the Set Aside program. The latter differed from 
the other two in that it was not crop-specific. The Soil Bank and the Acreage Retirement 
Program were implemented on a crop by crop basis. For example, suppose a farmer has 100 
acres allocated to wheat and 200 acres to com. A farmer would (if he decided to) withdraw 100 
times x percent of his wheat acreage and 200 times y percent of his corn acreage. Under the Set 
Aside program, he would withdraw z percent of his total acreage (300 acres). In other words, 
the Set Aside was a weaker form of control over production. 
The Acreage Retirement Program differed slightly from the Soil Bank. The latter was 
purely voluntary. If he so wished, a farmer could withdraw the required acreage. The former 
was mandatory. To avail of price supports, a farmer had to withdraw a minimum number of 
acres from production. He could, if he wanted, withdraw more. 1 Under either program, a farmer 
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was compensated for the withdrawn land. 
Acreage allotments, marketing quotas, and acreage diversion programs represent different 
degrees of control over the production of one or more crops. Each represents a tilting of the 
supply curve upward; the more restrictive, the more tilted the curve. 
To subsidize farmers, the government can pay farmers directly the difference between the 
price support and the free market price (assuming the latter is below the former) for each unit he 
sells. This method of support is called income or direct payments. Under this scheme, the price 
support is called the target price. Total payments are normally restricted to a maximum, either 
directly, e.g., no farmer may receive more than $55,000, or indirectly, e.g., a farmer can obtain 
such payments only up to a maximum of x bushels. To make this scheme operational, the 
government guarantees to buy the commodity at the free market price (more precisely, an 
estimate thereof) and in addition pays farmers the differential between the market and the target 
prices. 
An income payments scheme differs subtly from a price floor. Figures 7.2a and 7.2b 
illustrate this. Both methods result in some excess production, but the excess under the former 
is smaller-(qs - q •) as opposed to (qs - q;j). Furthermore, with income payments consumers 
pay the free market (and thus a lower) price for the commodity-pc = p •. The loss in consumer 
surplus due to a higher price is therefore eliminated-the area (A +B) in Figure 7.2b. However, 
consumers end up paying for the differential between the target price Pr (the same as ji) and the 
free market price-the area (A'+ B) in Figure 7.2a. Notice that the total loss to consumers is 
smaller under an income payments scheme-(A' + B' + c' + D' + E' +F) is less than 
(A+ 2B + C +D +E + F +G). But the gain to farmers is the same- (A' +B' +C)= (A +B +C); 
only the manner of payment differs. 
In only a few cases was a commodity supported via a basic instrument. Rather, support 









FIGURE 7.2 a 
I F E 
I 
D 
FIGURE 7.2 b 
167 
mixed instrument. To facilitate the discussion, I will label the basic instruments in the 
following way: price floor (1) , acreage allotments (2), marketing quota (3), Soil Bank (4), 
acreage retirement (5), poundage quota (6), set aside (7), and income payments (8). A mixed 
instrument will be characterized by some combination of numbers, e.g., 1, 2, 4; note that a basic 
instrument is in effect a degenerate mixed instrument. I now tum to a discussion of the kinds of 
mixed instruments used during the period 1953-72. 
B. The Mixed Instruments 
In the previous chapter, I gave a rough idea of how some agricultural commodities were 
regulated during the twenty-year period. Here I will provide a much more detailed picture. In 
Table 7.1, I indicate how wheat, com, grain sorghum, barley, oats, cotton, tobacco, and rice 
were regulated in each of the twenty years. For example, in 1955, wheat, cotton, tobacco and 
peanuts were supported via a price floor, acreage allotments, and marketing quotas; com was 
supported via a price floor and acreage allotments; and grain sorghum, barley, and oats were 
supported via a price floor. 
Table 7.1 shows clearly the considerable variation in the way prices of the eight 
commodities were supported. At any given year, the method of support differed across 
commodities, and for any given commodity, the method changed over time. In Table 7.2, I list 
all the mixed instruments (both degenerate and nondegenerate) used during the period. 
As Table 7.2 shows, the kinds of instruments adopted involved either a price floor or 
income payments in combination with varying degrees of production control. In Figure 7.3a, I 
illustrate a price floor with acreage allotments (2); in Figure 7.3b, a price floor with acreage 
allotments (2) and marketing quotas (3); in Figure 7.3c, a price floor with acreage allotments 
(2), marketing quotas (3), and the Soil Bank (4); in Figure 7.3d, a price floor with acreage 
allotments (2) and acreage retirement (5); in Figure7.3e, a price floor with acreage allotments 





















Tobacco X X X 
Rice X 
1954: 
Wheat X X X 
Com X X 
Grain Sorghum X 
Oats X 
Barley X 
Cotton X X X 
Tobacco X X X 
Rice X 
1955: 
Wheat X X X 
Com X X 
. Grain Sorghum X 
Oats X 
Barley X 
Cotton X X X 
Tobacco X X X 
Rice X X X 
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1956: 
Wheat X X X 
Com X X X 
Grain Sorghum X 
Oats X 
Barley X 
Cotton X X X X 
Tobacco X X X 
Rice X X X 
1957: 
Wheat X X X 
Com X X X 
Grain Sorghum X 
Oats X 
Barley X 
Cotton X X X X 
Tobacco X X X 
Rice X X X 
1958: 
Wheat X X X X 
Com X X X 
Grain Sorghum X 
Oats X 
Barley X 
Cotton X X X X 
Tobacco X X X 
Rice X X X 
1959: 
Wheat X X X 
Com X 
Grain Sorghum X 
Oats X 
Barley X 
Cotton X X 
Tobacco X X X 
Rice X X X 
1960: 
Wheat X X X 
Com X 
Grain Sorghum X 
Oats X 
Barley X 
Cotton X X 
Tobacco X X X 
Rice X X X 
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1961: 
Wheat X X X 
Corn X X X 
Grain Sorghum X X X 
Oats X 
Barley X 
Cotton X X X 
Tobacco X X X 
Rice X X X 
1962: 
Wheat X X X X 
Com X X X 
Grain Sorghum X X X 
Oats X 
Barley X X X 
Cotton X X X 
Tobacco X X X 
Rice X X X 
1963: 
Wheat X X X X 
Com X X X 
Grain Sorghum X X X 
Oats X 
Barley X X X 
Cotton X X X 
Tobacco X X X 
Rice X X X 
1964: 
Wheat X X X 
Com X X X 
Grain Sorghum X X X 
Oats X 
Barley X X X 
Cotton X X X 
Tobacco X X X 
Rice X X X 
1965: 
Wheat X X X 
Com X X X 
Grain Sorghum X X X 
Oats X X X X 
Barley X X X 
Cotton X X X 
Tobacco X 
Rice X X X 
17 1 
1966: 
Wheat X X X 
Com X X X 
Grain Sorghum X X X 
Oats X X X 
Barley X X X 
Cotton X X X X 
Tobacco X 
Rice X X X 
1967: 
Wheat X X 
Com X X X 
Grain Sorghum X X X 
Oats X X 
Barley X X 
Cotton X X X X 
Tobacco X 
Rice X X X 
1968: 
Wheat X X 
Com X X X 
Grain Sorghum X X X 
Oats X X 
Barley X X 
Cotton X X X X 
Tobacco X 
Rice X X X 
1969: 
Wheat X X X 
Com X X X 
Grain Sorghum X X X 
Oats X X 
Barley X X X 
Cotton X X X 
Tobacco X 
Rice X X X 
1970: 
Wheat X X X 
Com X X X 
Grain Sorghum X X X 
Oats X X 
Barley X X X 
Cotton X X X 
Tobacco X 
Rice X X X 
172 
1971: 
Wheat X X 
Corn X X 
Grain Sorghum X X 
Oats X 
Barley X X 
Cotton X X 
Tobacco X 
Rice X X X 
1972: 
Wheat X X 
Corn X X 
Grain Sorghum X X 
Oats X 
Barley X X 
Cotton X X 
Tobacco X 
Rice X X X 
This data set was constructed from information contained in the Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac, Volumes 8-29, and from Cochrane and Ryan (1978). 
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TABLE 7.2 
(I) Price floor 
(1,2) Price floor with: acreage allotments 
(1 ,2,3) Price floor with: acreage allotments 
marketing quotas 
(1,2,3,4) Price floor with: acreage allotments 
marketing quotas 
Soil Bank 
(1 ,2,5) Price floor with: acreage allotments 
acreage retirement 
(1,2,3,5) Price floor with: acreage allotments 
marketing quotas 
acreage retirement 
(6) Poundage quota 
(8,2) Income payments with: acreage allotments 
(8,2,5) Income payments with: acreage allotments 
acreage retirement 
(8,2,4,5) Income payments with: acreage allotments 
marketing quotas 
acreage retirement 
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angular shifts in the supply curve upward. Each shift represents the added effect of a 
production control method. The method that causes a particular shift is indicated between the 
production levels associated with the shift and the level prior to the shift. Whenever applicable, 
the effect of a marketing quota (3) is similarly indicated. I also depict a poundage quota (6) in 
Figure 7.3f; a poundage quota approximates a production quota and so can be interpreted as a 
binding marketing quota. 
Notice that the instruments illustrated in Figures 7.3a through 7.3f all involve a price floor, 
but more importantly, differ in terms of the degree of control over production. They have been 
presented sequentially in terms of increasing degree of control. A price floor with acreage 
allotments is the least restrictive, a price floor with acreage allotments and marketing quotas the 
next least restrictive, etc.Z Oearly, these instruments can be classified in ascending order 
according to their associated degree of production control. 
The same can be done for those income payments based instruments. Income payments 
with acreage allotments, marketing quotas, and acreage retirement are the most restrictive, 
income payments with acreage allotments and acreage retirement the next most restrictive, 
income payments with acreage allotments the third most restrictive, and income payments with 
the set aside the least restrictive. 
The acreage retirement programs associated with income payments schemes were in 
general less restrictive than those associated with a price floor. In any case, they were never 
more restrictive. For example, if under the former, a farmer were required to withdraw twenty 
percent of his allotment to a crop, then under the latter he would have been required to 
withdraw, say, ten to fifteen percent. 
In Table 7.3, I classify all the instruments according to their fundamental method of 
support-whether it is price floor or income payments based-and the degree of production 
control. The price floor based instruments are ordered in terms of increasing degree of control; 
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the income payments based instruments are arranged in reverse order. Again, to facilitate the 
discussion, I have numbered the instruments M 1 through M 11; M 1 through M7 are price floor-
based while M 8 through M 11 are income payments-based. 
TABLE 7.3 
No. Price Floor No. Income Payments 
M1 1 M8 8,2,3,5 
M2 1,2 M9 8,2,5 
M3 1,2,3 M10 8,2 




This brief description of the different price support methods adopted during the period sets 
the stage for an empirical analysis of instrument choice in the aforementioned agricultural 
markets. The instruments M 1 through M 11 can be organized into several classes with each 
class representing a certain degree of control. For example, M 1, M2, and M 11 can be classified 
as weak controls, M 3, M 4, and M9 as mild controls, and the rest as stringent controls. Numbers 
can be assigned to the different classes to create a discrete variable. The variable can then be 
used as a dependent variable in a limited dependent variable regression. A dummy independent 
variable can be used to account for differences in regimes-whether a price floor or income 
payments was the fundamental method of support. 
The objective of the regression is to test possible implications of predictions of the 
instrument choice model in chapter six. These implications are discussed in detail in the next 
section. 
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C. The Hypotheses: 
The comparative static results in chapter six suggest certain hypotheses about the choice of 
price support methods for the eight agricultural commodities. I emphasize that the hypotheses 
to be tested are suggestions and not predictions. In the theoretical model, the decision-maker is 
a single legislator. In the econometric model below, I implicitly assume that the appropriate 
subcommittee makes the choice of instrument, e.g., the wheat subcommittee decides what 
method to use for wheat. Thus, in effect, I assume that the selected political and economic 
variables affect the subcommittee's choice in the same way that they affect a single legislator, 
that there are no serious conflicts between the subcommittees, and that bargaining between the 
Agricultural Committee and the Chamber is for levels of support or payments (whichever is 
applicable) only. 
The propositions in chapter six deal with the choice of production control method(s) 
conditional on a price floor. Propositions 6.1 , 6.2, and 6.3 indicate that differences in demand 
and supply elasticities (at the free market level) affect the choice between a (pure) price floor 
and a production quota. The more inelastic demand is and/or the more elastic supply is, the 
more likely it is that the latter will be used to support the price of a commodity. Since 
elasticities generally do not change much from one year to the next they can be viewed as 
economic determinants of cross sectional choice: why is commodity X supported via one 
instrument and commodity Y via another? 
Proposition 6.4 indicates that the average cost of maintaining the surplus affects the 
choice; proposition 6.6 (technological change) indirectly suggests that the magnitude of the 
surplus also affects the choice. The average cost and the magnitude of the surplus affect both 
the cross sectional and the temporal choice-shift in instruments over time-of instruments. 
A (pure) price floor and a production quota are two extremes. As explained earlier, a 
production quota is equivalent to a price floor combined with a binding marketing quota and 
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thus is a price fl.oor with the most stringent form of control on production. Proposition 6.6 
implies that some intermediate form may be adopted; a price fl.oor with milder production 
controls such as some reduction in acreage could be acceptable. Hence, one can imagine a 
spectrum of choices with a price fl.oor on one end, a production quota on the other, and a 
number of intermediate fonns in between. Figure 7.4 illustrates this. 
Price fl.oor 
FIGURE 7.4 
Price fl.oor with 
some acreage control 
Production quota 
The choice among production control methods suggested above transfers quite readily to 
an income payments regime. The conclusions of propositions 6.1, 6.3, and 6.4 still hold if a 
price floor were replaced by a (pure) income payments scheme, that is, if instead the choice 
were between an income payments scheme and a production quota.4 The same is true of 
proposition 6.2, though not as obvious. As discussed earlier, the gain of producers under either 
regime is the same; only the manner of payment differs. On the other hand, consumers lose less 
under the latter. This means that conditions (6.9a) and (6.9b) would certainly be satisfied (see 
chapter six) so that the conclusion of the proposition would remain valid: if demand were 
sufficiently inelastic, then a production quota would be chosen by a legislator over an income 
payments scheme. 
The conclusions of propositions 6.5 and 6.6 also follow through. In Figure 7.5, I depict the 
effect of acreage restrictions under an income payments regime. As with a price floor regime, 
the gain to producers falls-from (A + B + C + D + E + F + G + H +I+ J) to (A + B + C +H). 
The loss to consumers without the restrictions, L, is indicated by the area 
[(A + B + C + D + E + F +G)+ py(qs - q • )]. With the restrictions, the loss L' is 
p 








[ (E + F + G) + {(A + B ) + PT ( q;- q *')}]; the first term represents the loss in consumer surplus 
due to an increase in the equilibrium price top *' and the second term to the loss in taxes . Quite 
clearly, L' is less than L. That is, the imposition of acreage restrictions reduces the political 
pressure from consumers induced by the surplus. Hence, an income payments scheme could be 
favored over a production quota if acreage restrictions were imposed. Thus, the conclusion of 
proposition 6.6 would not be altered if a price floor were replaced by a (pure) income payments 
scheme. A similar argument could also be made for proposition 6.5. 
So far, I have dealt only with economic determinants. However, there are also political 
determinants. First, the theoretical model indicates that the ratio of rural to metropolitan 
Congressional districts is a principal political variable affecting the choice. Specifically, 
proposition 6.8 suggests that a decline in the ratio biases the choice toward instruments with 
milder production controls.5 Second, the President has some influence over the choice. 
Historically, Republican Presidents favored less controls while Democratic Presidents more 
controls. Although this is not implied by the model, it can be discerned directly from the 
debates on price support legislation; the President through the Secretary of Agriculture played 
an active part in the debates. 
The preceding discussion suggests the following hypotheses. 
H 1': The higher the average cost of maintaining the surplus, the greater the degree of control 
over production. 
H2': The greater the magnitude of the surplus, the greater the degree of control over 
production. 
H3': The larger the elasticity of demand for a commodity, the less restrictive production 
controls over the commodity. 
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H4': The larger the supply elasticity of a commodity, the more restrictive production controls 
over the commodity. 
H5': The smaller the number of rural Congressional districts relative to the number of 
metropolitan Congressional districts, the lesser the degree of control over production. 
H6': Control over production is less restrictive under a Republican President as opposed to a 
Democratic President. 
To test these hypotheses, I have divided the mixed instruments into three classes: (A) 
weak controls, (B) mild controls, and (C) stringent controls. The instruments are assigned to 
one of these classes. Table 7.4 shows where each is assigned. An instrument is assigned to 
class (A) if it involves little or no controls and to class (C) if it involves very restrictive 
controls. Instruments that are neither too restrictive nor too lax are assigned to class (B). 
TABLE 7.4 
Weak (A) Mild (B) Stringent (C) 
Ml (1) M3 (1,2,3) M5 (1,2,5) 
M2 (1,2) M4 (1,2,3,4) M6 (1,2,3,5) 
MlO (8,2) M9 (8,2,5) M7 (6) 
M7 (8,7) M8 (8,2,3,5) 
Notice that M 4 is in class (B) while M 6 and M 8 are in class (C). This is because the Soil 
Bank was much less restrictive than acreage retirement programs. As mentioned earlier, the 
former was voluntary while the latter were mandatory. M 4, M 6, and M 8 differ only in terms of 
their associated acreage reduction programs. The first involved the Soil Bank while the other 
two acreage retirement programs. Notice also that M 3 is in class (B) while M 5 is in class (C). 
M 5 is on the borderline between the two classes. I assigned it to class (C) to generate enough 
observations for that class. Figure 7.5 summarizes the relative restrictiveness of each mixed 
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instrument and the grouping of the instruments into classes. 
M 1 M 7 (M 2, M 10) 
Oass (A) 
FIGURE 7.6 
M9 M3 M4 
Class (B) 
M5 M8 M6 M7 
Class (C) 
Given this classification, the choice of instruments is simplified to a choice of classes. For 
example, if M7 were adopted for commodity X in 1972, then this will be interpreted as the 
subcommittee for commodity X choosing class (A) in 1972. An appropriate econometric model 
for analyzing a choice problem of this type is discussed in section D. 
D. An Econometric Analysis of the Choice of Instruments: 
An ordered probit model is suitable for studying the choice problem outlined above. In an 
ordered pro bit model, the dependent variable takes on a finite number of integer values (a 
categorical variable) and is ordered in some natural way, e.g., finished high school (1), went to 
college but did not complete (2), completed college (3), completed a graduate degree (4). 
Oasses (A), (B), and (C) have these properties. Class (B) includes instruments with stronger 
controls than class (A) and class (C) with even stronger controls than class (B). Assigning the 
integers 1, 2, and 3 to Classes (A), (B), and (C), respectively, thus results in an ordered, 
categorical, dependent variable. 
The ordered pro bit model is just a subclass within a more general class of models-
econometric models with discrete dependent variables. Such models are used to study 
relationships between a variable that takes on discrete values and other variables, some of which 
may likewise be discrete. The former is treated as the dependent variable and the latter as 
independent variables. The "gap" between the discrete dependent variable and the independent 
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variables (most of which are usually continuous) is bridged by some latent continuous variable. 
An example should clarify this. 
Assume one wishes to study the relationship between a variable Z where Z takes on values 
1, 2, or 3 and a set of variables V1 through VK. Suppose that there is some implicit variable z• 
that is related to the V K in the following way, 
where e is an error term. And suppose further that, 
{ 
1 if z• e R 1 
Z = 2: if z• e R 2 
3, if z• e R 3 
where the Ri are subsets of the real number line (assume for simplicity that the Ri are disjoint). 
Since z• is random then z is also random. That is, z is related to z• in the following way, 
Prob(Z = i) = Prob(Z* e Ri). 
Assume now that data is collected. Let (Zj, V !j, .... V Kj) represent the jth element in the data 
set (the jth observation). Then, if there are T observations in the data set of which T 1 
observations result in Z = 1, T2 in Z = 2, and T3 in Z = 3, then the likelihood that one will 
observe the data set is, 
T1 T2 T3 
L = TI Pr(Zj=1) · TI Pr(Z1 =2) · TI Pr(Zr=3> (7.1) 
j=! /=1 /'=! 
or equivalently, 
T1 T2 T3 
n . . . L = Pr(Zj e R 1) · TI Pr(ZI e R2) · TI Pr(Zr e R3). (7.2) 
j=! /=1 /'=! 
In an ordered probit model, the Ri in the above example are adjacent disjoint sets: 
R 1 = {x: x :$; u}; R2= {x: u <x :$; u'); R3 = {x: u' <x}.6 This is depicted in Figure 7.6. Hence, 
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the likelihood of observing the data set is given by the function, 
T1 T2 T3 
L = f1 Pr(z; ~ u) · f1 Pr(u < zj: ~ u') · f1 Pr(u' < zi,). 
j=1 j=1 j=1 
LetBVj =B 0 +B 1 • V{ + · · · +Bk · VK then (7.3) is equivalent to, 
T1 T2 
L = TI Pr(ej ~ u -BVj) · TI [Pr(e1 ~ u' -BVI) -Pr(e1 ~ u -BVI)] · 
j~ ~~ 
T3 
TI [1-Pr(er ~ u' -BV~')]. 
/'=1 
Since the error tenn in an ordered probit model is assumed to be nonnally distributed with 
mean zero and variance one, then (7.3') reduces to, 
T1 T2 
L = f1 <l>(u- BVj) · f1 [<l>(u' -BVI)- <l>(u -BVi')] · 
j=1 /=1 
T3 
f1 [1- <l>(u' -BV~')] 
/'=1 
where <1> is the cumulative distribution function of a standard nonnal random variable. 
FIGURE7.7 
Rl R2 R3 




model of the choice among classes (A), (B), and (C). More specifically, let Zc, be the choice of 
the c th subcommittee at time t, then the dependent variable Zc, is equal to one (two;three) if the 
c th subcommittee at time t chooses some mixed instrument in class (A) (B); C). The 
independent variables (the VK in (7.4)) are given in Table 7.5. The hypotheses that each is 
designed to test and the "predicted" sign of the corresponding coefficient of each are also 
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TABLE 7.5· 
Independent Hypothesis "Predicted" Sign 
Variables to be Tested of Coefficient 
Real average cost of 
maintaining the surplus (AC) Hl + 
Surplus as percent of 
total production (SURP) Hi + 
Demand elasticity (DE) H3' + 
Supply elasticity (SE) H4 ' + 
Ratio of rural to metropolitan 
' Congressional districts (RURMEF) H5 + 
Presidency (PRES) •• H6 ' 
Dummy for shift to income payments 
from price floor regime (y) ••• 
* Data for SURP comes from Cochrane and Ryan (1976), for DE and SE from the Staff 
Report of the Food and Agricultural Policy Branch of the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(1985), for RURMET from McCubbins and Schwartz (1985), and for PRES from the 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 8-29. The real average cost was computed using 
total cost infonnation from Cochrane and Ryan and the wholesale price index for farm 
products (U.S. Statistical Abstract, 1955-77); total cost was divided by the surplus and the 
result deflated by the index. SURP was computed by dividing surplus by total production; 
data for the surplus and production were taken from Cochrane and Ryan (1978) and from 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture Publication "Feed: Outlook and Situation Yearbook" 
(1985). 
** This takes a value 1 if the President is Republican and 0 if he is a Democrat. 
***This takes a value 2 for an income payments regime and 1 for a price floor regime. 
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indicated in the table. Note that the expected sign for demand elasticity is positive though the 
hypothesis H3' indicates otherwise. This is not inconsistent. Demand elasticities were 
specified in negative rather than absolute values, the latter being the true definition of demand 
elasticity. If absolute values were used, then the predicted sign would be negative. 
The true relationship between Zcr and the independent variables is assumed to be implicitly 
defined by 
z;, =B o +B !ACc<t-1) + BzSURPc(t-1) + B -j)Ec(t-1) + B4SEc(t-1) + B sPRES (t-1) + 
+BJWRMET(t-!)+e1 • (7.5) 
where z;, bridges the gap between Zc1 and the independent variables. Equation (7.5) specifies 
that the choice of instrument at time t depends on the values of the independent variables at 
time (t- 1). This is appropriate since the timet choice is made in the preceding period. 
The parameters Bk are estimated using the technique of maximum likelihood. This 
involves deriving the first order derivatives of the function L (or its natural logarithm) in (7.4) 
with respect to all the parameters and setting them equal to zero. The values of the parameters 
that solve the resulting equations (the first order conditions) maximize the likelihood of 
observing the data set.7 These values are called the maximum likelihood estimators of the 
parameters. Maximum likelihood estimators have desirable properties, among which are 
asymptotic consistency and asymptotic efficiency. Thus, assuming the data set is "sufficiently 
large," the estimators give a good approximation of the true values of the parameters; in 
particular, they indicate the true signs-whether positive or negative-of the parameters. 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters are indicated in Table 7.6 and their 
corresponding asymptotic t statistics in parentheses. The coefficients of the average cost and 
the magnitude of the surplus both have the correct signs. Likewise, the elasticity coefficients 
and the coefficient of the Presidency variable have the correct signs. The t -statistics 
corresponding to the average cost and the magnitude of the surplus, as well as to the presidency, 
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TABLE 7.6 
Independent Estimated Asymptotic 
Variable Coefficient t -Statistic 
Constant 0.0678187 0.1273905 
ACc(t-1) .0801967 2.4906761 
SURPc(t-1) 1.0927777 4.5652057 
DEc(t-1) .4441556 1.9742095 
SEc<t-1) .6308068 1.3628031 
RURMET (t-1) -.0699424 -.2106846 
PRES<1_ 1l -.8395725 -4.0783627 
Threshold• 1.7116879 9.6444528 
* This is an estimate of the parameter u'; u is automatically set to zero. 
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are significant at the 1 percent level. The statistics corresponding to the demand and supply 
elasticities are significant at the 2.5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. In other words, 
HI', H2', H3', H 4', and H6' should be "accepted."8 
The coefficient of the variable RURMET has the wrong sign. But the corresponding 
t -statistic strongly indicates that the variable has no consequential effect on the choice of 
instruments. That is, H 5' should be rejected. It may be the case that the decline in the ratio of 
rural to metropolitan Congressional districts played a more important role in the bargaining 
between rural and urban legislators and only a minor role in the subcommittee deliberations, 
where the choice of instruments was generally ironed out. 
The statistical evidence presented in this chapter tends to support the implications of my 
proposed instrument choice model. The model suggests specific relationships between the 
degree of control over production and certain economic and political variables. The evidence 
supports the suggestions. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The Set Aside program was also mandatory. 
2. Because of its mandatory nature, an acreage retirement program resulted in a larger 
reduction in acreage than the Soil Bank. 
3. The latter two are roughly descriptive of the way price support legislation works. 
4. The proofs are essentially the same. It is not clear whether the proof of proposition 6.5 
would also go through. For the empirical analysis, it does not really matter whether it 
does; the impact of technological change is not tested directly. 
5. This assumes, of course, that less controls are accompanied by lower price support levels. 
Again, this tends to be the case. 
6. The term u is assumed to be zero. This does not affect the results as long as one of the 
regressors is a constant 
7. The log likelihood of L is guaranteed to be globally concave, and so the solutions to the 
first order conditions are maximizers of L . 
8. Some caution must be exercised in interpreting the effect of the elasticities. Due to the 
unavailability of elasticity estimates for each of the twenty years for all but one of the 
commodities, the same elasticity estimates were used for all the years. The estimates come 
from the FAPSIM (farm policy simulator) model recently developed by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. I was able to get estimates of the supply elasticity of tobacco 
for the mid to the late fifties. I used this estimate for the first part of the period ( 1952-63) 
and the USDA estimate for the second part of the period (1965-72). 
Note, though, that deleting the elasticity variables does not alter the results (qualitatively) 
for the remaining variables. The regression estimates without the elasticity variables are 
shown below; H 5' is once again rejected, but the rest are "accepted" at the one percent 
level. 
Variables Estimated Coefficient t -Statistic 
Constant 0.0315296 0.0742539 
ACc<t-!) .0840030 2.8764678 
SURPc<H> 1.3595608 6.9421323 
PRES<t-!) -.8518403 -4.2574512 
RURMET<H> -.1723448 -.5522314 
Threshold 1.6829895 9.6023266 
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9. I have not investigated and will not investigate the choice between a price floor and an 
income payments scheme. Cochrane (1978) has argued elsewhere that the switch to the 
latter was motivated by the desire of farmers to regain the loss in export shares propagated 
during price floor regimes. A price floor regime induces farmers to sell to the government 




This manuscript has been about price supports: why they exist and why they are 
implemented in different ways across markets and over time in a specific market. The first four 
chapters of the manuscript were devoted to the first question, existence, and the last two 
chapters to the second, the choice of regulatory instrument. One chapter, the fifth, bridged the 
gap between the two parts. 
In the first chapter, I presented the basic argument forwarded by economists to rationalize 
the existence of price supports. I argued that their contention is flawed because it assumes a 
mechanism inconsistent with the way price support programs actually work. In chapter two, I 
discussed an alternative rationale: two types of models that political scientists might use to 
explain why policy outcomes might be inefficient. I pointed out their weaknesses, namely, that 
they fail to adequately account for the obvious link between economic forces , the preferences of 
decision makers, and policy outcomes, and that they assume a world in which either pure 
cooperation among or pure conflict between legislators is the norm. In chapter three, I 
identified conditions sufficient for legislators with naturally conflicting preferences to form a 
winning coalition in order to guarantee passage of a mutually beneficial package of bills. In 
chapter four, I then developed a model better suited for explaining the existence of price 
supports and derived comparative static results from which certain hypotheses were generated. 
I tested some of the hypotheses against data from U.S. feed grains markets and found the test 
results consistent with the hypotheses. The model rectified the deficiencies of the political 
models and, on the basis of arguments in chapter three, assumed some form of bargaining 
between legislators with conflicting interests-those who favor price supports and those who do 
not-is possible. 
The economic literature on regulation has dealt mostly with the inefficiency problem. In 
particular, the traditional economic cost-benefit approach to regulation and the new economic 
theory of regulation focus principally on the problem. In chapter five, I summarized and 
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criticized the two models at the cutting edge of the new theory, the Stigler/Peltzman model and 
the Becker model. Both recognize the connection between economic factors and policy 
outcomes but, unfortunately, de-emphasize the role of political institutions in shaping policies. 
Thus, neither deals satisfactorily with the problem. And so neither is a better alternative to my 
proposed existence model. 
Regulation takes many forms. But with few exceptions political scientists have 
downplayed this characteristic. They have been mainly concerned with the study of inefficient 
policy outcomes. In one way or another most economists are equally guilty. Stigler and 
Peltzman, for instance, implicitly assume that differences in regulatory form are unimportant. 
Becker deals with these differences. But he does so simplistically since he assumes that the 
influence of institutions is inconsequential. In sum, existing models cannot adequately address 
the instrument choice problem. 
In chapter six, I constructed one such model. Roughly speaking, the model generalized my 
existence model and expanded the latter in a way that made it suitable for analyzing the choice 
of regulatory instrument. To some extent, it could be viewed as a natural extension of the 
Stigler/Peltzman model. I concluded the chapter with an application of the model to the choice 
of production control methods in the implementation of a price support program. I derived a 
series of comparative statics results, which I then used in chapter seven to generate hypotheses 
about the nature of production control over eight agricultural commodities whose prices where 
supported during the twenty-year period, 1953-72. I undertook an econometric analysis of the 
data for these commodities during the said period and basically concluded that the data could 
not reject the hypotheses. 
Although the manuscript deals mainly with price supports, its principal contributions are 
easily generalizable. These are, first of all, the bargaining power of a committee within an 
institutionally constrained legislature, and second, the choice of instruments in the regulation of 
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markets. 
For all its power, Shepsle's model of a legislature does not satisfactorily explain how small 
minorities--that is, committees--secure legislative majorities, even though it may account for 
stable outcomes. By insisting on the radical independence of policy dimensions (the orthogonal 
basis vectors), it fails to appreciate the significance of the ability to trade across jurisdictions 
and thus fails to account for the actual occurrences oflogrolling arrangements, implicit or 
explicit, among legislators. I have partially rectified this deficiency by introducing the notion of 
an extraneous jurisdiction within the model's framework. A jurisdiction is a policy issue over 
which a committee has authority; it is extraneous if it does not yield benefits to constituents of 
legislators within the committee but could potentially benefit constituents oflegislators outside 
the committee. I have shown that, under fairly weak conditions, a committee could use an 
extraneous jurisdiction to create and successfully defend a winning coalition with 
noncommittee members. 
Jurisdictional arrangements are generally taken as a given in most studies of Congress. 
The enormous workload of Congress requires an appropriate division of labor whereby 
committees specialize (and presumably have some comparative advantage) in certain areas of 
legislation. This results in a mapping of committees to jurisdictions. However, the mapping 
may not be as neat as has been presumed. If part of the power of a committee lies in its control 
over an extraneous jurisdiction, then it would seem that some competition for that jurisdiction 
would take place. Indeed, this appears to be the case for food stamps. I think that it is 
worthwhile to study the nature of such competition, for it adds a new dimension to the 
institutional world of Shepsle. As legislation becomes more complex, new jurisdictions will be 
created, some and perhaps many of which will fall into II gray areas. II Competition is then likely 
to result. 
A regulatory policy is instrument dependent. That is, it cannot be divorced from the 
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method of implementation. One simply cannot talk concretely about a particular regulation 
without discussing how it is to be implemented. Price support policy is invariably associated 
with price floors, income payment schemes, and acreage restrictions. Likewise, trade policy is 
characterized by tariffs, import quotas, and a variety of other instruments. A positive theory of 
regulation must of necessity account for such variation. 
I have taken a step in this direction by developing an instrument choice model for an 
individual legislator. However, more work needs to be done on the instrument choice problem. 
Like Stigler (1970) and Peltzman (1976), I essentially bypassed the legislative process in 
deriving my conclusions. But, as I indicated in chapter four, the elements within and the nature 
of the process play a significant role in determining policy outcomes. Specifically, the choice of 
instrument is made at the very least by a subcommittee, not just a single legislator. The 
subcommittee must choose both the instrument and the appropriate tax rate. Assuming the 
members of the subcommittee are sophisticated enough, they will realize that the tax rate that 
will be chosen for each instrument will correpond to the choice of the median voter under the 
instrument. Thus, each will choose that instrument which yields the highest gain at the 
corresponding median voter tax rate. Certain conditions will determine which instrument 
generates the most votes for a legislator. I speculate that the composition of the subcommittee 
will have some impact on the choice. For example, in the case of price support policy, a 
production quota is biased in favor of consumers since it yields lower losses and gains relative 
to a price floor at the same price support level. Thus, if the subcommittee is staffed with 
legislators who are only mildly supportive of farmers, then given a choice between a price floor 
and a production quota, it would choose the latter. 
Although my dissertation focuses on price support policy, it does have some implications 
for policy analysis in general. With some adjustments, the methodology I use can probably be 
adopted in studying other policies. Ultimately, my goal in writing this manuscript is to 
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convince others that a better understanding of the policy process, particularly the restrictions 
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